

JOHN FOSTER DULLES: THE LAST YEAR

FOREWORD BY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Eleanor Lansing Dulles



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John Foster Dulles: The Last Year


Foreword by Dwight D. Eisenhower

One of the most powerful—and puzzling—political figures of our time, John Foster Dulles, is revealed in this unusual biography by his sister, who writes with intimacy and tenderness, but also with the relentless perspective of an experienced historian. The story of his life—as a Presbyterian minister's son playing *Pilgrim's Progress* in village fields, as a prize Princeton scholar, as an eager young lawyer, and finally as a Secretary of State—is illuminated brilliantly against the backdrop of his last year, when Khrushchev challenged the West and a stubborn, dying man stood in his way.

Eleanor Dulles's access to family records, the Secretary's private archives and correspondence, and many revealing interviews with his associates have given the narrative importance for the layman and the scholar. Here are descriptions of the Secretary's relationship with President Eisenhower, his handling of the McCarthy challenge to the State Department, his negotiations with Khrushchev, Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Chiang Kai-shek, his behavior in time of danger—as in the Berlin, Lebanon, and Quemoy-Matsu crises of 1957-1958. As his sister compares the "public image" of the stern righteous crusader with the warmhearted man she knew, there emerges a striking portrait of one of the most influential and controversial figures of the twentieth century.

*Photograph of John Foster Dulles on front
of jacket by Alfred Eisenstaedt*

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John Foster Dulles: The Last Year

DEC 1963



JOHN FOSTER DULLES:
The Last Year



ELEANOR LANSING DULLES

Foreword by Dwight D. Eisenhower

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To Janet

FOREWORD

During my eight years as President I was privileged to have about me a remarkable group of dedicated public servants. Among the foremost of these was a man whom I have often referred to as one of the great Secretaries of State in United States history, John Foster Dulles.

From the beginning of my Administration—and even before that—our relations were close. In the six years that I was privileged to work with him, this relationship grew steadily in warmth and understanding.

By Constitutional provision ultimate responsibility for conduct of foreign affairs rests with the President. Nevertheless, the nature of a President's duties carries him into a multitude of fields other than that of foreign relations, and responsibility for much of the original policy planning in international affairs rests with his Secretary of State. In this field Foster Dulles was imaginative, forceful, and realistic. Possessed of a keen mind, a lifelong interest in foreign relations, and a complete dedication to the United States and to free institutions everywhere, Foster's grasp of the relationship between foreign relations and the other aspects of national security was remarkable indeed.

A story of the final year of this valiant man's life is called for as a contribution to the history of the period, and I congratulate Mrs. Eleanor Dulles upon producing this volume.



Gettysburg
June 17, 1963

PREFACE

In writing this book I have consulted many people, who have been generous enough to devote time and attention to the book in its various formative stages. I have acknowledged certain interviews and letters in a note on sources. I cannot assume that I have correctly recorded views or fully reconstructed the situations reflected in these consultations, though it has been my effort to give a clear impression of the information and opinions presented to me.

I have received help of inestimable value from those who turned their minds, not only to the substance, but also to the more tedious and mechanical aspects of producing the book, including editing and reading proof. Among those who have helped me in the later stages are Addice Thomas, Pamela Dulles, Joseph Mott, Phyllis Bernau, Millie Asbjornson, Philip Crowl, Mary Pircher, Blythe Finke, and others, who know, I am sure, how much I value their help. I shall always be grateful for the patience and helpfulness of Miss Gertrude Rotter and Miss Aurelie Rotter.

For the rest, my purpose in writing is explained in "The Needs of History." I cannot record, however, the help that I have had, over the years, which has gone to mold not only the particular make-up and conclusions to be found here, but the entire background of my thinking in approaching this account of my brother's last year, and the factors that contributed to his outlook and efforts at that time. There is no full accounting possible in the world of intellectual effort.

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John Foster Dulles: The Last Year

THE NEEDS OF HISTORY

"Truth is various in its extent, its modes and its relevance."

—Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*

The dilemma of the biographer and of the historian is that he writes either too soon or too late. If he waits until the shape of events and the stature of men can be viewed from a distance with perspective, he will find that the footprints in the sand have been obliterated and even the tracings on the harder rocks of history have no clear delineation. Those who have gone by in their hurried passage toward the future have become increasingly impatient with history and have blurred unwittingly the signs of the past. If the biographer writes soon, he can capture the flavor of the years; he can record some detail that may reveal the causes of events. He is, by the very fact of being in the struggle about which he is writing, moved by the ambitions, envies, hopes, affections, and fears that are the pulse and the motive forces of the contemporary scene.

My brother John Foster Dulles, in planning for the gift of his papers to Princeton University, was aware of the importance of history and of these facts. He was almost alone among public figures in setting no time limit before which his private papers would be open to the research worker and the scholar. The arrangements he had contemplated before 1955 and until his death in 1959 showed his active interest in the requirements of history.

In his instructions to the committee of five young men charged with the control of the collection, he said:

Access to my personal papers, for the purpose of furthering bona fide research in the field of history, political science, international relations or related subjects, shall be granted as widely as possible. The presumption should be that access should be granted in any particular instance unless a compelling reason exists, in your opinion, to withhold such access. Access shall be unlimited after the expiration of twenty-five years from the date of my death. . . . It is not my intention that the functions and control which I have

given your committee shall be exercised other than to insure that the material from my private papers is publicly presented in a factually accurate manner. Specifically, I do not intend that you shall apply any other test to material presented to you for approval [of publication, also under the control of the committee] than the determination that source material is factually accurate and sufficiently complete to present a true picture. It is my hope that your exercise of your functions and control will facilitate productive research work in and publication from my papers by any person with a legitimate interest in so doing, rather than to hinder and discourage such work.

Foster's interest in historical research, evidenced by the way he kept his notes and papers, may be traced from his ready agreement to the suggestion made by President Harold Dodds and William S. Dix, librarian, in a letter of February 16, 1955, that he place his papers in a special collection at Princeton. The correspondence was intermittent but active from that time until the final agreements to turn over the later papers, including the microfilms of most of the related state documents, to the library. John W. Hanes, Jr., acted for Foster in many of these dealings. Account was taken of the Presidential library to be set up in Abilene, Kansas, to house the Eisenhower papers, and those Dulles papers considered to be properly a part of the Abilene collection were shipped there. Arrangements for duplicating some for the John Foster Dulles Library of Diplomatic History at Princeton are now contemplated. On September 16, 1957, Foster wrote to Dix: "I shall try to get busy on the deed of gift." By July 25, 1958, the major agreement for the collection of personal papers had been drafted, and consultations in the Cabinet were under way to permit the eventual rewording of the Presidential executive order that controlled the use of official papers.

There was far from unanimity in the Cabinet and in the controlling organs of government about the lightening of these restrictions, although the intent of the wording had been strained to the legal limit to permit use by historians seeking information in official sources. Executive Order 10501 of November 5, 1953, based on an earlier order, read in part that knowledge or possession of defense classified information should be "permitted only to persons whose official duties require access in the interest of promoting national defense." These words clearly excluded the use of such material to those nonofficial historians or biographers who might otherwise have been cleared or given access. It was widely recognized in government circles that these restrictions were unnecessarily rigid and would prevent the use

of sources no longer requiring high classification, if any, and would thus delay the presentation of the true historical picture for some fifteen or even twenty-five years after classification automatically expires.

A determined effort was exerted between 1955 and 1959 to modify the order in the interest of wider use, and as a result the new order, 10816, adopted in 1959, read that an agency may permit persons outside the executive branch, performing functions in connection with historical research, to have access to classified defense information with that agency if that agency determines that "access to the information will be clearly consistent with the interests of national defense. . . ." The White House release of May 8, 1959, indicates that this was to lessen the restrictions of the narrower criterion and make it clear that the "Executive Order is not intended to deny access to classified information to trustworthy persons engaged in historical research." Thus a positive approach was embodied in the wording that emerged, designed to "encourage historical research."

This agreement was reached during the time of Foster's intense interest in the collection and shortly after he had been informed that Clarence Dillon, his long-standing friend, was heading a group to construct a wing to the Firestone Library at Princeton to house the "Dulles papers." One of the other agreements executed in May had been signed on April 5 at Hobe Sound, Florida, in a hand less firm than his usual flowing style.

Foster's long-standing concern for diplomatic history had been grounded on his conclusion that the lesson of the peace treaty of Versailles had been imperfectly learned, that Wilson's struggle for the League of Nations had not had adequate meaning for later diplomats, and that policy makers were often prone to ignore the past. He also knew that papers disappeared. One Secretary of State took his away with him.

It was his conviction that if the public in general and its chosen leaders in international affairs had a better understanding of the forces at work and the basis for a just peace, the world could move forward with new energy and faith. In this spirit he suggested that the inscription on the walls of the new library should read:

This nation of ours is not merely a self-serving society but was founded with a mission to help build a world where liberty and justice would prevail.

Love of peace by itself has never been sufficient to deter war. There can never, in the long run, be real peace unless there is justice and law and the will and the capacity to use force to punish

the aggressor. The task of winning peace and its necessary component, justice, is one which demands our finest efforts.

Foster's writing on May 13 on another of the papers connected with the library was one of his last acts before his death. I remember being surprised at the vitality of his interest and at his pleasure over the architect's sketches shown him in final form in May—he was “delighted,” he said. He had talked to Dr. Philip Crowl, who was to be loaned by the Defense Department to Princeton to help arrange the papers. He had spoken to Clarence Dillon about his important gift; he had kept in touch with John Hanes about many aspects of the arrangement and knew that all the substantive agreements were by then in good shape—the final paper was signed in July, after his death.

The committee had been chosen in December 1957: his son, John W. F. Dulles; John W. Hanes, Jr.; William B. Macomber, Jr.; Roderic L. O'Connor; and John R. Stevenson—all young men capable of acting in the spirit of the gift, and ready to serve for many years. In devoting his time and thought to these matters over a considerable period, he was mindful of the Biblical words “the truth shall make you free.” Thus two vastly different buildings appropriately associated with Foster now stand as memorials: the Gothic rooms at Princeton and the wing-high architectural triumph of the late Eero Saarinen, the Dulles International Airport at Washington.

Thinking over these things, the events of the times, the insight, the dedication, and the inspiration that I found my brother had given to men in remote places in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, I came to the conclusion that I would endeavor to recapture in a book some of his spirit, and record a part of his convictions. It was while I was driving over the golden sands of northern Peru, with one of the junior State Department officials, that I became persuaded that I should make the difficult effort to write this book. This young man urged me to add my note to the record.

I was aware of the handicaps under which I would suffer. I had deeply admired and loved my brother. I had, however, for reasons implicit in my own attitude toward life, decided to make my own life, completely independent of his. Thus I was far away for many years, working in different fields, until after I had gone to Washington for the Social Security Board in 1936, and then to the Department of State in 1942. The ties that pulled us together during my early professional life were rooted in our affection and veneration for our parents, which bound the five of us—Foster, Margaret, Allen,

myself, and Nataline—through the years. Then, as both a help and complication to my association with him, I had worked in the Department of State under him while he was Secretary from 1953 until 1959. I brought to this period, from 1942 to 1952, many friends and associations that were unknown to him and yet with which he became deeply involved. Twice I gathered together State Department friends and associates, assistant secretaries, experts, economists, and others at my house to give him an opportunity to talk informally as he took on special tasks for the Department of State.

The special nature of my contacts cannot be brushed aside. In some ways they limit my perspective. Nevertheless, it is my belief that what I can contribute to the understanding of the work of the man can benefit more from the personal experience; the knowledge of some otherwise forgotten detail may outweigh the fact and bias of my personal involvement in the various actions and decisions. If it is impossible for a current biographer to be impartial and to write without feeling, it is still true that these feelings and judgments are in a sense a part of the story. My relationship, whatever it means as a special point of view, does not diminish my experience in research.

Interpretation, whether by friend or critic, is essentially colored by one's own experience—in my case by sailing days, by laughter in the afternoon, by serious talk of the nature of man and of the spiritual forces that will shape the future. It is inevitable, in thinking of a brother, that one remembers a quick turn of phrase, a friendly word, a helpful act. I remember many of these words and gestures. I can recall the time I let the jib sheet run and it burned my hands, and his look of surprise at my clumsiness as the yawl fouled the buoy. I can still see his puzzled look as I explained some Berlin matter that was completely illogical but in fact correct; his look of pleasure as he bent over the beautiful inlaid box, a present from the Austrian treaty days, which he had given me for my birthday in June 1955. "Why was I so generous," he teased me, "it is a lovely thing."

All of these flashes of sight and sound and movement go to make up the nature of the man—vital, forceful, eager, full of personality and special ways and thoughts, of care for his wife, his sisters, his brother, his children, his grandchildren; a man who sang the hymns loved by his father and mother and who wept openly at the time of their death.

These elements do not necessarily make the statesman, but when they are translated into other areas, they are manifest in many things—the desire for advice on a speech, a lunchtime family consultation

on an early draft of the Japanese peace treaty, solicitude for the health of a Foreign Service officer, loans that were really gifts to those he knew were in trouble.

Perhaps the future biographer will be able to catch some of this feeling from his letters. There are many that show the personal solicitude he had for others, and his eager anticipation of friendly meetings, his pleasure in the thought of future excursions and family reunions. Perhaps a biographer will get, later, from the revealing conferences with the press a sense of the game and the keen enjoyment of mental effort on both sides of any question. Some of his staff will tell in later years of the hazardous episodes in flying, the quick enjoyment of a swim or a sail in a foreign country. The writer in years to come, if he is not misled by the repetitive clichés, the misconstrued and misquoted phrases, may discard the suggestion that he was a lawyer at the cost of being human and that he was not a complex personality; his beliefs were simple and direct, almost unsophisticated in the form in which they were expressed to the public. Certainly his faith in the nature of man and his concern for the search for freedom can be understood by all those who set his phrases in a broad context. These words have an enduring force and meaning. Perhaps the many in lands bordering on the areas of tyranny will come to know, as some do already, that he was dedicating himself to their future.

I have been persuaded by friends who knew of my double connection with Foster, personal and professional, to try to combine them both in one narrative. It is true that I was never present at one of the more important conferences. I did not attend the small meetings of the top officials, but I had frequent and frank talks with him. In connection with the work of the German Office in the Department, to which I was assigned for seven years, I had appropriate and official contacts with his office, sitting in on meetings with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, with Willy Brandt, Mayor of Berlin, and others who came to Washington. In the news conferences I could occasionally get the broader picture at first hand. I did spend most of my waking hours in the years from 1953 to 1959 with those who worked with him or under him. In my daily contacts with those who dealt with him most intimately I knew the nature of their relations with him on speeches, preparation for conferences, in testimony on the Hill. I knew of his distress when he was misquoted. I knew of his burning desire to explain to Congress, to the American public, and to the world what he thought were the bases of our policy and what were the goals of the nation.

I have chosen for my review a year of vital decisions, his last

full year of service. It is a year that reflects in a remarkable manner the results of most of his former experience, study, and development up to that time. It seemed to me advisable to limit my effort to a short part of my brother's life. Others will follow with more definitive studies. They will devote their time to a scrutiny of his writings and his work over several decades. They will analyze and summarize his policies. This is not the task I have undertaken, neither am I trying to laud him for those qualities that, I thought, made him a notable figure.

Thus, having been persuaded, I tell my story of my brother as I saw him. Perhaps it was not in the spirit of today for a man to be so sure of his responsibilities and his aims as Foster was. In fact, his principles were long-range, and the day-to-day requirements sometimes seemed an interruption to him in his concentration on the larger view. While he bowed to necessity and recognized the limits to his power, he did not bend his beliefs to fit the opinions of the inexperienced observer or those who were not willing to study with him the deeper implications of national policy.

The firmness of his position derives in part from the fact that he was not mainly the product of one group or of any casual series of associations; he was in a sense welded from the puritan tradition, and felt he would be without a rudder if forced by circumstance to alter his fundamental ideas. He saw no necessity to do so. He was not a man of Wall Street; he was more a man of Watertown, New York, who came to know London, Paris, Berlin, and New York—but not as a child of the city. He was a product of the Calvinistic American tradition, who came early to appreciate divergent strains of European and Oriental thought.

He came close to being, as time went on, a completely logical man. He brought to a world of contending dictatorships and democracy a sense of men's personal responsibilities for the defense of freedom, a conviction that excellence was required of him, that he must use the talents of mind, inheritance, and education he had been privileged to receive. To do less would have been to betray not only his family, but his fellow citizens and his religion as well.

For those who, for reasons of their own philosophy or mere indifference, wished to play down the role of the individual, he had little patience. While he knew that many were embarrassed by the words "duty" and "righteousness," he was not afraid of them. He even believed that there was an intellectual elite to which many could belong, an elite of those who should make a special effort to exert leadership.

Those who did not approach foreign policy with his sense of mission at times felt uncomfortable in his presence. If one of his assistants said, "There is no use arguing with him," it was the result of a misunderstanding. He thought both sides of an important question should be vigorously defended, even if for a time it meant he sometimes argued a line he did not believe in. This would occasionally surprise his staff. He often stuck to his point if he thought the contrary arguments unsound, but he on many occasions changed his estimate of a situation, his tactics, or his timing. Less often would he alter his aims and goals. There was little use in trying to shake him from his basic convictions. Neither his own staff nor the men in the Kremlin could make much headway in that direction. But the love of argument was with him from childhood. He always respected those who would challenge his view and bring forward new facts or a well-articulated contrasting analysis.

Although he was not conscious of a desire for personal power for its own sake, he did try to control and redirect world forces of great magnitude. This was a bold and dangerous thing to attempt. It aroused both fear and admiration. It is because he did, at crucial moments, and always acting with the President, change the tide of events that the study of his life is worthwhile, the account worth the telling.

It is the intent of this chronological narrative of a short space of time to supplement by reference to preceding events words or incidents that may show how preparation and anticipation made possible the swift action taken on various occasions. It is also intended to bring together those personal anecdotes that reflect a mood and a character, which can help in the understanding of Foster's capacity, aims, and style of performance. Since it is the *whole man* who acts and decides, the bare outlines of principles and policies cannot be appreciated in their full meaning without some understanding of the man who was Secretary of State. Moreover, the policies themselves take on added significance if the man who helped to shape them is seen as a three-dimensional person. While this study is not mainly a biography and not primarily a study of American foreign policy, it is designed to show how the interests of a man in family, religion, friends, sport, travel, history, and philosophy made him the recognized craftsman in the making of foreign policy. The tasks performed in dealing with summitry, NATO, Lebanon, China, Germany are of major importance and can in this setting take on, it is hoped, the right proportions in a long chronicle of oncoming history.

Those who wish to see history in bold outline can quote one authority, who quotes another, and come to a number of apparently author-

itative conclusions. Even the most categorical-minded observer can, however, seek out facts and, if he will, broaden his view of forces and of people. I have endeavored to bring together such facts as may help to the understanding of one year in the life of a man. To these facts can be applied acid tests, to the opinions can be directed the counter-views. The reader can, if he wishes, move in the world of legend, of psychology, of mysticism, and of political mythology, but the quotations and the facts are there for his use if he wishes to turn to them.

The public held many easily accepted stereotypes of Foster: the strong, the rigid, the cold, the remote, but also the friendly, the thoughtful, the courageous. The husband, the father, the brother, the friend—all of these words bring different associations to different people.

His principles transcended his relations to the people with whom he was involved. If the world found him unreal, a rock, a symbol of power, rather than a man with keen human motives and reactions, a keen tennis player, a sailor, a witty companion, a generous protector, this was for him a cost that he was willing to pay if thereby he could move ahead more certainly and successfully with his main task.

Even though he hoped to round out his time in the service of his country and expected to bring to a more mature stage the alliances on which he worked so ardently, the European unity that seemed to him so important, his last days were not clouded by a sense of failure. He had faith in the strength, under God, of the human spirit.

He felt he had, with the help of others, checked the onward march of Communism. He hoped and he believed that the values that were for him paramount were accepted widely and that there was time to build and the will to fight for a better world.

In spite of everything that has been said, and because of everything, he wanted to be respected, he wanted to be understood. Sometimes he felt that the price would be too great in terms of what he felt he must accomplish. Although he revered history, he thought less of what history would make of him than of what he could accomplish in his lifetime.

1958, THE LAST YEAR

The years between January 21, 1953, when Foster Dulles assumed the responsibilities of the Secretary of State, and the year 1958 had been times of increasing struggle and widening accomplishment. In the first year he had witnessed the courage of the hopeless revolt of the Germans against tyranny on June 17, and helped with the armistice to end fighting in Korea in July. This was the year, in March, of Stalin's death.

In 1954 he faced the disappointment of the defeat of the European Defense Community in the French Parliament, and the subsequent stopgap measure, the Western European Union. In 1955 the unexpected agreement of the Soviets to an Austrian treaty was followed by the unproductive summit meeting in Geneva, in which he took part.

In the year 1956 the eyes of the world were focused first on Hungary, then on Egypt when after the refusal of the United States and England to continue plans for financing the Aswan Dam, Nasser seized the Suez Canal. The attack by the Israelis, the French, and the British on Egyptian territory heightened the drama that reached a climax in the General Assembly of the United Nations, where the Secretary spoke for the United States in condemning aggression in the effort to save the United Nations. Only a few hours later, he was in Walter Reed Hospital for an operation for previously unsuspected cancer.

Before the year's end in 1956 and through the arduous months of 1957 the Secretary attended various conferences of the ministerial meetings of NATO and the alliances throughout the world whose strength he considered essential to the survival of the free world. Thus it was with a vast store of experience that Foster looked to the problems of 1958 and beyond with the strength and determination to meet the challenge with new ideas and an unflinching will to freedom.

The first Russian Sputnik was launched in October.

A year is one per cent of a century.

Some years, however, seem stretched by the will of man and the multitude of events to a larger extent and a longer span. The sudden awareness of outer space as a field of man's endeavor, the circling Sputniks, soon to be followed by the United States Explorers orbiting the earth, were a part of this larger dimension. The moon was still untouched, but men were looking up to its cold mountains and beyond. Meanwhile, control of political life seemed beyond the capacity of most men, and the threat of annihilating war hung over the year 1958.

Foster was in full strength and vigor as he faced the responsibilities and the decisions. He knew that patient work was needed to assure and expand the security pacts and consolidate the alliances on which so much depended. He knew there was danger in the peacelike gestures of Nikita Khrushchev standing in the path of progress of the free world, no longer hiding behind Nikolai Bulganin. He knew that a world hungry for peace was anxious to grasp any prospect of a negotiated solution even though the agreements might provide only paper-thin assurances of security. He knew that many were tired of the financial burdens, the diversion of resources to defense, the continuing worry about atomic attack from a U.S.S.R. fully armed with nuclear weapons. Twice, according to General Maxwell Taylor, he went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to modify what some thought to be his belief that "massive retaliation can deter any kind of threat" by saying that this was not his view.

The public was restive and some were quick to criticize. He was even to be called on occasion a menace and a threat to the security of the United States. He knew that the power that made it possible for his office to act swiftly and effectively in times of crisis involved the peril of sudden clashes and of possible disaster for the country and, in fact, for most of mankind. He was convinced that progress had been made in the free world, but he looked ahead to increased effort. His close relations with President Dwight D. Eisenhower brought to him a resource rare in the execution of foreign policy. The country was strong and willing to shoulder most of its international responsibilities.

For Nikita Khrushchev, 1958 was also to be a year of special importance. His ambitions in the international sphere were to become evident when he threw off the pretense of being only second in command, and, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, assumed the

top role in the U.S.S.R. in March. His voice was to become louder and his acts more spectacular as the year went on. The more or less credible signs of an emotional nature and erratic course of action, which were particularly evident at this time, reflected both his lack of experience in diplomacy and his assumption that he could frighten the United States and the rest of the free world into concessions designed to make the path of the Soviet Union easier. He had already won control and had been able to institute economic reforms that included a measure of decentralization. He was confident of both the continuing scientific achievements and the growth of production, which would enhance the strength and increase the prestige of the Soviet Union. Thus the danger of miscalculation, based on the lesser quarrels within the free-world camp, was great during this time.

Khrushchev was to devote considerable thought and energy to breaking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Alliance, and to weakening the defense pacts in the Middle and Far East. He knew that if he could force retreat in the Pacific, in the oil-rich Arab countries, or in Berlin, he would win a spectacular prize for the Communist world. He might gain ground at a meeting at the summit. He might confuse the world by his announcement of the cessation of nuclear testing. He might win over some uncommitted country. He could perhaps pose as the saviour of the colonies now moving toward independence. If wiles and propaganda did not succeed, then "rattling the atom" might help him to win his point. He was preparing a many-pronged attack on the emerging new nations.

Moscow was relatively close to Peiping at this time. Mao Tse-tung could be counted on to shell the Offshore Islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and even, when such warlike actions did not cause a withdrawal of the United States fleet, to proclaim a cease-fire. There were few conspicuous signs of divergence in the attitude of the Soviet and Chinese Communists toward "coexistence" or the economic and social systems that were developing in the two countries—these were to come later, and become strikingly evident in 1962. The belligerence of the "Chicom" (State Department abbreviation for Chinese Communists) was less strident in the early months of 1958 than it was to be later.

This was the year when the Soviets were to show their disdain of public opinion by executing Premier Imre Nagy and three other Hungarian patriots, shocking the non-Communist world, and stirring misgivings in Yugoslavia and in Poland as well. The general attitude toward a possible summit meeting was being revised as newsmen in

many centers spoke of Khrushchev's new tough line. As the climate seemed to change, he was to send money and agents into the Middle East in large numbers, he was to visit Peiping to connive with Mao Tse-tung, and he was to shout angry words in East Berlin.

During these months Foster was to watch changing conditions in North Africa and sub-Sahara regions with special care, and to establish a Bureau of African Affairs. His fears for the Middle East had already been placed before Congress and steps taken to reinforce the power of the executive branch to act in a crisis, a crisis due to reach a climax in July. The United States and Great Britain were to work together closely in both North Africa and the Middle East, as well as elsewhere. In fact the collaboration had rarely been as fully coordinated as in these months. The colonial era was drawing to a close, and the spirit of independence, which Foster valued so highly, required the careful attention of all the long-established democratic governments. France, through the eyes of General Charles de Gaulle, reviewed the power structure and focused sharply on the question of leadership in Europe.

Meanwhile men of stature and imagination developed working procedures and long-range purposes for the European Economic Community. The names of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer, Walter Hallstein, Robert Marjolin, Alcide de Gasperi, Dirk Uipko Stikker, Amintore Fanfani, Harold Macmillan, and a dozen others will always be associated with the important new institution that came into existence during this year. It was to round out and carry further the work of the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom, the two associated organizations. It would bring a new energy and productivity to this part of the Atlantic community and give a stronger foundation to NATO. The decisions and operations of these men and their associates were to leave their mark not only on the decade but on the century.

The countries outside the network of security alliances, and not closely associated with the Western leadership, would urge disarmament and a halt to nuclear build-up during this year; Jawaharlal Nehru, in India, pleaded the cause of neutrality and warned of the danger of the atom. Even in England, the voice of Bertrand Russell was raised against atomic weapons.

Changes in leadership, both violent and peaceful, were to shift the position of many important people. Juan Peron would go and be followed for a few years by Arturo Frondizi. Abdul Karim el-Kassem would murder King Faisal (only to meet his own fate in early 1963). Batista would lose ground to Castro. Nasser and Sukarno would ex-

tend their ambitions and reach temporary limits. In Africa, Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Julius Nyerere, and Habib Bourguiba would manifest their political capacity as change accelerated in their countries and neighboring areas.

In the United States the shame of Little Rock and the persistence of segregation made foreign relations more difficult in 1958. Foster was to speak sadly of this fact in one of his press conferences. The President continued in close harmony with his Secretary of State in crises and in more quiet interludes, their understanding unmarred by conflict either of thought or style.

Sherman Adams, however, was soon to resign and leave Washington to save the President embarrassment. The Congressional elections were to lead many Senators and Congressmen to sharpen their knives. Vice President Richard M. Nixon would be stoned in Peru and in Venezuela. Anti-American demonstrations were planned in Brazil for the Secretary's visit. Milton S. Eisenhower, studying the situation on a special trip, advised lines of new support that would lay a basis for what later came to be called the Alliance for Progress.

Competition with the Communist world carried not only geographically into the various countries and hemispheres, but into the world of science and culture. The exchange of musical, artistic, and technical and educational groups, and a plan for scientific cooperation in the form of an agreement called the Lacy-Zaroubin Pact, provided for many types of exchanges. The Brussels Fair would place in contrast the solid exhibit of the Soviets and the shining U.S. pavilion.

Through this time the men working for the International Geophysical Year continued with great activity in the Antarctic; a twelve-nation pact on Antarctica was brought forward. The *Nautilus*, the United States atomic-powered submarine, crossed under the Arctic ice at the North Pole on August 3.

This was also the year of the second great blizzard of recent times. Those who skied to work in the streets of New York were too young to remember the blizzard of 1888, but it was in that year, on February 25, as Edith Dulles wrote in the diary she and her husband kept, that "Our first child [John Foster Dulles] born. Edith in Washington. Allen in Detroit." My mother's entries in the forty-year "line-a-day" diary always gave the single initial "F" for Foster; he was never called by his first name, John, in the family or among his friends. "Aunt," Eleanor Lansing, jokingly called him Johnny, and Mother, occasionally, Sonny.

After he had celebrated his seventieth year Foster was to face, at

the end of that year, the beginning of new pain and finally the days in Walter Reed. But before that time, in the spring of 1959, he would sail his well-loved waters, enjoy his friends and colleagues, travel new skyways, and develop new plans for security and international cooperation. For, although Khrushchev may have planned otherwise, this was not to be Khrushchev's year, but Foster's.

“WORK, FOR THE NIGHT IS COMING”

There were many problems for Foster to tackle in the four days before Christmas in 1957. He had returned from the NATO meeting in Paris on December 21, and his speech for December 23 on NATO was circulated in the Department and elsewhere for critical comments. The conference of Afro-Asian nations, meeting in Cairo to continue work begun some months previous in Bandung, had raised some disturbing points. The October proposals of Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki for neutralization of Germany, brought forward again on December 10 and 21, were ominous. There was a new cabinet in Iraq. The substance of the still top-secret Gaither report had leaked to the press.

On the 24th, his sister Margaret, and her husband, Deane Edwards, came from their home in Rye, New York, to stay in the one guest room at 2740 Thirty-second Street, the Dulleses' Washington home. The family gathered for a gay supper at Allen's.

Christmas dinner was at my house at McLean, Virginia. It was a quiet place, looking out over rolling, frosty wheat fields and remote from city noise. Twelve of us, all family, gathered together on the terrace for cocktails on the mild afternoon of Christmas Day.

Foster was in fine health and spirits, teasing the younger members about their stamina, warning that we were in danger of overeating as usual. He, nonetheless, enjoyed the meal more than anyone—the three types of turkey dressing, oyster, chestnut, and apple, the yule-log chocolate cake, the pies, and all the usual extras prepared by Relli, my Austrian housekeeper.

The day was typically American as the family forgot for a few hours everything except the tree, the presents with their bright ribbons and paper, the jokes, the exchange of family news. Foster's presents to me were a package of stiff-backed, lined, legal-size yellow pads, and a check for a portable radio. But the tree and the dinner were our main celebration. Gifts were of minor interest to us.

When Foster and Janet went back to Washington with the Edwardses, he turned eagerly to read his Christmas cards, several thousands of them in three large baskets. He sat on the couch facing the bright wood fire as dusk closed in. He sorted them into three categories—some he would answer himself. There were those from people whom he knew well, the austere engraved greetings peculiar to Washington officials that could be answered in a more impersonal way, and others to be taken care of officially. He arranged some of the cards that caught his fancy on the mantel. This was to be his last Christmas in his home.

There was a staff meeting and regular work the next day. His Christmas party for the staff—clerks, aides of all ranks, assistant secretaries who worked closely with him—was held at his home the next afternoon. More than 150 of them came. The carol singing around the buffet table was enthusiastic, if not of the highest musical order.

On this day, Friday the 27th, he had given some time to the consideration of the President's State of the Union and Budget messages, of special importance this year because of defense problems. But on Saturday he was able to get away for a brief respite in New York.

For a decade or two Foster and Janet had traditionally given a large eggnog party for their associates in Sullivan & Cromwell, the law firm of which he had been senior partner. For perhaps twenty-five years, a few old close friends had met at Foster's house on Ninety-first Street for New Year's Eve dinner. During the evening each wrote answers to agreed questions—a forecast of the major events in the coming year, predictions about whether governments would fall, and who would be in power in particular countries—and then had opened the sealed envelopes with the previous year's guesses. This amusing and sometimes enlightening look into the future had now become too dangerous for a Secretary of State. It could no longer be merely a game. His forecasts, if publicized inadvertently, could prejudice delicate negotiations. Even at a New Year's Eve party, he could not escape responsibility. Although he did not have the party at the end of 1957, it was nevertheless a day to be enjoyed, an evening to be spent in pleasant and congenial companionship. The more stormy weeks were ahead.

The trip was for both business and pleasure. Janet and he were driven from the airport to Syosset, Long Island, home of his banker friend George Murnane. He stayed there for the next four days and wrote a letter of thanks to Mrs. Murnane:

I shall always recall your classic remark that you enjoyed so

much having us because most of the time you did not realize we were there. Actually, letting us alone without a series of social engagements was, I know, the best thing all around.

I got quite excited playing bridge again, and I think for the first time in my life was actually playing when the New Year was ushered in. . . .

While Foster was resting on Long Island, the events of the new year were in the making. Charles de Gaulle was contemplating the destiny of Europe in relative obscurity in Colombey-les-deux-Eglises. Nehru was pleading for disarmament. Sukarno, of Indonesia, was turning with increasing interest to Communist offers. The Bulganin-Khrushchev note of December 10 was under review; a second note based on the resolution of the "Supreme Soviet" of December 21 had not yet been delivered. In theory, both dealt with the relaxation of tension. A further note came on January 8. Nkrumah was assuming leadership in Ghana. Castro was preparing his revolution. Nasser was constructing a new Arab world. The European Common Market was making a little-noticed advent on the world scene. All was quiet on the China Sea. No clash between Arab and Jew was reported from Jerusalem.

As the world shook itself awake on January 1, after the festivities, the commentators began to make their various forecasts for 1958. The *New York Times*, in an editorial, wrote of "a year of opportunity." It was considered to be that in the minds of many. But in Moscow, Khrushchev, gaily toasting peace and the friendship of the United States, drank first to the Red Army.

One commentator, Fred Sparks, of the *New York World-Telegram*, wrote: "Happy New Year to a Fall Guy." His column was devoted to the Secretary of State. Sparks expanded on a thesis that has been advanced by others: no one with ordinary common sense would give up a good law practice, an interesting career, a pleasant and honorable life, for the stress, the criticism, the badgering that the Secretary of State in modern times has been called on to endure. He added that the American people had made "J F D the whipping boy." "The Secretary of State is like a tax collector, essential but hardly popular." "Dean Acheson," he said, "could have told Dulles that there was no chance for a happy new year." Foster kept this clipping in his files.

He was, however, much too busy to give such comments more than passing attention at the time. On Thursday he drove in from Syosset at about eleven in the morning for a brief talk with Amba-

sador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge about United Nations affairs, and then on to lunch with Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the U.N., Lodge, and one or two others in Lodge's Suite 42A of the Waldorf-Astoria. Disarmament was very much on his mind. This question had been complicated by the fact that Harold E. Stassen, then United States Disarmament Adviser in London, had fallen out of step with Eisenhower and Dulles, and appeared to want to act on his own. The Soviet desire for a summit meeting brought the matter to a critical stage without much prospect of advancement. A revolt had broken out in Venezuela, and there was considerable unrest in Syria and in Iran.

After lunch he saw a number of good old friends, including his cousin Elly and her husband, Jock Elliott. He teased Jock about how much better he looked since Elly had been feeding him. Jim Barco, of the United States Mission to the United Nations, brought in the "memorandum of conversation" from the luncheon meeting for clearance before forwarding to the Department. These condensed reports of conversations with high officials outside the Department and in particular with officials of other governments were written immediately after a meeting by one of the participants. Foster usually saw his visitors alone to create a greater atmosphere of intimacy; and because a stenographer was never present at such meetings, he frequently wrote the summary memos himself. Later in the afternoon he called on Herbert Hoover at his suite at the Waldorf. He and Janet went on to the reception given by Sullivan & Cromwell and saw many of their old friends. They always enjoyed being in New York and were happy to be free to dine informally with the George Sharps (George had been one of his younger partners in the law firm in the old days). Later they had the pleasure of going to the theater.

He spent that night in New York at the Waldorf. The next morning he called at Brooks Brothers regarding some suits he had ordered, and then took off for Washington soon after ten o'clock. He had ahead of him some twenty appointments, among them a conference at the White House.

It took only five or six minutes to ride with Under Secretary Christian A. Herter across the Memorial Bridge up Twenty-first Street. Usually they drove into the basement of the Department, where the elevator was waiting to take him to his office. This was a small automatic elevator that did not stop at the fifth floor, where the Secretary's office was, unless a special key was used. A few such security precautions were used to prevent the curious and unauthorized from stopping

outside his office door. In the latter part of 1958, however, he had to go through the lobby because of the construction of the large new addition to the Department building. On this morning he went directly to Under Secretary Herter's office.

The door of Foster's private office was frequently open. Those who stood at the desk of Phyllis Bernau, his personal secretary, could frequently see the Secretary bending over his desk in complete absorption, writing, or perhaps telephoning in his customary low and even voice. His special assistants, who worked in cubicles in an adjoining office, could pass freely in and out. They could also keep an eye on the people who waited to see him. The setup was very informal and he had only the minimum of protection. It was easier to get through to the Secretary, if one had legitimate business and kept to a short time, than to see most business executives in large firms. There was relatively little waiting in the outer office. Those who saw the Secretary usually had an exacting schedule because of their own responsibilities. The whole system was for the quick and orderly dispatch of business. Only a serious crisis or a call from the White House would substantially alter the plans for the day, and yet there is little indication that the week's schedule was developed in advance, except for staff, National Security Council and Cabinet meetings, and news conferences. Foster knew what he thought should be done; his aides listed the priorities in the light of changing developments abroad and would work out the arrangements with little time for preparation. No inflexible advance arrangements were feasible. Revolutions and other crises did not usually come on schedule.

There are tremendous demands upon the time and energy of the Secretary of State. In no other period did the burden of representation, policy making, defense before the legislature, and administrative duties, as well as negotiations with foreign powers, fall so completely on one man as it did when Foster was Secretary. Moreover, there is no country of the first magnitude where the personnel changes in both the Foreign Office and in embassies throughout the world are so frequent and so sweeping. The lack of a permanent under secretary such as the British have, the calling for frequent transfer of ambassadors, not only with the change of political leadership but even during one administration, makes the conduct of foreign relations harder to plan.

In the twenty years prior to 1958 the scope and complexity of responsibility for foreign affairs had increased perhaps tenfold.

There were many days when the appointments totaled more than forty. Some would be only two or three minutes, to check a fact or

to receive a cable or a brief summary; some would be hours long, with the President, with the National Security Council, and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with ambassadors or visiting heads of state, or with his own working assistants and officers in the Department.

Everyone in the Department recognizes that time is the most precious commodity of the statesman. He cannot hoard it, he cannot multiply it; therefore it must be conserved and used to the utmost. In this need to get the fullest information and the clearest advice from those thousands who worked in the field of foreign relations, the Secretary focused sharply on the subject in question, excluding minor or irrelevant details. He would listen intently and then, when he thought enough had been said, he would switch quickly to a different subject, with equal concentration.

One of his valued aides describes as an "old canard" the view that portrays the Secretary as operating foreign policy out of his hat, with little reference to the views and recommendations of Departmental officials.

In view of the facts readily available to those who look into the matter, it is remarkable that the idea that the Secretary was a lone operator is still repeated. In point of fact, from the moment he walked into his office at 8:20 in the morning until he left at about 7:30 in the evening, he was almost never alone. Even the brief twenty minutes he took for lunch on a tray was sometimes shared with a colleague. The entire day was taken up with consultations.

When the Secretary hired William B. Macomber in 1955 to be his principal aide, he made a major effort to impress him with the fact that in the position of Assistant, he would have a great deal to say with regard to the people who got to see him and the papers that were brought to his attention. He stressed the fact that Macomber's responsibility in this regard must be carried out with extreme conscientiousness. The Secretary said that he was older and more experienced than the individual officers in the Department; "But he did not say more intelligent," Macomber says, and he did not consider his wisdom or his experience so superior that he wished to avoid being exposed to the wisdom and background of the Department's officer corps. It was the job of his immediate staff, he felt, to insure that he never took action or made a decision without knowing, as fully as possible, the cumulative knowledge and views, as well as the recommendations, of numerous others in the Department. "In my experience," Macomber says, "he never did. I am sure his other special assistants [Joseph N. (Jerry) Greene, Jr., Roderic L. O'Connor, and John W. Hanes, Jr.] will give testimony to this statement."

He liked to talk with the desk officers or junior officials if he thought they had something to contribute to the problem under consideration. One thing he did not like was to spend time with someone who repeated the same argument over and over, or who added useless information. I remember he once asked me what the compass directions were. I said, "The west is over there. The north . . ." "You don't need to go the rounds," he said. He felt that if there was merit in the view put forward, he could grasp it in the first place.

From young manhood he was never without responsibility in law, in the church, in government. This had led to an acuteness of concentration, which was one of his great gifts, but which also caused misunderstanding among those who wished to present him with facts and problems he thought irrelevant.

Some did not understand the urgency of his manner of working and felt excluded from his process of thinking. They wished to bring forward ideas that they considered interesting or even important, and felt that when they were explaining the main issue, point by point, the Secretary was not listening to the detail.

At times he appeared to brush aside casual observations, or even to call a halt to discussions that seemed to him confused and distracting. This was doubtless the result of his intense desire to solve the primary matter. There were times when those who were called in to "brief" the Secretary on a particular point, unaware of the long sequence of appointments, felt baffled as they found themselves in the outer hall after three or four minutes of conversation. They wondered whether it was possible for the Secretary to have grasped their meaning in so short a time. They may have felt they had performed a thankless task. But if some were annoyed, those who were in constant contact had a different view of how things worked and did not feel rebuffed. They understood and marveled at his extraordinary powers of concentration. The outside experts who occasionally came to offer advice or information usually did not know that he heard little from them that added to the vast flow of facts and opinions that came through regularly constituted channels.

The records of his daily staff meetings, with his small intimate group of close assistants and with the larger group of assistant secretaries and consultants—twenty or sometimes more than thirty persons—indicate that those who were there talked, while the Secretary listened. He broke in only to sharpen a point or to suggest a possible shift in emphasis.

There were two types of staff meetings: the "small staff meeting" held in the Secretary's office on Tuesdays and Thursdays; and the

larger gathering, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, held in the Conference or Map Room. These meetings, usually over by 10 A.M., began with an intelligence summary prepared in the Department mainly in the hours from three in the morning until nine. Both meetings included a general roundup of news—particular developments since the close of business in Washington the previous evening. Then came a round-the-table query as to major problems and a brief discussion by the Secretary of what seemed to him most urgent. Before the end of each meeting the Secretary made concise requests for action on a number of matters, indicating precisely where the responsibility for taking the next steps lay. These meetings, necessary because of the unpredictability of events around the world, were considered an essential part of the Secretary's contacts with the rest of the Department and his preparation for any meeting with interagency groups or with the President.

When an important decision had to be taken, he would summon most of the key people in the Department who had expertise in regard to the problem before him. In many instances the younger desk officers were included, even though their assistant secretaries, who ranked them, were also present. He knew many of these younger men and held them in such high esteem—Macomber mentions particularly the Israeli desk officer, the Yugoslav desk officer, one man in the Division of International Organizations, and the several men in the German Office—that he rarely took a decision on a matter in their area of work without consulting them personally. The Secretary developed, through a comprehensive give and take of argument and analysis, all the courses of action open to him and the factors bearing on the decision, pro and con. In these discussions everyone had an opportunity to participate. He thought best, Macomber reports him as saying, "when he could argue out a problem with people who knew the subject under discussion and had the intellectual capacity to reason and to argue with him." Quite apart from his desire to have full access to the experience and ideas of other competent officials or consultants, he seldom came to a decision alone, simply because he did not trust his ideas until they had been fully analyzed and explored with others.

"He was very effective in debate," Macomber says. "Even if you had a good case, it was extremely difficult to 'win' an argument with him. Nevertheless, if someone had, in fact, a strong case against the line the Secretary initially put forward, he would see the merits of the case and abandon his original line, even if his mental gymnastics allowed him to 'win' the theoretical argument or at least arrive at a

draw. In other words, behind the give and take of discussion, he was searching for the real merits of the case, regardless of which side he was arguing."

Perhaps this habit originated in his childhood, for family argumentation was keen. There were, however, no purely absurd exercises in logic, as some biographers seem to have thought. The arguments dealt with real or plausible situations, on issues of some validity. The nightlong argument between my uncle and my father about the precise moment at which the twentieth century began was not without basis in reality.

"Incidentally, when you think back," Macomber told me, "the one thing that most of his senior or personal assistants had in common was that they were good arguers. I think particularly of Bob Bowie, of Policy Planning, Walter Robertson, of the Far East Bureau, Livingston T. Merchant, of the European Bureau, *et al.*" "*Et al.*" included those personal assistants and advisers whom he found in the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and elsewhere, and whom he consulted almost daily.

One person who contributed a unique element to the arguments about policy was the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs during a number of years, Carl McCardle. He would argue sometimes without a clear analytical approach and, as one of the aides once said, "The boss would demolish the position with a logical argument which seemed conclusive." Then Carl would say, "I still think I am right." Foster would conclude that there was indeed something wrong with the original logical proposition. He valued the fact that Carl's uncanny instinct for the public's reaction was frankly and emphatically expressed. Foster never failed to take account of his reaction. He felt there was value in being exposed to different approaches to problems. What he hated was to be agreed with merely because he *was* the Secretary.

In the end, the Secretary made the decision. In some cases, where the matter was of great moment, he repeated a large share of the argument with explanation of the alternatives to the President. Even in these instances, however, he put either a tentative decision or a definite recommendation for action before the President.

The task of the Secretary of State is, in fact, to survey the entire scene and, having taken into account all the elements laid before him, to make a decision. This decision, while subject to review and modification at the White House, must still be complete and must include courses of action that could be adopted without a large amount

of further preparatory work. If the groundwork was not already there, the decision itself would be theoretical. The decision had been reached gradually and was consistent with the course of discussion in the meeting that had preceded it. If, at the conference table, someone did not agree with the conclusion and the recommendations, he had an opportunity to argue his view out to the end. In the great preponderance of cases, the Secretary's decision was the same as the one the others had concluded, in the course of the discussion, to be the correct one.

Many of the characteristics needed to carry on these tasks effectively could be learned in business, law, or other professions. Foster had been a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell at thirty-two. But a keen sense of how to get the best advice from "the field" and from Washington and a sound appraisal of the state of preparation for action could only be learned on the job. The relations with the President, the Congress, and with the press were highly specialized and peculiar to the Department of State.

To carry on this complex and exacting job, a man must have unusual physical, mental, and moral vigor. The Secretary had a clear knowledge of the requirements of the job; with two Secretaries of State in his family, he had viewed it for years as almost impossibly sprawling and burdensome, with administrative success closely dependent upon the quality of the Foreign Service, and effective policy dependent upon the adequate defense of the Department before a questioning Congress and a critical press, and what is at best a puzzled and acquiescent public. Secretaries of State are seldom popular.

He learned to husband his strength like an athlete, preparing for an endurance of strength, a test of extreme capacity to excel.

Foster, as many children, had had several brushes with physical danger. Just after he was baptized, his nurse wandered off with him and for some hours no one knew where she and the baby were. They were found on the "flats" by the river. That same year he developed a severe cold and fever, but he was well enough to enjoy his first Christmas tree.

Once, as a child, he was thrown from a carriage when a door flew open; another time he was knocked unconscious by lightning. Then in 1901 he had a desperate bout with typhoid, the most serious illness of his first sixty years. There was then no sure way of fighting this disease, and the treatment of plunging him into a tubful of ice water and ice was so drastic that the whole family suffered with him.

One of the early pictures of him shows him being carried to the carriage by his father on his recovery; he was smiling, but frail and thin; he was taken from Watertown to Henderson, our summer home on Lake Ontario, and in a few weeks was sound and well.

Foster had seen President Eisenhower in serious medical danger, and he did not take the gift of health lightly. Dr. Alva "Ducky" Daughton, who was his physician, said to me, "He does exactly what I tell him. That is how we control his gout. He also lets me watch his heart and he is careful with his diet." Dr. Daughton said that he had never known anyone else who could walk on a gouty foot without limping. Foster had had thrombophlebitis in 1944, one of two attacks, when, at considerable risk and in spite of the concern of his New York doctors, he went to Washington to help Secretary Cordell Hull with plans for the preparatory conference of the United Nations. The doctors feared the blood clot would travel to his brain, but he insisted on going. Gangrene developed, and a nerve-crushing operation had to be performed on his foot.

When his doctors told him, after his thrombophlebitis, that he must give up smoking, he found this very hard. He told Rod O'Connor once that he thought one of the pleasantest things in life was to sit after dinner on a terrace or before a fire and enjoy good conversation with a cigar and a glass of brandy. Smoking meant relaxation to him, and comfort; he sometimes bit through the stem of his pipe when at the helm of his yawl in a high wind. He never smoked after the doctors' warning, but he had a recurring nightmare. He said he would be sitting with a group of men with a glass of brandy in his right hand, and the butler or a friend would pass a box of cigars. Just as he reached out his hand and started to pick up a cigar, he would awake bathed in sweat. He never knew whether in his dream he took the cigar or pulled back his hand empty, but it seems his control never broke, asleep or awake.

Few people, except those who knew that his wife, Janet, took a bedboard for him on all their travels, were aware that he also was operated upon for correction of an injured vertebra. His back had been hurt years before, perhaps while sailing, perhaps at tennis. According to Dr. Daughton, he had an unusual capacity to stand pain without giving any outward sign. His extraordinary physical resistance had never been more evident than when, less than a week after his five-hour cancer operation in 1956, he began preparing for the NATO meeting in Paris.

The kind of life he had to lead on his travels held certain dangers. He loved the good food, but he knew that too many banquets were

not the best diet for a Secretary of State. When he ate alone in the Department, he usually had a salad with cottage cheese, an apple, and tea. He once said to me, "I wish some doctor would discover that cottage cheese is no good."

In January 1958 he was, however, in the best of health, ready for the heavy schedule of the three weeks before leaving on January 22 for the Baghdad Pact meeting. He knew that the work would be demanding, but he looked forward to a brief cruise in the Caribbean afterward. He was to be denied this, for when he wrote Bob Hart, his favorite sailing partner, he found that Bob was having trouble with his own back. Reluctantly he gave up the prospect of the kind of vacation he most enjoyed.

When the new year's tasks began, on January 2, the Secretary had several appointments in the Department before going to the White House at four o'clock to confer with the President. He had seen the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Wilhelm Morgenstierne, making his final call before retirement, a figure who was to be missed in Washington's diplomatic circles. He had spent an hour with Harold Stassen, in from London, on disarmament matters. His talk with the President was to be one of many in the next few days.

In this period, when the hope for disarmament and the fear of nuclear conflict were in the forefront of the Administration's concerns and when the whole defense posture was under searching consideration, the collaboration of these two men on the State of the Union Message for January 9 and the Budget Message for January 13 brought them together in a close working relation that was to set the tone for national and international policy for the entire year. Their points of view are to be seen in both messages and also in the speeches the Secretary was to make in the next few weeks.

The partnership between Eisenhower and Dulles was one of the closest between a President and Secretary of State that Washington had ever witnessed. Eisenhower's work in the institutional framework of the army had given him an approach to international relations that differed from that of Foster Dulles, the lawyer, but both had been confronted with danger and both had for many years actively explored the ways of achieving peace.

The President and the Secretary were different in temperament, though in ways it was evident that they complemented each other. Foster was perhaps more evenhanded in his approach, repressing in most of his formal relations feelings that the President could often express more freely. This came in part from the fact that Foster had

worked much of his life without protection from the public. Even as Secretary of State he was more exposed to chance meetings and unprogramed public view. Both the Department of Defense and the White House have more buffer zones than the law or the Department of State. Moreover, the Secretary has to endeavor to protect the President. He may not quote his private utterances; he cannot defend himself. If a policy is unpopular, he must accept the appearance of carrying the main burden of decision, even though the public knows, and so does he, that the ultimate power lies with the President. Perhaps there was also something in the difference reflected in the sporting moods of the golfer, and the tennis player and sailor. The man at the helm of a sailing craft must fight with a wind that often will not let up. He may have to throw his weight on the wheel for hours on end to hold it well over, without intervals of casual conversation or early relief from strain.

While their beliefs were similar, long interest in religion and philosophy had led Foster to a more than usually complex view of underlying values. There was never a difference between them over aims, yet each in his own formulation gave a special tone to similar ideas. Foster, trained in philosophy and law, had a way of formulating his thought that sometimes seemed to the President to get away from what the people needed to hear. Foster had been able to speak directly to the voters in upper New York State in his Senate campaign of 1949. His sister Nataline, who rode the campaign bus with him, testifies to the warmth of response to his talks. His fellow citizens had understood his type, his almost "New England" directness and friendly approach. In the cities, however, he did less well in the campaign, and as Secretary he came across less clearly in urban areas than did Eisenhower.

Foster could accept without difficulty President Eisenhower's alterations in his speeches and articles. Often these made the speeches more understandable to the people he was trying to reach. Eisenhower, for his part, could accept with gratitude Foster's logical formulations and diplomatic analyses of proposals to meet the cold-war problems. They worked together on an almost day-to-day basis, with the Secretary making frequent use of the white telephone in his office, his direct line to the White House, and by his bedside at home. No instances of disagreement can be recalled. Theirs was a notable partnership of two men with widely different backgrounds, inheritance, and emotional responses, but with mutual respect.

Throughout the process of analysis and discussion of issues in the Department, if the matter was one of considerable moment, the

Secretary kept the President informed on the course of the consultation. The Secretary would sometimes leave the conference table to call the White House, and often he interrupted a meeting to go to the executive office for a personal conversation. When the Secretary laid the issues before the President at a final stage of decision, there was then no surprise and no difficulty.

Foster would review with the President the various factors under consideration and indicate how, in his opinion, the situation was likely to develop. Thus he could get the preliminary thinking of the President to guide him in the crystallization of his thought. Once a conclusion had been reached in his own office, he would take this to the White House, often late in the day, as a firm but not final recommendation. Because the two men thought so much alike, and because the President was already informed of the key factors in the case and the drift of the Secretary's thinking, and had been given full opportunity to comment on its advantages and risks, the mortality rate of the Secretary's final recommendations to the President was not high.

The President did not abdicate any of his authority to the Secretary. Their day-by-day, almost hour-by-hour, contact influenced the ideas as they were being developed, and the final word came through, therefore, on the same wave length.

A myth created by persons unfriendly to the President that the Secretary made the decisions and then told the President about them was completely erroneous. The President's constant and active interest in foreign policy was not only essential to his office but congenial to him in the line of his wide previous experience abroad. The General, as he now prefers to be called, told me of his many friends among foreign heads of state and of his close working relations with many of them. There was no doubt that the Secretary needed the President and relied on his constant support. The fact that the President also needed the Secretary was indicated in many ways. Their frequent telephone conversations as well as their many conferences showed the extent of this close relationship.

Senator J. William Fulbright wrote in the *Cornell Law Quarterly*, 1961, that under President Eisenhower, "Secretary Dulles seemed at times to be exercising those 'delicate, plenary, and exclusive powers' which are supposed to be vested in the President." There is no doubt but that the Secretary accepted considerable responsibility and exerted real influence in the field of foreign policy. But it is also true that the American position was the result of careful deliberation between the Secretary and the President.

I had the clearest impression of Foster's relations with the President when I talked with General Eisenhower in Gettysburg in 1962. His remarks and the letters he has written me about Foster emphasize the warm and close understanding between the two men. He spoke of the "magnificent sense of humor" and "the depth of feeling" Foster showed.

Through the General I have an increased appreciation of how much Foster enjoyed his work. When, in 1953, the President had to choose a new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, he discussed the possibility of Foster's appointment several times with him, but the President concluded that Foster wished to remain in his position as Secretary and keep on with the work he had begun.

Eisenhower has indicated that the selection of Foster for his post, and the choice of Herbert Brownell, Jr., for his, had been agreed upon by the President and his advisers as soon as the results of the election were known. There is little doubt that Eisenhower and Foster had talked of his possible future work during the campaign.

After Eisenhower's trip to Korea between December 2 and 5, Foster flew out from Wake Island to the heavy cruiser USS *Helena* to meet with the President-elect. Here a number of prospective members of President Eisenhower's Cabinet—Charles Wilson, Herbert Brownell, George Humphrey, as well as General Lucius Clay, Admiral Arthur Radford, and a number of others—spent three days talking of foreign and domestic problems.

The President-elect returned to New York on December 14, and three days later met with Foster and General Douglas MacArthur at Foster's home on Ninety-first Street. Foster outlined for the President some of the basic ideas that seemed to him essential to his taking on this job.

After the December trip on the USS *Helena*, on Eisenhower's return from Korea, Foster said in 1952 at a midday dinner in McLean that, although he had had questions about the prospect of working with the President-elect, he was agreeably surprised by their dealings during the voyage, and named three reasons: first, Eisenhower was "slow to anger"—Foster paused and remarked that the Bible did not say that one ought not to be angry, but merely that one ought to be slow to anger; second, Eisenhower preferred to deal with people personally, rather than to receive his information and advice on paper; third, Eisenhower liked people.

The combination of events that led to Foster's becoming Secretary is much more complex than most people think. A boyhood predilec-

tion is not enough, and I have found no evidence that as a youth he wished to be Secretary. Leading up to the post was his work with Governor Thomas E. Dewey in 1944, his work with Secretary Hull in the early forties, his association with the Federal Council of Churches and with General Eisenhower when they were working for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—Foster as head of the Endowment, Eisenhower as president of Columbia.

Foster told my son in his study at 2740 Thirty-second Street in September 1957 that people suggested that the Secretaryship had been his long-standing ambition, and then said that perhaps it had been "in a vague way." He went on to say that he thought some of his work—which could be inferred to include the Japanese treaty or even the "Six Pillars of Peace"—prior to becoming Secretary might have been as important as what he had been doing as Secretary.

There is no doubt that Foster was thinking of the Eisenhower candidacy long before most people realized he was interested in the matter. He was fascinated with the problems of national foreign relations, and this inevitably led in 1951 to a concern as to who would be the next President. It was not by chance that I had invited Senator James Duff, of Pennsylvania, to my home in McLean shortly after Duff became Senator that year—my son, David, and I thought that he might hold an important place on the Foreign Relations Committee. So when Senator Duff and Foster walked to the end of the garden talking together about General Eisenhower, then in Paris, I knew that Eisenhower's candidacy was of keen interest to both. While this was not the crucial conversation leading to the decision to support Eisenhower, it was one of several that preceded Foster's subsequent trip to Paris to talk to Jean Monnet (on economic matters) and to Eisenhower (on political matters) in the spring of 1952.

Foster had known more than a dozen Secretaries of State personally. He had worked under eight and had been acquainted with Robert Bacon, Philander Knox, William J. Bryan, Charles E. Hughes, Frank Kellogg, Henry L. Stimson, Cordell Hull, Edward Stettinius, James F. Byrnes, Marshall, and Acheson, and, of course, Lansing. He had a clear idea of what their responsibilities and problems were and never took them lightly.

Like many others, he had seen the difficulties that could arise in dealing with Congress. He had become increasingly aware of the personnel and administrative problems in the Department. He realized that the defense of the budget before Congress, and other parts of the Secretary's responsibilities, could cut seriously into his work in policy formation. The question that he put to the President-elect was whether

a man so weighed down with miscellaneous tasks could in fact see clearly the problems that were vital to the security of the nation.

On November 20, 1952, Marquis Childs reported in the *Washington Post* on a memorandum that, he said, reflected a long continuity of thought on the matter. Given to President-elect Eisenhower, it was about a conversation Foster had had with Herbert Brownell, soon to become U.S. Attorney General. In this note, the future Secretary was quoted as listing twenty major tasks of the Secretaryship. These ranged from the "solemn and ceremonial to the bureaucratic." One of the twenty was the making of policy in the field of foreign affairs, and Foster was quoted as having said, "[Making policy] is what I am primarily interested in. If the office could be revised so that most of the routine work was taken off the Secretary's shoulders I think my answer would be yes. What is more I think it can be done. I believe most of his present tasks should be delegated to a truly able Under Secretary, and if he were not to be an overworked housekeeper as the Secretary tends today to be." He is quoted as hinting that the job for which he was best suited would be to carry on the leading role through the National Security Council, though this would have required new legislation.

There is no doubt that President Eisenhower had these provisos in mind in the coming years, but it is also clear that Foster accepted the job even though there was no notable change in the scope of the position, which Foster considered unsound and impractical.

During the years, the President and the Secretary had frequent talks about the content of the job and the need to provide for the less vital functions and tasks in a manner that would not consume time required for vital policy making. The General thought that Foster became increasingly enthusiastic about organizational changes that would broaden the coordinating functions and bring more order into the foreign-policy programs outside the Department of State. Thus the two men continued to discuss ideas that Foster had brought forward in 1952, when he accepted the post. It can be said now that he continued to regret his inability to concentrate a major part of his time on policy, and sometimes carried out the jobs of a "housekeeper" reluctantly. Nevertheless, he had agreed to carry out the task and, though with a somewhat divided mind, to accept the job that his grandfather, John W. Foster, had held under Benjamin Harrison and which his uncle, Robert Lansing, had carried through five difficult years under Woodrow Wilson. He is said to have explained to President Eisenhower—and to have had his full agree-

ment—why there should be no Colonel House dictating foreign policy from the White House. There never was.

During the temporary interregnum of November 1952, when General Eisenhower and Foster were working together at the Hotel Commodore, a Western Union telegram of four or five pages came in from Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran, then a revolt-ridden country. It asked what the attitude of the new Administration would be toward his country. Foster and the General were astonished, for it was highly unusual to be addressed by a government on a serious matter outside the State Department channels. Moreover, the matter would normally be considered top secret. No notice was ever taken of this perhaps unique incident. When the Secretary-designate had time to sit down to consider the reply, he was interrupted by one of the aides with a message. The President-elect had scribbled on the piece of paper something to the effect that "I had a free hour so I tried my hands at an answer." The Secretary read it and exclaimed, "For gosh sakes! He doesn't need a Secretary of State—this is a perfect answer!" They sent the answer in the same way the message had come in, uncoded, by Western Union. The work of the two men, each supporting the other, had begun.

As the President said, in a reminiscing message for the dedication of the Dulles Library at Princeton, there had developed "between Foster Dulles and me a trust, a faith in each other, that was never for a second broken." He described the "very informal basis" on which they worked, with the "little notes, telephone calls and, the most valuable of all, conversations which would take place in the late evening, when he would come over to my office and we would discuss affairs of the moment. . . . These conversations [after business was done] became, particularly on Foster's part, rather philosophical—a sort of inquiry into what was happening at home and in the world."

The late afternoon and evening conversations, sometimes held in the Trophy Room in the White House, characterized their relationship; these began with a serious though quick review of main events and issues and ended as the President walked to the door, where the Secretary's car waited, recounting a humorous anecdote or a joke, following a brief comment on the day to come. The frequent telephone calls during emergency sessions, often late in the night, could be succinct and to the point because the two men understood each other.

The routine of the day, January 2, 1958, differed little from the

days that were to follow. Because the Secretary had been away from his office for three or four days, his assistants, responsible for Latin America, cultural affairs, administration, European affairs, and a dozen other things, had a large number of matters to bring before him. After the White House conference his daybook shows people coming to consult him—one arrival sometimes combining with others still there—at 5:00, 5:06, 5:09, 5:50, 6:09, 6:31, 6:33, 6:34, 6:35, and 6:36. Then, with his briefcase full of papers, he went home at 7:30. This was one of the evenings, probably, when Phyllis called so that Janet could meet him down the hill and walk back with him to the house. He had a quiet dinner with Janet, a short period of work, and an early bedtime. One of his numerous detective stories was to distract him for a brief half hour before he went to sleep. (Once, before a trip, he visited the Department lobby newsstand to get a detective story to read on the plane. There were none. "I guess the State Department is too highbrow for that kind of stuff," he said to his messenger, James Payne. He was vastly disappointed. Reading these stories, for him, was a pleasant way to fall asleep.)

Friday, January 3, the same pace was maintained. The Cabinet meeting at 9:00 followed a brief staff meeting in the Department and was a prelude to the meeting in the morning of the National Security Council. German matters, the Bulganin note, the Gaither report, Antarctica, the forthcoming Baghdad Pact meeting, and similar questions were under consideration.

John Hanes, his aide, had realized soon after he began working with the Secretary that it was tiring for him to eat lunch every day from a tray at his desk. There was no assurance that he would not be interrupted by telephone or by a caller.

Down the hall a hundred yards, at the corner, was a small room, about twenty feet square, with a window opening to the southeast, formerly used by a junior officer. John Hanes arranged for it to be furnished for the Secretary's use.

It became a pleasant refuge, with a comfortable sofa and rugs, and was suitable for use as a small conference room or as a dining room for four or five people. The colored charts on the wall showed the various cruises on the *Menemsha*, Foster's yawl, and there were other prints of sloops and schooners. This gave him real refreshment, because it reminded him of his favorite recreation, sailing. The facilities that were available to the Secretary at that time were extremely limited, but the use of this small room, 5157, not directly connected with his office and not even known to many of the State Department officers and always locked, gave him a hide-out. The

record shows that his luncheons there gave him from fifteen to twenty-five minutes' rest. Practically no one knew that the room existed.

Meetings with Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy, Lewis Strauss, Atomic Energy Commission, and others followed the lunch on January 3. Karl Gruber, who had been Austrian Ambassador to the United States for several years and who was leaving for a new post in Vienna, came in to pay a farewell call. He was the handsome, broad-shouldered Tyrolese who had taken over Innsbruck from the Nazis and was sitting in their former headquarters to greet the incoming American troops.

After several discussions on defense and nuclear matters with Christian Herter and Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith, among others, he managed to end his day at the office at about 7:30 P.M., and went home to dress for a black-tie dinner in his honor at the Turkish Embassy—the embassy knew he was going to Ankara in a few weeks.

Weekends differed from other days mainly in that work did not usually begin as early, often leaving time for church. Most of the conferences were held in the house on Thirty-second Street—a Norman stone house with several fireplaces, a steep roof and gables, set on a secluded, wooded slope. On Saturday, the 4th of January, Bill Macomber came at 12:00 to work with the Secretary, who had been writing in his study.

Talks continued after lunch. In the late afternoon Senator William F. Knowland called at the house for a half-hour conversation, followed shortly by Sir Harold Caccia, the British Ambassador. The talks, which were to be renewed on Sunday, were mainly concerned with the Macmillan statement released to the press on January 5 proposing to the Soviets a nonaggression pact, and the recent note from Bulganin. Problems of the Middle East and of North Africa were also of general concern. The revolution in Venezuela appeared to have quieted down.

Sunday was busy with some of the same matters. Ambassador Caccia came in again, as did some of the State Department aides. Arthur Larson, of the United States Information Agency, and Vice President Nixon were among those who worked with him as he went over the drafts of the President's State of the Union and Budget messages line by line. There was time, however, to go to the Presbyterian church and enjoy a leisurely family lunch.

He liked best to work at his home. The surroundings reflected his

life and interests. The unique table in front of the sofa where he often lounged was the polished surface of a thick, gnarled root of an oak tree, said to be Formosan but bought in New York. The whorls and rings of the table reflected the strength of the heavy twisted root below. On the hearth by the fire was a Russian bear made of iron, rampant, standing two feet high, a relic from the childhood home, given to his mother by a Russian friend some seventy years ago. Over the mantel was a fine large portrait showing Robert Lansing in the high-ceilinged rose-colored salon of Paris's Hotel Crillon working at a desk with his fellow delegates on the papers to be presented to the conference preparing the Treaty of Versailles, with young Chris Herter standing by. The timbered library had a stairway at the end leading to his bedroom. Foster sometimes entered the house by the side door and used this stairway to his bedroom in order to avoid the ladies' tea parties. At the back a door opened on a leafy stone terrace, where he paced back and forth, looking down the wooded slope in privacy almost equal to that of the home in Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, which he had given up when he assumed his Washington duties.

Monday, January 6, was another story. There were nineteen appointments, including a long session with the National Security Council. Lunch was in the small room, 5157, and took about twenty minutes. The birthday party for Senator Everett M. Dirksen in the Mayflower shortened the working day by about half an hour; the Secretary reached home at a little after seven.

As usual at the beginning of the year there was a service at the National Presbyterian Church. This year it was at eight o'clock Tuesday morning, January 7, with the Cabinet in attendance.

The continuing round of discussions, through Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, brought him into contact with several hundred experts, officials, newsmen, Senators, Congressmen, ambassadors. The executive session with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House was longer than most of the other appointments. So was the meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, preceding the President's State of the Union Message on January 9.

The beginning of the year usually brought several requests to testify on the Hill. These required long hours of preparation and effort in explaining the issues, time that was sometimes out of proportion to the actual substance of the questioning, which was often repetitious. In particular, in 1957, the Secretary had poured an enormous amount of energy into his defense of the Eisenhower Doc-

trine and his request that Congress give "an extra wallop" to the policy that would call for extraordinary action in case of need. This investment of time and effort was to pay off at the time of the crucial decisions with regard to the Middle East in July 1958.

Once the decision was made and the line was set in the Department and with the President, the Secretary's role changed. He ceased to be the analyst or judge, and became the advocate, defending publicly and privately, with Congress, with the leaders of foreign governments, with diplomats, and even with journalists, the steps that had been chosen. The vigor and self-confidence with which he supported a course of action once it had been determined tended occasionally to give others an impression of inflexibility. Few outsiders knew the manner in which the decision had been arrived at in the first place.

He found some of the legislators constructive, but some he regarded as politicians who might unwittingly lay bare the anatomy of foreign policy while this policy was still in the making. There was always the additional problem of untimely leaks to the press. These could be very subtly arranged by those who wanted the headlines. Some would hint that a subject was discussed; then the clever reporter or commentator would write a theoretical construction of problems and solutions. Soon a Senator or Congressman would deny or confirm a part of the story. Then the Secretary would be confronted with the difficult problem of ignoring or clarifying the issue, too complex or too delicate to explain in full. The conclusion in the Department as to how to respond always had to take into consideration the foreign press and the reaction in centers abroad. Self-defense was not Foster's style. He considered it an avoidable drain on his time. He thought it was less important for him to be liked or even understood than it was to devote his full effort to the substance of the job.

Foster's tendency in talking about official matters, to those who could not know the whole story, was to be reserved on actions taken by the Administration. This led to misunderstanding of his actual position on ambassadorial appointments and on his relations with key individuals on the Hill and elsewhere. It was not until afterward that some of us knew he had opposed a number of these actions and had occasionally lost out when domestic politics were at issue.

There is considerable evidence to indicate that the Secretary was sensitive to the treatment he received on the Hill. It had been harsh for a period after the Suez crisis in 1956, and it would be again as the Middle East crisis became more acute, though his relations with

Congress were more cordial in 1958 than they had been the year before. At one time I was in his private limousine when the Secretary was picked up in the evening after a long session on the Hill, several hours under klieg lights, and more time off the record. "They act as if I were a criminal at the bar," he said. "There is no impression that I am an experienced and trusted officer. The questions today were sometimes so hostile, they tried to put me on the defensive. My friends seemed to be watching and waiting." He was weary and exhausted. It was one of the few times I saw him discouraged. Usually he concealed his more somber feelings with either a casual remark or even a joke at himself, at his friends, or at the expense of opponents in the political game. He knew this was part of the job.

HEADLINES AND FOOTNOTES

The Secretary of State strode down the aisle of the State Department auditorium at 11:00 in the morning of January 10, followed by Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Andrew Berding and Press Officer Lincoln White. Andy Berding had under his arm the black briefing book, in which were some sixty or seventy condensed summaries prepared in anticipation of questions. Foster had studied them the night before and perhaps read a revised paper in the elevator going down. I never saw him refer to them during a press conference. As he passed through the room the conversation of newsmen died down.

Sometimes, because of an important event or urgent problem, the conferences were opened by a formal statement, carefully prepared, widely cleared, and intended, by preceding the more varied discussion, to have a strong impact. But today there was none.

The tense silence was broken by his crisp voice: "I am ready for questions."

The first question was "Mr. Secretary, did you read Premier Bulganin's new note as meaning that the Soviet Union intends to call a Summit Conference whether or not the United States or other countries agree in advance?" The next six questions and the long and careful answers of the Secretary were addressed to various aspects of this matter. There followed several questions on disarmament, the problem of German reunification, science for peace, the forthcoming Baghdad Pact meeting, aid to India, questions related to the Middle East, French financial matters, nuclear testing, and Soviet aid in Asia and Africa.

Many questions and answers explored the success of the Soviet Communists in creating the impression that they were anxious for peace. The newsmen endeavored to press the issue that the Soviets were showing more initiative than the United States. Foster countered this with a description of the President's proposal for inspection

against surprise attack, progressive reduction of nuclear stocks, and other attempts to limit armaments. He summed up his explanation by saying, "They cover up that vacuum [in their peace efforts] by being emphatic, shouting about 'how we love peace.' They may have what you call the initiative in terms of using words which are really meaningless unless you give them content. We have initiative in terms of giving content, which alone gives meaning to the talk about peace and limitation of armament."

"Are you then saying that the Soviet Union is articulating a bad policy better than we are articulating a good policy?" a newsman asked.

The Secretary answered, "That could very well be. They have developed their propaganda to a much higher degree than we have done it. Probably that is because of the fact that they do everything through government. . . . They are telling the French that Soviet help would give them everything they want in North Africa. In North Africa . . . they are telling the people there that they should accept Soviet help to get rid of all French influence. They have the capacity to speak with different voices in different places which we don't possess. . . . And also—I will give them credit for it—just as they have developed certain techniques in the field of science, and so forth, to a higher degree than we have, I think they have developed propaganda techniques to a greater extent than we have. Take, for instance, this technique of Bulganin's shooting this letter in to blanket the President's speech of yesterday, and to try to discombobulate the efforts of the NATO Council to work out a coordinated answer to the earlier letter.

"From what you say, Mr. Secretary," a correspondent asked, "is it fair to assume that you have little enthusiasm for talks with the Russians on any level?" The audience laughed.

"I think that I have had more talks with the Russians than perhaps any other American of any comparable position. . . . I think I have been to about fifteen major conferences. . . . You have got to keep trying and trying. . . . You can find areas of common interest. . . . [He spoke of the Lacy-Zaroubin agreement of cultural exchanges as an example.] I am quite prepared to go on trying to reach agreements. . . . I don't want to try to reach an agreement . . . which puts the . . . security of the United States at what . . . is demonstrably a very great hazard."

This was a typical news conference.

There were more than twenty of these conferences in 1958. He held more during the time he was in Washington and not on trips than any

recent Secretary of State. Before the new building was opened two years later, 150 to 175 newsmen could crowd into the old auditorium for the conferences. The back of the room was always full of cameras, sound recorders, and a tangle of wire cables. Latecomers had to stand. Only a few of the Department officers were allowed to attend because of the limited space. When the conference was over, usually at 11:45, John Hightower, as dean of the press corps, would say, "Thank you, Mr. Secretary," and the Secretary would walk rapidly up the aisle, followed by a rush of reporters—like the breaking of a log jam—to reach the telephones.

The meeting with the Press Club on January 16 was more festive in atmosphere than the conference of January 10. When the Secretary and Berding and some of his other aides got into the car on Twenty-first Street to drive to the Press Club building on Fourteenth Street, Foster had in his briefcase a short speech over which he had worked many hours. A first draft had been prepared by a junior officer and had been read carefully by Foster before he started to line up his own speech on his yellow pad. Then he worked on the text, chiefly on Sunday. The relation between Foster and the section assigned to speech writing was sometimes indirect. The Secretary wrote his own speeches and then was meticulous in circulating each draft for comment. He worked in such concentration and in such an intense manner that he was frequently on his fourth or fifth draft before his colleagues could catch up with the first and second. However, he took all the suggestions into account because of the importance he attached to the final statement. The draft the Secretary used at the Press Club was probably the ninth or tenth draft. It had been worked on by senior officers, cleared by many, and reviewed by the President.

Clearance is the bane of existence in the State Department when it concerns small matters demanding too much time from too many people, but it is a safeguard and a useful instrument on important matters. When the Secretary planned to speak of major policies affecting troubled areas or to discuss such questions as nuclear testing, disarmament, a summit meeting, or some new proposal for international cooperation, the draft in a preliminary form, perhaps a second or third draft, would be circulated through the assistant secretaries to a number of desk officers, including, of course, those in the Bureau of Public Affairs most competent to handle this matter and aware of the probable public reaction.

After careful review within the Department the manuscript would

then in many instances be made available to the Pentagon or to other agencies outside the Department for a review. Once a manuscript had passed through these two stages, it would be ready to be submitted to the President, having the benefit of the views of perhaps thirty or forty officers. The President said to me that he rarely made substantial changes in anything the Secretary wrote, but that his suggestions were invariably adopted. I know that the Secretary felt these contributed to the effectiveness of his statements.

Thus, while it is true that a cable affecting a small economic matter or some minor suggestion with regard to a conference or travel of one of the ambassadors often requires several days of clearance in a dozen offices, to the irritation of the Department, the system, if used with some discretion, is a necessary protection of American interests. It also serves to keep the thinking of many persons in harmony on important matters.

In welcoming the Secretary before one of the largest crowds to gather at the club, Ben Grant, President of the National Press Club, said that someone recently had written, "Any American boy has a chance to become President, but he also runs the risk of being appointed Secretary of State." He wondered why the Secretary had accepted the job—to become, as he said, one of the "most important men on earth."

The Secretary noted that he had had in the last few years more than two hundred meetings with the press here and abroad. "And at least it can be said that I survived those multiple contacts although some would say I have not survived unscathed." He continued: "I can say this, that nothing has taken place which has shaken my faith in the press, my desire to have close and intimate relations with the press, even though we disagree at times" and added that "the operations of the free press is one of the great bulwarks of our society."

The Secretary spoke for approximately twenty minutes, deliberately leaving considerable time for questions from the floor. He spoke of the recent success of the Russian Sputnik and the effect of this achievement on American public opinion. He affirmed his belief that the Soviet minds "fine enough to deal with modern scientific and technical problems cannot be kept from coming to independent conclusions about other matters." He stressed the importance of United States strength and the role of negotiations in achieving a just peace. His talk had been written as a further answer to the Bulganin and Khrushchev note, to which the official reply had been sent on January

12. He referred to the President's formal answer and called for a convincing indication of the will to deal on an effective and acceptable basis. He suggested it was a serious weakness in the Soviet position that they could not disengage themselves from the German problem, a problem they could not solve.

The question period brought many queries, among them one on the always provocative problem of Red China. "Any time it will serve the interests of the United States to recognize the Communist Chinese regime, we will do it," the Secretary answered.

He was then asked by one newsman if the decision whether or not to condemn the aggressors had to be made now, he would take a position different from the one he had taken with regard to the action of France and the United Kingdom and Israel at Suez in 1956. He may well have thought at that moment of the three trips he took to Europe in the summer of 1956 to stave off later tragic events and which, in his view, one could have assumed made clear to Britain and France the American reaction if they used military means to settle the Suez question.

He told the reporters that the decision to condemn the attack on Egypt was one of the hardest the President and he had had to make. "I have never yet in public office—and I do not think I ever shall—try to explain the reasons or defend myself for that, because I cannot do that without reopening old wounds, old controversies, which we are trying to heal and which, in my opinion, have been healed, for which I thank God." He warned that negotiations with the Soviets must be undertaken only with the assumption that the task is hard and long.

The sessions with the press were stimulating, and after the session was over, there was always some discussion in the Department of the questions raised. If a sharp reaction could be expected abroad, it was sometimes decided that cables giving the background should go to the United States ambassadors in a number of countries for their use with the local news media.

At all levels in the State Department and in the White House much thought was devoted to dealings with the newsmen. Each bureau would consider very specifically what it hoped the Secretary would say, and what idea he could put across. The local and the foreign press were on their toes to watch for breaks. Only rarely did he turn for confirmation to his assistants, or postpone an answer for further facts. Almost no type of question was barred. Nothing was too detailed, or too general, nothing too sensitive to be broached. John Hightower, who was always on hand, said to me that, as contrasted

with the President's press conferences, the Secretary was often asked five or six questions on one topic. The effort was made to find in some variation in his answers a clue to the latest thinking, a hint as to a change in policy. He, on his part, aware of this danger, was not afraid to repeat his exact words if he felt variation in language would lead to misconstruction.

On a number of occasions his comment was curt: "No," "Yes," or "I cannot comment." He felt the stakes were too high in this battle of wits to rely on brilliance or repartee, or to appear to be embarrassed by a question.

The press presented the Secretary with a well-recognized dilemma. In many cases no one else, except the President, could set the record straight. If the Secretary made a statement, it echoed through the Kremlin as well as in the foreign offices of sixty or seventy countries. He wanted the newsmen, who were able and energetic in their pursuit of facts, to see the underlying principles of the United States position and to sense the power and direction of our programs. He enjoyed the sharpness of the questions, but he was quick to recognize the traps that might be laid for him. Some observers have concluded that the consequences of a misstatement could be so disastrous that the whole tradition of off-the-cuff discussion was wrong. Yet, in spite of some misgivings, because of our natural openness of temperament, United States officials go further in sharing views with the press corps than do those of other countries.

Occasionally there was a humorous response. When the Secretary was asked about student rioting in Taipei, he responded, "I wouldn't attach too much importance to these student riots. I remember when I was a student at the Sorbonne in Paris I used to go out and riot occasionally."

"On whose side, sir?"

"I can't remember now which side it was on. That shows how students just like to riot for the fun of it."

Although there was a hint of battle at the beginning of many of the morning sessions in the crowded auditorium, it was the kind of contest that Dulles relished. By the time the questions had been answered, enlarged upon, parried, or exploded, he had most of the gathering with him. This was not always apparent in the stories that were written. He knew that reporters, responding to the need for news stories of local impact for their home papers, might not always give the full picture, and in rare instances the necessity for speed in filing a story led to some distortion.

On the whole, I think Foster enjoyed the news conferences. John

Hightower described him in a conversation with me as "the master." Foster knew that he was being tested by alert and often aggressive minds. He felt that this was a fair contest and that it called for his best effort. He knew that most of the questions in the forefront of public thinking would be presented to him in these meetings.

He said to Berding, as Andy quoted in his book, *Foreign Policy and You*, that the great importance of public support "does not mean that foreign policy should be created by public opinion." He believed that the President and the Secretary had the duty of taking leadership. "However, Mr. Dulles made two important qualifications: The Administration could not be too far ahead of public opinion, and the Administration had a responsibility to inform the people adequately and bring public opinion along with it."

When one reviews the record, it is evident that he used the news conference as an instrument of foreign policy. Since he had always maintained that strength was in large measure moral, it is logical that he should consider the convictions and aspirations of the people of the United States, molded in considerable measure by the press, as an important element in the survival and progress of the nation. Since he had always contended that miscalculations on the part of the enemy were the most serious threat to our security, he tried to issue warnings and indicate willingness to oppose aggression with force through those channels he deemed most effective.

In the days of Secretary Hull the relations with the press were extremely informal, almost casual. Berding remembers that the Secretary would go once every day to the reception room in Old State and hold a news conference. Approximately a dozen correspondents would attend, and the session might be over in ten minutes or less. The gradual increase of the scope of the Department's operations and of the gravity of many of the problems gradually changed the situation, and the public demand for news rose with it. One of the Department officers said, "The Secretary was the ablest public figure in our time in using a press conference to keep the public informed about the major complicated issues of the day."

Berding says that Herter avoided press conferences when possible. He felt they were dangerous. Berding had written out some suggestions for Herter for one press reception. "To my dismay, however, he told the newsmen in all honesty that he did not like press conferences, and why." But "in background conferences he was at ease and superb."

Foster had a number of discussions with his brother, Allen, about

the good and the bad of news conferences. Allen in the Central Intelligence Agency was more protected from the public. He questioned sometimes whether the State Department had to be as responsive as it was to the desires of the newspapers. Both men recognized the uncertainties of any one of these sessions. There was some protection in the fact that the text was edited as the script was run off in sections during and immediately after the conference. Changes of meaning were never made, but in the case of a word, or a slip of tongue, a sentence was sometimes edited; but little needed to be done. On this as on other matters, Foster and Allen had many a frank and animated discussion, frequently ending with a mutually agreed conclusion, each always valuing the point of view of the other.

To the Secretary both the large and small newspapers were important. Berding says, "Secretary Dulles said to me that the most important feature of his press conference was the transcript published textually by the *New York Times*. This, he believed, was read word for word by every embassy in Washington and many foreign offices overseas and by thousands of influential people."

But he had decided when he assumed the office of Secretary of State to give an equal opportunity to the reporters from the small papers as far as possible and not to give the inside track to those from the large metropolitan dailies. This created some difficulty, for the men from the powerful journals vied for a special entree. Some of them thought that by their competence and reliability they had staked out a well-established right. Perhaps because he was a small-town boy himself, this attitude went against the grain of the Secretary, and he never yielded to the pressure.

The special evenings he gave occasionally to selected groups of newsmen were welcomed by them, but a serious strain on him, especially when, in a few instances, the ground rules were broken. It was understood that the Secretary would make plain when he was talking "for attribution," and when he was giving intimate details that might help them anticipate coming events but that were not to be reported. Occasionally a reporter betrayed this confidence.

A notable case was an unauthorized story after a dinner by the Secretary in 1954, which caused trouble in England and the United States. He was speculating informally on possible variations in policies regarding Taiwan and Korea, reviewing a number of possibilities. The story in the *New York Times* on the basis of questions by a guest bore little relation to anything the Secretary said.

Many of Foster's answers to newsmen were fairly long and self-contained statements of United States policy. But his love of abstract analysis, his desire to defend the logic in a course of action, even before the exact nature of decisions on a program had been determined, sometimes led him to statements that were misconstrued in the retelling.

Words were his instruments and his enemies. He had been used to a precise and serious use of words for almost half a century. He did not like and did not tolerate sloppy use of language among his friends and associates.

But his very precision sometimes caused difficulties. The statement in 1955 in which he said Goa was regarded as a province of Portugal caused great furor in India. In expressing what was understood to be a legal reality, some reported the story as if he seemed to say Goa *should* belong to Portugal. They thought they saw policy in what was intended as a descriptive statement of fact. Yet he had not said that the situation was either desirable or undesirable. He knew that for four hundred years Goa had been considered a province of Portugal. His own view of colonies had always been—as he was to explain to General de Gaulle later—that they should be free and independent at the earliest date consistent with their welfare.

His use of the term “agent,” which also caused a considerable disturbance in Germany, was in a context of careful, legal analysis. (See Chapter 15.) The Secretary of State was speculating at the November 26 news conference about the possibility of East Germans acting as “agents” of the Soviet—but would he, people asked, take a further step and consider these officials servants of a *sovereign* East Germany? (The answer, of course, was no.) If such a new turn of events were to be taken, many thought, the accepted policy on Berlin unification and on Central Europe would collapse.

All such matters are of great concern to those who think a word may mean war and peace. To understand what is meant one must have a precise feeling for what weight a speaker puts into each phrase. One has to listen in much the same mood as that which governs the speaker; this few are willing to do.

The lively arguments that sometimes developed in the press conferences seemed to him to help clarify issues. It was not always evident to him at the time that the subsequent article might lack the balance of the group discussion and that the readers would fail to get a well-rounded understanding.

Newsmen and the public, using striking words from his speeches, repeated the shortened phrases, so that the busy reader was left

with words like "brink," "massive retaliation," "liberation"—phrases that seemed to many to suggest alarming possibilities.

A number of phrases were used over and over, often out of context, frequently without giving the sense or even the wording actually used. Most striking of these was probably the word "brink." The origin of the terms "brink" and "brinkmanship" is of keen interest and can now be told.

On Sunday, December 4, 1955, an interview took place that was to shape Foster's public image, to his disadvantage, as much as any single chance event of his Secretaryship. Three men, all connected with the Henry Luce publications, came to the house on Thirty-second Street shortly after lunch. One was James Shepley, then head of *Time's* Domestic News Bureau. Another was John Beal, who covered the State Department for *Time*. The third was Charles J. V. Murphy, Washington editor for *Fortune*. The meeting was arranged at the request of Murphy, who was developing a series of articles about the Eisenhower years and who, on this occasion, was particularly interested in how President Eisenhower and Foster had collaborated in developing foreign policy. Shepley was there because he was gathering material for a *Life* article. Beal was well launched on a book about Foster, and he brought a tape recorder.

The discussion, which lasted two hours, was easy, wide-ranging, and informal; it was understood on both sides that its substance was to be off the record, although Foster did agree that he might later permit certain points to be attributed to him if they were cleared with his office. Some five weeks later, in the issue of January 16, *Life* came out with an article by Shepley, which was announced on the cover by the dramatic headline: THREE TIMES AT BRINK OF WAR: HOW DULLES GAMBLED AND WON. That phrase with its aura of unrestrained adventurism was to carry an impression of recklessness that Foster's enemies never stopped exploiting and which his friends were hard-put to square with the search for peace, which was his true and deep concern. The word "brinkmanship" entered the political vocabulary of our times, always to be associated with Foster, and caused him profound distress.

So fierce was the storm that blew up in Washington and abroad, even while the magazine itself was still in the mails, that Foster was strongly urged by many of his colleagues at the White House and inside the State Department to repudiate the interview. He chose not to do so. He decided that an attempt on his part to set forth his inherent position would only add fuel to a controversy that had run out of control; the wisest course, in his judgment, was to let the

matter be brought, all in good time, into a truer perspective by his own actions. Here, it may well be, he miscalculated. He underestimated the long-run consequences of the catchy phrase of "brinkmanship." For the phrase had the singular quality of highlighting those very aspects of his character—his resolution, his sense of certainty about what was right—that built the foundations of his carefully prepared decisions. These were the qualities that equipped him to grasp the essential elements in a crisis, and yet in such a way as to give anxiety to many who did not fully understand either the scruples that entered into his nature or the stakes United States foreign policy was defending. The statement in the Shepley article that gave rise to the furore was as follows:

Always, of course, there has been and continues to be risk. Says Dulles, "You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. Some say that we were brought to the verge of war. Of course we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into war is the necessary art. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost. We've had to look it squarely in the face—on the question of enlarging the Korean war, on the question of getting into the Indochina war, on the question of Formosa. We walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action."

These words in the statement were spoken, but in a context that was not given, and they were not for attribution. Charles Murphy, who had asked Foster the question that elicited the statement, says that, taken alone, it gives quite a different impression from the one Foster had clearly intended to convey. It came at the end of a long disquisition, lasting perhaps ten minutes, on the circumstances of the Communist challenge that United States policy had to meet first in Korea, then in Indochina, and finally at Quemoy and Matsu, the island approaches to Taiwan. Foster was in his own library, at ease. He summed up the different circumstances presented by each challenge as it arose and the risks the United States was forced to run in coping with the succession of threats; the gist of his argument was that in each case the United States had been "dragged to the brink of war." Had it not then been willing to grapple with a deadly and adventurous opponent, the country would surely have been drawn into the abyss in the end. This was a very different matter from appearing to gamble lightly with the destiny of nations. The art of diplomacy in crisis, as Foster explained it, lay in recognizing danger and facing it; this was what "brinkmanship" as an effective policy

really meant to him and indeed, that single statement apart, it was the idea that the article itself tried to convey, as a careful reading will show.

The fatal phrase, however, was never to be overtaken. A draft of the article was submitted to one of Foster's assistants as *Life* was already on the presses; the political implications were either not sensed or the time was too short for drastic changes. The damage, in any event, went unrepaired. Foster never saw the draft before publication. Henry Luce, who quickly made himself familiar with the circumstances of the Sunday meeting, gallantly tried to quiet the storm by issuing a statement, in his role as editor in chief of his publications, in which he made it clear that Shepley's report was based not so much on an authorized interview as on a review of the historical record, for which Foster had supplied the background. The tape recording was long ago destroyed; no transcript of the discussion remains. It is a pity.

Foster used at least half a dozen other phrases, oft quoted and misquoted, and some were to take on a disturbing meaning as they became further and further divorced from their original setting. The statements regarding "liberation" and the "rollback" of Communism were, some charged, hypocritical, but they were used at a time when many hoped for possibilities of advancing freedom in East Europe. The optimism of views clearly had to be revised as Communist aggressive potential increased.

His term "agonizing reappraisal" was well understood by some of the leaders of Europe, and they shared the same sense of the need for action. After the defeat of the European Defense Community in August, they established, almost at once, the Western European Union—a substitute, a stopgap, and a halfway station on the road toward the European Economic Community.

The term "massive retaliation" has been used as characteristic of Foster's concept of strategy in the cold war ever since his speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12, 1954. In this he said, "Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power." He explained the danger of permitting the aggressor to assume that manpower would be decisive and added that "The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing." Because the press isolated the words "massive retaliation" from the rest of the text, his

further analysis in the article of April 1954, in *Foreign Affairs*, took on special importance. Foster was aware of the public concern.

Here he was elaborating his views, aware that the "nuclear pacifists" were attempting to sharpen the difference between conventional wars and atomic conflict likely to destroy a large segment of mankind. It seemed important therefore to explain more fully the relation of various means of cooperative defense using sometimes conventional forces, sometimes mobile units with tactical atomic capabilities and a variety of weapons. Most important was the effort to demonstrate the will to use ultimate weapons in order to prevent miscalculation. This determination could show an aggressor that he could not prudently concentrate on one victim if the power to retaliate were evident.

In the 1954 article as well as in one in *Foreign Affairs* of October 1957 he placed collective defense in a broad setting of economic and political measures. He stated that atomic attack and thermonuclear retaliation are not the types usually evoked under all circumstances; indirect and minor forms of aggression must be anticipated. And again he said, "In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon the deterrence of vast retaliatory power." In discussing in this article and elsewhere the "long haul" concept, which he felt should guide planning after the Korean emergency had passed, he gave attention to the broader problems of economic development and the more delicate aspects of the defensive pacts and the mutual-security measures, which seemed to him of crucial importance in developing balanced and enduring strength. "Thus, in contrast to the 1950 decade, it may be that by the 1960 decade the nations which are around the Sino-Soviet perimeter can possess an effective defense against full-scale conventional attack and thus confront any aggressor with the choice between failing or himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country." The message that he was conveying to the potential aggressors was clear as he endeavored to enlarge the scope of planning for the free world.

The concept of "unleashing Chiang Kai-shek" was sometimes associated with the Secretary, although there seems to be no indication that he laid the basis for the phrase. In connection with their determination to end the Korean War the President and Foster developed what has been described as a three-pronged attack, acting through New Delhi, directly in Korea, and by laying the way open for a possible flanking movement by Nationalist Chinese forces. It was not surprising therefore that he did stand behind the decision

to draw back the Seventh Fleet as a warning to Red China that they could not wage war on the United States without risk of serious developments. The Presidential announcement early in 1953 was followed by the Korean armistice in July; the decision was thought to have induced the armistice signing.

The various uses of the term "neutralism" have not been studied comparatively. It is probable that the later statements reflected a somewhat different meaning from some of the discussion in the earlier speeches and press conferences. There is no doubt, however, that the Secretary felt that every free country should, according to its capacity and its strength, carry some of the burden of protecting freedom. This duty meant facing the issues and acting along with other nations of like mind.

"Summitry" was a word that gained vogue in 1958. It derived from the speech of Winston Churchill on May 11, 1953. It took on a symbolic meaning and was vivid in its clarity for the average person. The Secretary used the word, but was not inclined to believe that the bleak crags or shining peaks of the summit suggested a rich and fruitful treasure. He used the phrase in the manner of the day, but when he thought conversations might be fruitful, he usually referred to them instead as "negotiations."

If he said "Communism must fail," it was easy for some to infer that we would win the cold war without delay. This situation is not unique in public life. It may be that he did not fare worse than others. Yet it was to him a cause for irony, because he had been trying to clarify his views by constant speaking and writing for more than three decades. The fact that some of the catchy and partially misquoted phrases echoed for years and could not be amended was, to him, frequently a source of chagrin.

When in Congress in 1958 a few were even asking for his impeachment and some newspapers printed articles saying "Dulles must go," he had the satisfaction, at least, of knowing that the Kremlin understood his meaning.

By 1958 the belief had arisen in some quarters that the Secretary was willing to risk disaster for the sake of standing on a previously annunciated principle.

A wide variety of opinions concerning Foster's service as Secretary of State was expressed in headlines and columns by leading journalists at this time, although some of those who wrote critical articles had a private admiration for the performance of the man who could fence with them so adroitly in the news conferences.

In late December of 1957 and in early January there were numer-

ous articles on his policies, some requesting his resignation. These seemed to be of sufficient currency to call for official notice. In any case President Eisenhower made a statement on January 16 that Mr. Dulles was the best Secretary since Thomas Jefferson and that there was not the remotest prospect of his resignation. This endorsement was discussed by James Reston, of the *New York Times*, in his column of January 17, entitled "Dulles Stars at Bat." The Secretary arrived at the Press Club, he wrote, "in good spirits," and he "hit quite a few curve ball questions out of the park and departed at 2:15 with the score very definitely in his favor."

A number of complimentary articles were to appear in February at the time of his seventieth birthday. In the first part of this year, his stock appeared to be rising, although he continued to be an interesting target for editorials and feature articles. In the minds of some he seemed to stand for opposition to negotiation, although there was no real basis for this conclusion.

Although some of the shrewdest commentators now seemed to understand his attitude, the image of a rocklike, inflexible figure, with a frozen position, unwilling to negotiate, continued to be a favorite subject in the cartoons.

After the NATO meeting in Copenhagen in May, a number of articles appeared hailing "Dulles at his best." Later, in July, the swift and successful action in Lebanon brought more praise than blame. In the fall of 1958, however, the shelling of the Offshore Islands was reported to have reduced his popularity for some weeks. The tide turned soon after the off-again-on-again cessation of the shelling. By the time of the Berlin crisis in November and the NATO meeting in December, which was firmly handled by the Allies, public support was running strongly in his favor.

Toward the end of 1957 Foster had become increasingly concerned about his relations with the news media. He had always recognized the importance of keeping the American public informed, not only because political support for the Administration was important, but even more because foreign policy affected the lives of the whole nation, irrespective of party or other affiliations. He had hoped as time went on that his speeches and other public statements could throw sufficient light on the intricate problems with which he was dealing. Yet a number of influential writers seemed to be critical of the government's foreign policies to the point where their writings sometimes obscured the issues. He felt it might be useful to make a special effort to be sure that publishers, editors, and leading columnists and commentators understood what he was trying to do.

In October 1957, with this in mind, he called on Philip K. Crowe to take on the job as representative on dealings with the press on matters related to policy. Since Ambassador Crowe, who had just returned from Ceylon, was not to have any administrative responsibilities and was not of course to take over any of the duties already being carried by the Bureau of Public Affairs, he would be free to travel and talk with persons in the public-relations field in the United States and abroad. Crowe rendered useful service and was followed late in 1958 by William Scranton, now Governor of Pennsylvania.

Crowe sat with the press at news conferences and attended many meetings, talking to the men informally. The severest criticism in the press came from both the extreme right and the extreme left groups in the United States and also from certain foreign centers where leading policies had come to diverge from those in Washington. But others were also restive. Thus, although Foster had increased his contact with the press over what had been normally the case, in the last ten years this special arrangement seemed useful as a way to lessen the impression of his remoteness.

Many of the newsmen had resented the fact that the Secretary was unduly cautious in barring them from trips to Red China. Quite naturally they wanted the adventure and the challenging opportunity of going to Peiping and felt that what was going on there should be reported. The Secretary, however, had talked to many correspondents from other countries who had been there, and he knew that there was much less to be gleaned from talks in the Chinese capital than many thought. He was convinced also that the Chinese authorities did not wish to have them come.

He had come to the conclusion in any case in 1957 that he would not in principle oppose their going and would lift the passport prohibition at least to a limited extent. Thus, he said, they could select representatives to go. This act did not materially alter the situation; the Red Chinese, not assured of visas to the United States, refused to allow the newsmen to come into the country. The reporters still felt frustrated, and some continued to blame the Secretary.

Foster had been faced with the problem of how to explain himself and his views to the people. He relied a great deal upon the fact that the President could speak to, and reach, some of those he could not. This familiar and well-loved leader had been able to bridge the gap of doubt and distrust that often opens between those with power and those who feel they are helpless, defenseless, and, at times, in ignorance. If it was not easy for Foster to get through to some groups, it was in part, he realized, because of some logical or theoretical

element that seemed to set his principles apart from those of average men—though he thought his principles were theirs, too—and in part because he could not wisely manifest doubts or fears without damaging his position in a foreign-policy debate. The correct impression was sometimes difficult to achieve because of an image that had developed in the early part of his official life—as the successful lawyer, reserved, lacking in sympathy for those whom he did not know, quick in decision, but unwilling to change with changing circumstances.

The President has power; the people elect him to exercise it. But the fact that an appointed officer, in one of the least-loved agencies, one that seems to do little for the immediate welfare of the American people, should hold a crucial position, able to make decisions perhaps affecting their lives and security, induced a feeling of public uneasiness.

In public relations those close to the Administration, including Foster and his colleagues, counted heavily on the direct honesty and kindly personality of the President to create approval of policies involved with dangers and sacrifices some were loath to accept.

There is perhaps no solution to such a dilemma, for a weak Secretary can cause dangers much more real than those people imagine. Foster did not expect to be popular. He set an exacting standard for himself and for others. His code of ethics called for dedication from those who had education and opportunity. He gave short shrift to those who did not live up to their capabilities, whatever they might be, and those who did not carry a load corresponding to their capacities.

The standards of behavior that he set seemed to some exacting. And it is possible that he sometimes overestimated the potential of others, judging on too little evidence that a person had failed in his "obvious" ability to serve his family, his business, or his nation.

Some said he was self-righteous, yet he was humble before God and history. He was not arrogant. Those with a legitimate reason to debate his views were encouraged to do so, and those who had, in the State Department's phrase, "a need to know," such as the ambassadors from abroad, were given long and patient accounts of what was happening and why. He did not think, however, that he was called on to justify his actions to those who knew few of the facts, or to whom it was impossible to communicate the more sensitive elements of the problems with which he was dealing.

It was his conclusion, often expressed, that only by using both the spiritual and material resources of the nation to the fullest ex-

tent could we hold back the forces of tyranny and in the end bring new freedom to men everywhere. But when he stated these facts, there were those who thought his words a sermon and his message without warmth. In this last year Foster was to make a determined and repeated effort to explain to those who were hesitant and critical not so much his views, but the views that he thought the American people should hold for their safety and welfare.

The atmosphere changed among serious newsmen, and by the later months there were, not only in Washington but elsewhere, many who could interpret his ideas to those who could not or did not read his longer statements. The very precision of his wording called for an effort to interpret his meaning. At the same time, he knew that his efforts to give the kind of information that was sought were limited by the gravity of the issues. The attempt to create a tone of friendly sympathy for those who were fearful and for those who considered themselves occasionally the potential victims of overriding events was to a considerable extent beyond the limits of normal time and energy.

Therefore he tried in old and new ways to explain the threat of Communism against political, intellectual, and religious freedom, and its meaning for the laboring man, the teacher, the artist, the businessman.

How could he show that the world was changing but that firm principles must still guide conduct? He had tried different approaches with partial success, and he was to use the news conference with increasing skill and with remarkable frequency. He felt he could not, however, vary his basic form of statement, or yield his deep-rooted beliefs, even though the repeated references to phrases like "atheistic Communism" jarred on some of his listeners and readers. Whether in this year his efforts at achieving understanding succeeded or failed, it is still too soon to say. He was sensitive to criticism, yet when he had decided on the best course of action, in the light of all circumstances, he never pleaded his own defense, or showed his own personal difficulties and doubts to the world. He was judged, and, he would admit, rightly, by the consequences of his actions and not by his motives.

FAR COUNTRIES

On the morning of January 22 there was a National Security Council meeting. Foster attended it and also had half an hour's talk with the President before leaving for the Middle East for the meeting of the Baghdad Pact countries.

When he arrived at the airport, just after noon on this cold wintry day, he found the waiting diplomats of the Baghdad Pact countries, the dean of the diplomatic corps, and a group of newsmen there to see him off. Janet was already there with his personal baggage, including detective stories for him, crossword puzzles for her, his dark blue cashmere shawl, his old beige sweater, leather slippers, and his formal clothing, the bedboard and a bottle of Overholt Rye. Janet had long ago learned the routine of packing. She went with him on most of his journeys (she had diplomatic passport Number One, a distinction arranged for her; the Secretary had Number Two). She often took notes, helped him with the social side of the trips, and got to know the embassy staffs and their wives.

Also waiting at the airport were the group who were going on the plane, Phyllis Bernau with working supplies and pads for the Secretary and a typewriter for her use on the plane, Jerry Greene with the briefing books and the latest cables. Some of the Department officers, particularly those connected with the countries to be visited, and a few friends and their wives and children clustered around. There was a sense of drama about each trip, even though many of those who came to the airport had little knowledge of why it was to be made or what would be accomplished. Many knew that these trips were arduous, even dangerous. The travelers waiting as the plane was readied for its long flight saw the tall, broad-shouldered figure look around to greet his friends and colleagues with a humorous nod and a short word of farewell.

The Secretary's hair was ruffled in the breeze as he stood before the microphone. His departure statement was brief, for he did not want

to anticipate the outcome of the meeting. He would be back in this same airport in six or seven days, greeting some of the same people. He spoke of the half-hour conference he had just had with the President, of their joint concern about subversive activities in the Middle East instigated from outside. He referred to the right of collective defense provided in the United Nations Charter—a right that he had helped to safeguard in the drafting of the charter in San Francisco in 1945—and referred in passing to Morocco and Iran, chosen for the brief stops for talks and for fueling and rest for the crew on the way to Ankara. I was on the outskirts of the group, and he motioned me aside to tell me briefly what he thought would come out of the National Security Council that might affect Berlin policy, on which I had been working. (There would not be a substantial change, but a slightly new meaning might be attached to policy statements as possible emergencies were considered. Since there were no recorded minutes of discussions in the council, his comment was of great interest to me in connection with my work for the coming months.)

The plane was now ready for the take-off. Foster shook hands with the circle of diplomats, nodded to his other friends, went quickly up the steps, turned with a wave and a smile, and the door was slammed shut.

There were many jokes and cartoons about Foster's travels as Secretary—in fact, it was the cartoonists' favorite way of portraying him. One of the jokes circulating around Washington at the time was a take-off on Robert Paul Smith's book. The joke went this way: "Have you heard the title of John Foster Dulles's autobiography? It's *Where Did You Go? Out. What Did You Do? Nothing.*" Then at the meetings of the Gridiron Club, Washington's exclusive newspaper fraternity, the skits often showed the Secretary in an amusing travel situation. In one of the instances described by Beal, in his book *John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959*, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were allegedly to have had a meeting at Washington Airport—the only place they could nab the Secretary for a conference between his trips—and the Secretary arrived from Asia wearing an aviator's antigravity suit and a space helmet. Foster enjoyed this kind of good-natured humor, and though he may have been hurt by some of the more grotesque newspaper cartoons, he knew this sort of thing was part of the game.

The responsibilities of the Secretary of State have so increased over the years that Secretary Dean Rusk is covering more territory than Foster himself did; but, at the time, Foster's travels were record-

breaking. Since he flew in the slower Constellations, people estimated he was aloft longer than any other statesman. He had a great love of adventure and a longing to see even farther frontiers. One summer day when he was standing on my terrace and I was questioning the significance of an attempt to reach the moon, he turned to me reflectively: "I would very much like to go to the moon. It would be a tremendously exciting adventure."

"But there's nothing up there to do," I protested.

"I would still like to see it." He spoke eagerly, as though he might actually go some day.

Our mother's diary refers to Foster's first journey on May 11, 1888, when his parents carried him wrapped in a blue coat and cap, with a nurse to help, by sleigh, by train, by ferry and horse car, and then by sleeper from his grandfather's home in Washington, where he was born, to New York City and then to Watertown. The trip required just over twenty-four hours. He was three months old.

In the years to come he was to travel far and circle the globe, going from Rome to the Far East in less time than it had taken to go from Washington to Watertown. There was an international tradition in the family on the Dulles side: an Envoy John Welsh; Joseph Dulles, a merchant (in the China tea trade); two missionaries, Harriet Lathrop Winslow, who lived in Ceylon, and her son-in-law, John Welsh Dulles, who served in India. On the Foster side his maternal grandparents lived abroad and were in the diplomatic service, with chief assignments to Mexico, Russia, Spain, as well as negotiating in Japan, for China, the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Their work and travels took them to many lands over a period of fifty years, during which John W. Foster was connected with the "Department," as well as being Secretary of State. Foster observed also the heavy burdens and grave anxieties of international diplomacy from his uncle, Robert Lansing—the husband of his mother's sister, Eleanor Foster—who was Secretary under Woodrow Wilson.

The life in Washington, which all of us shared, was a vital part of his preparation for understanding people and problems. It gave him a greater sophistication than would normally have come to him as an upstate boy in a small town. All of us spent one or two winters with our grandparents, and Foster lived as a young man for two years at the Foster home at 1323 Eighteenth Street when he attended George Washington Law School. These visits were glamorous and full of excitement for all of us children.

The large four-story red-brick house, which my grandfather built, had plenty of room for living, working, and entertaining. My grand-

mother, Mary Parke Foster, presided like a duchess over the tea table at five o'clock, as Senators, Justices, ambassadors, and State Department officials came in early, with plenty of time for a relaxed hour of conversation before a formal dinner. The reception rooms—the size of small ballrooms, as they seemed to us children—were romantic with their tablets, screens, hangings, and vases from the Far East and Europe.

The women with their sequins and plumes and the men with their decorations and sashes were dashing and romantic. Altogether, the teas and dinners had a dignity and graciousness that make modern cocktail parties seem chaotic by comparison.

Madison, the graying colored butler, had his own style of protecting the family and was known to welcome even the most dignified by familiar names. On one occasion he dismissed a less welcome caller by saying that all the ladies and gentlemen were in the bathtub! In spite of my grandfather's stern code of behavior (he was usually called Mr. Foster or John W., in a formal manner), Madison was heard to indulge in picturesque lies to protect the family and to aid the young people, particularly Foster and Margaret, who were in the debutant set, in their more frivolous activities. He died in the unnumbered nineties in 1939 surrounded by silver punchbowls and framed and autographed photographs of royalty in his picturesque apartment in Foggy Bottom, not far from the drawing room from which the "treasures" we gave him had come. He was a devoted and loved part of the patriarchal scene in the family home.

Although of course as young children we had neither telephone, radio, nor phonograph, we had many windows on the outside world. It was natural that the family circle should often include missionaries from foreign lands, and we had close friends in Beirut, China, Korea, India, and, in fact, scattered pretty well over the globe. We did not think of these people in terms of foreign policy, but we did grow to understand the life, the poverty, the superstitions, and the eager hopefulness of those with whom the missionaries dealt. Foster gained much from these contacts, some of which he renewed in later life. As a result, it would be hard to say that there was any area of the world for which he did not as Secretary have a personal and even intimate feeling.

In the years of our childhood we moved back and forth between more quiet days in Watertown and Auburn and the more rapid pace of Washington diplomatic life. It is apparent now that this swing from one tempo of quiet living to another that so clearly reflected the excitement of far countries and other cultures gave us all curiosity

and a desire to see and understand, a desire that stimulated our interest in international affairs and our zest for adventure.

Part of Foster's preparation for his later travels had been his trips abroad with our father, Allen Macy Dulles. Although as a minister and then professor of theology he could not afford luxuries, he managed to pay for steamer passages and take his son abroad for bicycle trips and for Alpine climbing. Some photographs show the man and the boy standing together on a glacier, the father slight of build, but alert and with the look of strength and balance, his son, broad-shouldered, already showing signs of mature strength. These were good days of vagabonding, seeing the country, learning about the people.

It was always a wonder to us afterward how my father with his small salary (my mother took no pay for her full-time work as head of the Women's Educational and Industrial Union) was able to finance these trips to Europe. The answer lies in part in the fact that the fare on a small steamer was very low, and that in addition he had a small family nest egg. It is true that our grandfather, John W. Foster, helped with the education of the children at the college stage, but there is no indication that he gave any other subsidy to my parents, who felt independent in spirit and perfectly capable of tailoring their simple living to the funds available. During most of these years my father held two jobs, as pastor and as professor.

Many of the stories of the sojourns abroad became family folklore. It is not surprising that "John W." took his handsome, intelligent, French-speaking grandson with him as an assistant when he went to the second Hague Peace Conference. He was a secretary to the Chinese delegation—or started off that way, ending up as secretary to the entire conference. Foster showed his ingenuity when the conference could not get started because a diplomatic impasse had developed over who should call on whom first. He solved the problem by taking the cards of all the diplomats and delivering them in one drive around the city. Foster was only nineteen years old at the time.

Foster had always traveled lightly and easily, whether he was going out on Lake Ontario or to Hankow to see General Chiang Kai-shek—or just taking a quick trip to Europe to settle business in two or three days. He was always ready to accept new ways of travel. In 1937 he was booked to fly on the dirigible *Hindenburg* a matter of days after it burned to cinders at Lakehurst, New Jersey.

His first trip to a dozen capitals and diplomatic missions in 1953 gave him new insight into the work and problems of the Foreign Service abroad. He felt then, and was to be increasingly impressed with, the desirability of talks with these officers as often as feasible.

As soon as a hint of a projected trip got around, appeals would flow into the Department of State for the Secretary to visit various countries. Requests would come both by wire through the embassies of the governments and also from our embassies and consulates. The local governments felt that it was easier to explain on the spot their difficulties with their neighbors, their economic and security needs, and their internal political problems. They also wanted the prestige and publicity of a visit from the Secretary and his party.

Ambassadors had various motives for wishing the Secretary to come to their missions—from a desire to explain the state of the plumbing and the lack of embassy transportation to a request for the Secretary to approach the head of state and the foreign minister.

In the case of Germany, for example, Ambassador James B. Conant knew that Chancellor Adenauer liked to write directly to Foster. This made the embassy uneasy, and to clear up points of uncertainty, a meeting would be arranged between the Secretary and the Ambassador and the Chancellor and his Foreign Minister. In the Far East, particularly in times of difficult travel, officers felt an inevitable sense of remoteness living and working in faraway posts, a kind of isolation, as though they had been abandoned. When the Secretary came they could explain how they thought their problems were misunderstood or neglected. They also could learn of battles with Congress, of budget troubles, and of the efforts at cementing alliances that might bear on their own situation.

The cable, which has changed usage and led to less formal *aide-mémoires*, is a wonderful thing in its speed, but it is a difficult instrument to deal with. Because time was of paramount importance in many instances and from two to twenty clearances might be required before the desk officer could sign "Dulles" (with his own initials in parentheses), the wording had to be precise, condensed. Adjectives and adverbs that might have provided a description of mood had to be omitted. Only an ambassador or one of the top officials could put in their drafts a few extra words of courtesy and of local color. The cables from Washington were *instructions*, except for FYI (For Your Information only) messages. The words were like the skeleton of a legal brief, a diplomatic capsule sometimes hard to swallow.

In contrast to such messages, a few hours of sitting around the

table with free and full discussion were of enormous value to the officers abroad. It was not only the flash of a smile, a remark from the Secretary, and the ability of a young officer to express a doubt or a suspicion that counted, but the fact that the store of words in the English language was unlocked and conversation could return from the mechanical drafting, clearing, coding, decoding, and distribution to the more human exchange of impressions and ideas.

The Secretary, for his part, had found that his travels opened up to him a new perspective of methods of work, problems of intelligence, evaluations of people and events, which were hard to reconstruct or envisage in his office in Washington. These trips—both the time in the air and the hours on foreign soil—took the place of the long conversational evenings that in more leisurely times he managed to fit into an active life in the law. Thus the men in the field came to know him better, in many cases, than the officers in Washington.

His trips were not without their physical costs, however. He said to me after one of several trips to Berlin, "Be careful of these tiring flights, they will wear you out—I know." He and Janet had once been "lost" a week in the Pacific in 1938 when two engines of their plane went out near Wake Island.

The 1958 trip to the Middle East for the Baghdad Conference was in a Constellation, comfortable but not up to the standard of the *Columbine III* or the jets used after 1958 for the majority of official trips. Though comfortable, it was a slow plane in terms of modern travel. They were bound first for Argentia, a United States fueling point in Labrador, where the Secretary hoped they would land in time to have some lobster!

Inside the plane, an atmosphere of camaraderie was immediately established. The Secretary took off his coat, put on his slippers, and walked through the cabin to see what different members of the group were reading or writing. Some were playing cards. Sandwiches and coffee were served by the crew as soon as the plane gained altitude.

Shortly after the plane was airborne, the Secretary was accustomed to settle back for a time in the high-backed leather seat and watch the passing clouds, and then swivel around to dictate to Phyllis or Millie Asbjornson across the aisle. There were always papers to look through before he was completely out of telephone contact with Washington and a statement to put in shape for his next conferences. Often he would put in an hour on a speech scheduled for some future date. Janet would read his text if it was ready for her perusal—she frequently made suggestions that clarified the wording

—or if none were ready, she would work on a crossword puzzle. After two or three hours of work both would occasionally go into the forward cabin to join in a bridge game with some of the staff.

Soon cocktail time would bring a tray of drinks from the galley as the crew, cheerfully discussing landing prospects, weather, and the lighter conversation of this tight little world, took orders for dinner. Most had been on this plane and with this crew before. They knew the routine of work and relaxation. They joked freely with the Secretary about his ideas of light eating; he teased them about their frequent meals (Phyllis said that occasionally while eating at her desk she would "hide the pie as he came through"). His staff was quick to join him in a game, or to leave their game and work over the script that was being put into shape for ready use. He would announce an early bed hour—for himself, advising the more casual that they were flying away from their normal bedtime. Thus, after an early supper, giving up the thought of lobsters, the Secretary announced curfew, and he and Janet retired to the compartment that had been arranged around their berths.

Since the plane was flying against the sun, the hour of arrival would cut into the usual time of sleeping. The landing at eleven o'clock Moroccan time would be early for those whose mental and physical equilibrium was adjusted to Eastern standard time.

There were eight berths forward and two in the larger open space amidships. The compartment would be used by the Secretary and Mrs. Dulles for several nights. There was room for Phyllis, Jerry, Andy Berding, Bill Rountree, Freddie Reinhardt, Jack Irwin, from the Pentagon, and Lou Jefferson, the security officer. Some of the military advisers, General Maxwell Taylor, John Bell, of the International Cooperation Administration, an aide, and other assistants, went on a separate plane. The Secretary did not like to travel with a larger group; if more than ten were included, an unlucky person had to sleep in the baggage compartment. This amused the Secretary, but he had too much understanding for the strain of air travel to consider it desirable.

The purpose of the January trip to the Middle East was explored in a question, and answered at the news conference of January 10. The Secretary had said: ⁶

The United States now takes a more active part in the Baghdad Pact because of the fact that the joint resolution of Congress which was adopted last March authorizes the United States to participate in defense efforts. . . . In view of the fact that we are now taking

a more lively interest . . . not only military but also economic, it seemed appropriate as evidence of our interest in the Pact, that I should personally go there. . . . We have no present intention of joining the Pact. . . . The Middle East resolution was proposed, in part at least, as an alternative to joining. . . .

The trip to Ankara was envisaged as a part of the continuing work of strengthening alliances and giving moral support to those countries that, though they often felt themselves to be weak, wished to oppose Communist aggression. The effort and the watchfulness in Washington were to have useful results at the time of crisis, but were not to prevent the climax of revolution in the summer of the year.

The situation was one peculiarly hard to deal with. Many of the pressures on the countries of the Middle East were covert and not easy to identify. There was a widespread restlessness, and an unsound economic situation for which no ready solution could be found. At the time of his defense before Congress of the Eisenhower Doctrine (January-March 1957), the Secretary related it to the Truman Doctrine, which also was designed to protect free peoples from direct and indirect aggression. (The Eisenhower Doctrine had asked authorization from Congress to use the armed forces of the United States to secure the independence and integrity of nations of the Middle East that request such aid. Authority was also asked to assist these nations in developing their own security measures.) He indicated that he could, if he were still practicing law, give an opinion as to whether or not the President already had the authority. That had not "a particle of importance"; what was actually important was "do the people in the area who are endangered think, do we mean business . . . what do the Russians think, do we mean business?"

Dulles had fought many hours for the measure against the skepticism of some on the Hill. He feared that the growing weakness in this troubled area might lead to successful pressure by the Communists. Only by joining in defense measures, and by assuring solidarity among the free nations, could the progress of Soviet intervention be halted. The troubles in North Africa and in other parts of the East were linked with the subversion originating in Moscow, but often found a congenial "launching pad" in Egypt. It was known that money for political purposes, which was used by extremist Arab nationalists or by Communists, was flowing into Cairo, as well as into Syria.

Compared with other troubled areas, interest had been less and confusion greater in respect to the Baghdad Pact countries. Almost

continuously for many months the problem had been on the Secretary's mind. He saw the opportunities for disturbance; he had seen them in fact long before the Suez crisis.

After the passage of the Middle East resolution, the President and he had sent Ambassador James P. Richards, of South Carolina, as Ambassador to study the economic needs. The Secretary had authorized the joining of the military-planning group and he held frequent meetings to consider the points of weakness. Several such conferences in January had to be squeezed into a crowded schedule. In one of these it was decided that Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy should go to North Africa to see what could be done to relax tension there. Meanwhile, various high-ranking visitors came and went. The Prime Minister of Laos was entertained. Jean Monnet, economist and financier, came to discuss the financial problems of France, and a possible loan. General Lauris Norstad, Commander of SHAPE, was back for consultation on defense and NATO matters.

In the judgment of the Secretary the trip to the pact meeting merited the expenditure of time and effort, even though no spectacular results could be anticipated. He could lend his personal prestige and that of the President to the consultations. In going he was following his consistent belief that the connections between the countries, particularly some of the smaller ones, needed to be carefully watched.

As long as the Communists continued to probe in every region for points of weakness, the responsibility fell on the leadership in the free world to explore the reasons for these signs of weakness and to try to shore up those countries that needed help and to demonstrate a recognition that the free world was united in its war against tyranny and aggression. The Secretary considered these cooperative efforts to be a part of his task. His determination to meet these requirements continued to take him to the more remote capitals, as well as to the most active centers of political intrigue.

Because the budget was considered important in the years of President Eisenhower, there was a tendency to think that he and Foster both underestimated the importance of spending for defense. It is probable that in the early period of the Administration the reliance on the nuclear deterrent colored much Washington thinking, but the Administration moved out beyond this concept before the public became aware of this evolution. The Gaither report of late 1957 and the first Soviet Sputnik were catalytic agents.

The Secretary used the phrase "capacity for massive retaliation" in 1954, not with the thought that the Allies should rest on their oars, but with a view to the Kremlin. There should be, he thought, no

possibility of Soviet miscalculation of our ability and determination to resist aggression.

Some time before the April 1954 article in *Foreign Affairs*, so often quoted and misquoted, he had talked to me about the incredible weakness we suffered in the early years of the Korean War. I asked him, in 1950, why we were not progressing in Korea. He was not a pessimist by nature, but his spirit was as low as I ever saw it. He turned rather sharply to me and said, "Do you know how many soldiers we have? We have only a few and this is war. We need hundreds of thousands of combat-ready troops."

While the tactics that had to be used in NATO in dealing with various countries called for subtlety, and sometimes seemed to show a fluctuating policy, I never felt either in his conversation or in his speeches a failure to value the foot soldier and conventional weapons, or to recognize the danger of guerrilla warfare. He himself had been in areas where jungle warfare was well known. While he did not think the tactics of the Pentagon were in his jurisdiction, there is nothing in his actions to demonstrate an underestimation of the need for diversified defense with well-balanced forces.

Much of the discussion of these matters was and should still be secret; however, those who consider that in 1958 the United States was depending mainly on "the big bang," or a threat of a knockout nuclear blow, may be misreading the story as it will gradually emerge. In any case, Foster, in his contacts with the NATO countries and with the leaders in the Middle and Far East, was of necessity concerned with the problems of brush-fire wars, guerrilla warfare, and attacks in significant force—in Indochina, in the Far East Offshore Island crisis, and in the sporadic fighting in North Africa.

The Gaither report, which had stressed the lag in missiles, the inadequacy of communication and warning systems, and the lack of civil defense, had a salutary effect. It gave support to those who wished to see the defense budget increased. It did not, however, greatly change the direction of strategy. Foster, in commenting on matters of this sort in practice, submitted his texts to his associates in the Pentagon. If he did not always change the wording of his speech exactly as suggested, there is reason to think, however, that he was in close accord with the views of the military leadership.

Foster had concluded in the early postwar period, when the difficulty of reaching an accommodation with the Soviets on Germany or Japan became evident, that alliances between groups of countries were essential to build strength in the free world. He had fought hard for NATO, but he felt that the Far and Middle East also needed co-

operative security pacts. He was thus the prime mover in connection with the establishment of ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.), the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Baghdad Pact, which was to be the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). There are many who question the substantive importance of SEATO and CENTO. Because their economic strength and their military potential are not outstanding, their importance has been discounted by some in considering security measures. The Secretary felt however that these treaties were essential to fill in a certain large power vacuum that developed in this period.

In 1947 Great Britain had indicated an inability to safeguard Greece and Turkey at the time, and the United States filled the gap with the Truman Doctrine. Britain had also indicated in various ways the necessity of diminishing both economic and military support in other areas. Growing feelings against colonialism, and even against trusteeship under the aegis of the United Nations, hastened the changes that were taking place in the Pacific, in the Arab countries, and in Asia.

Foster, who had written and talked of the inevitability of change as the law of life, did not feel that this situation could be reversed, but did conclude that new cooperative institutions and consultative bodies were necessary. In the development of both SEATO and CENTO, England cooperated fully with the United States and participated in appropriate ways. But the leadership for the various meetings fell on the United States. England was at this time divesting herself of colonial responsibilities everywhere. France, having suffered several setbacks in Southeast Asia, was contending with the almost insoluble problem of Algeria, and it was difficult for Paris to play a significant role in the East at this time.

One can scarcely fail to note the fact that after the formation of SEATO and CENTO, aggressive Communism has failed to carry out successful ventures in any of the countries that were so aligned with each other and with the United States.

Foster said to me that security could be greatly enhanced by steps of apparently only slight material importance but ones that could carry meaning to an aggressor. A locked screen door could be broken down by an intruder, but if it *were* broken down, the act became more serious, legally different. It was a duty, he felt, to erect barriers against attack—both those that could be intrinsically strong, and in some cases those that had mainly legal meaning. Both served as warnings. In thinking of alliances he felt some could serve first as legal barriers even if their military importance was less obvious. But

he thought that the Communist countries ought to be circled loosely, not with an iron ring.

He used to compare the banding together for mutual action—economic and military—to the early development of fire departments, which moved by cooperative action to fill in a patent void. Alliances and mutual defense seemed on his mind constantly over the years.

If, as has been said, the United States was his client, it is also true that the Western Alliance and, in a sense, the whole free world was his client.

On this particular trip there were three main touchdown stops. It had been announced in advance that the servicing at the American base in Morocco was not to be considered an official visit. The Secretary thought that he might have a brief word with the king, Mohammed V, but this had not been definitely scheduled. (Foster did not have time to go to Rabat.)

Ambassador Cavendish W. Cannon and the Foreign Minister of Morocco, Ahmed Balafrej, met the plane. They drove about twenty miles with the party, directly to the Mamounia Hotel in Marrakech. This was a lovely country, as Janet's diary records. The nearby mountain slopes were sometimes gold with dry grass, sometimes green from recent rains. The Grand Atlas Mountains were brilliant with snow. The air was clear and invigorating, the sunshine almost dazzling. Foster and Janet agreed the city looked much as it had about twenty years ago, when they had stopped there on the return trip from King George V's funeral in 1936. (Janet had been hesitant at first at the thought of going to the service, but Foster had said that there would be more crowned heads together than they would ever see again. They were glad they went, but Janet took cold and so they had gone south to Morocco afterward.) In fact, they suspected that it probably had been almost the same even a thousand years ago. Foster pointed out to the Foreign Minister the place in the lovely, sheltered inner court of the hotel where he had sat on the 1936 journey writing his book *War, Peace and Change*.

Soon a large and excellent luncheon was served in his honor. Foster had hoped to have a few hours free from foreign-policy questions, but the Foreign Minister felt courtesy demanded that he stay with the Secretary throughout his few hours in the country. He even accompanied Foster and Janet and Security Officer Lou Jefferson when they strolled through the Medina, the ancient bazaar hemmed in by thick stone walls. They were fascinated by the merchants in souks, the narrow streets crowded with rugs, leather goods, jewelry,

copper and ancient objects of art, as well as simple household pots and pans. The people jostled each other and shouted their wares in lively competition. There were soldiers guarding the streets to safeguard the Secretary, but they could not line the path in the crowded bazaar.

Foster had brought no money, so that when he saw a large copper pot that he wanted for his cabin on Duck Island, he borrowed some from Lou Jefferson. He saw a number of other things that interested him, but bought only a few. When he emerged from the dark and devious streets of the inner city into the broader walled areas of the ancient town, the crowd shouted: "*Vive le roi, vive Monsieur Foster Dulles,*" pleased that he had taken the time to visit them and their ancient city.

At 7:30 that same evening, the Foreign Minister, always in respectful attendance, gave a formal dinner at one of the royal palaces. The guests passed through a series of rooms and patios and came to a large tiled inner room. Here a number of round tables had been set up, surrounded by low leather lounging chairs. In the center of each table, arranged for six or eight guests, was a large copper dish. In each was a large whole roasted lamb, cooked with many savory herbs, delicious and tender. The meat was easy to grab with the fingers according to the local manner of eating. There were no forks. The servants passed to each guest a silver ewer of water, Palmolive soap, and a towel, to wash after eating from the common dish.

The lamb was followed by large roasted turkeys with dressing. Foster said that from early childhood he had preferred the drumstick, thus solving the practical problem of eating neatly in a satisfactory way. Janet found that the round of bread was of considerable help in enjoying the juices and the dressing. The third course was several chickens for each table, followed by the familiar native dish of couscous, a farina that the Moroccans roll into little balls and pop into their mouths. Foster and Janet were given knives and forks to maneuver at this point. The meal was topped off with wonderful ripe mandarin oranges. With coffee, the men withdrew for a brief chat before the party left for the airport.

No news conference had been provided for—this was basically a fueling stop, to give the crew a rest and time for servicing the plane—but to Foster's surprise, even though this was not the capital city, newsmen crowded around with questions. As reported by the Paris newspaper *Figaro*, he answered all but the more general questions with "No comment." He did not wish to make an official statement until he reached Ankara.

They were over the high mountains of Mesopotamia in the early

morning, passing close to Mount Ararat of Biblical fame, where Noah was said to have found dry land for the first time after the flood. They descended beyond the mountains to Mehrabad, the airport for Tehran in Iran, at five in the afternoon.

Here the Dulleses had a pleasant surprise. In addition to the official greeting for the American guests, two little children, six and four years old—their own great-niece and great-nephew, Alexandra and Matthew Buresch, Allen's grandchildren—came to the airport with flowers. Their parents, in diplomatic station in Tehran, were on an official visit to India.

Foster and Janet spent the night of Friday the 24th and the 25th in Tehran. After reviewing the honor guard at the airport, the Prime Minister escorted them to the quarters in one of the palaces that had been prepared for them. They were to go almost immediately to a festive dinner for 160 guests. The baggage was brought in, but the suitcase with the evening clothes was not among them. This created a minor crisis. Various outfits of Ambassador and Mrs. Selden Chapin and others in the party were brought in to see what could be worn. After forty-five minutes of scurrying about, some of the aides turned up with the missing bags, and calm was restored.

The diplomatic corps was well represented at the dinner. There was native music and dancing. The toasts were made "to peace," and were in a fairly serious vein. The Soviet Ambassador was observed to be listening very attentively to what was said, and left almost immediately for Moscow to report. The evening had been colorful and charming, but Janet wrote in her diary that they were "very tired." As soon as protocol permitted, they left for their quarters.

The next day provided opportunity for official calls, including some time with the Shah. There was a luncheon at the palace, and the men of the party were engrossed in their conference so long that Janet went alone with Mrs. Chapin to a Pakistani reception. Foster considered his conversations in Iran of great significance to the Baghdad Pact conference and the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Tehran was a working stop. Foster wanted to find out what the explosive elements in the situation were and, by talking with the embassy staff and the Iranian officials, to form a clear estimate to amplify both the factual and interpretive information that had been reported to Washington earlier. He wanted to give what assurances he could, in personal conversation, of the United States determination to maintain stability in the area. He was sure that the Soviets would note his concern for the welfare of the country.

Although the conditions were not as reassuring as he might have

hoped, Foster enjoyed the exotic city. He did not have time to visit museums or mosques, but the whole atmosphere was romantic. In the various meetings and at the dinner and luncheon he saw many fine mosaics, the hall of mirrors, the peacock throne, and the oriental buildings full of mystery and beauty. His talks with the Shah had been on the whole satisfactory. Every impression bore out the political facts of unpredictability of popular reactions, the inscrutability of many of the officials, the certainty of intrigue in various quarters, and the sharp contrast of immense riches and fathomless poverty causing unrest that might upset the unstable equilibrium at any time. The problems of the oil-rich East were so complex that even with full knowledge it was difficult to know how they could be handled. This complexity and mystery, the sights and sounds and smells of Tehran made amply clear.

Foster's taste in food, which had had a good start on better-than-average American cooking in his childhood home, had become more esoteric with his travels. He thought that a meal in Paris, well planned—and he might go to the restaurant in advance to talk over the food and wine—was one of the pleasantest occasions he could offer his friends. Janet tired of caviar. Foster enjoyed the best when he could.

After his mother lost her sight in the late thirties, he sent her a box of special hors d'oeuvres and soups from Charles in New York, with a note that went something like this:

I know you enjoy a beautiful sunset, but here, I hope, is a real treat that will appeal to your palate—not a substitute for some of the lovely sights of the past but still intended to give you a few moments of genuine pleasure.

(From time to time he sent her other things, including symphonies for her Capehart. The Capehart phonograph was a present from Janet and Foster.)

The Constellation flew through sleet and rain. When it reached Ankara, the windshield of the plane was entirely coated with ice. The pilot made three passes at the landing strip, but, finding conditions impossible for a safe setdown, reported to the Secretary that he did not think he ought to make an instrument landing. He thought it wiser to go to some other airport, where the weather might be better. They decided on Istanbul, not far away on the Bosphorus. Here they got in without difficulty and were met by Consul General

Robert Miner, from the United States Mission. Though some of his Turkish friends urged him to go to the Hilton Hotel, about an hour's drive away, and then to consider the night train to the capital at Ankara, Foster preferred to stay with the plane, hoping for a break in the weather. He wanted a night's sleep in the embassy if possible.

The party stayed in the cabin for a few hours. Drinks and sandwiches were served while an animated bridge game was started, with the Secretary playing in serious concentration. As the weather improved, they took to the air, continuing their game and hardly noticing the time until they came into Ankara for a successful landing. The Secretary and Janet left immediately for Ambassador Fletcher Warren's residence; at 9:30 in the evening Minister Selwyn Lloyd called on him to confer on the coming meeting.

These were stimulating, instructive days, but taxing on the strength and on the imagination.

This same night, shortly after the Secretary had gone to bed, there occurred what some thought a hostile demonstration but not an attempt on his life. A building on the embassy grounds was bombed a short time after his arrival. The security officer told him of the episode. Since no one had been injured, Foster did not express alarm, and merely inquired later about the course of the investigation. Fear has no part on the agenda of a statesman.

The Turkish officials, who were friendly and pro-Western, declared that the attack had been carried out by Egyptian extremists as a pro-Nasser, pro-Communist gesture. In fact, little notice was taken of the event, and no comment appeared in the United States newspapers. Foster himself never spoke of it to any of us then or later. (At one time, because of threats to several officials, the government had thought it wise to station a guard outside the houses of the top officials, including the Dulles home on Thirty-second Street. The Secretary thought it a tedious assignment for the officer and, in addition, did not really like to have him on patrol there. The guard was removed at the Secretary's request.)

In the course of the meetings, the major considerations were measures to render the area more secure and development of a sound economic program to assure the stability and capacity to resist subversion. There was an announcement of a ten-million-dollar contribution to the proposed telecommunications network. Foster's statement, which had been talked over at length with President Eisenhower before his departure, mentioned the importance of regional and political association to security and peace and the interrelation of military capacity and economic health:

Security cannot be taken for granted. It must be won by positive efforts. . . . It is vital that there be forces of national defense. These constitute indispensable, visible evidence of the will of the people to fight, and die, if need be for their homes, their nation, and their faith. There is no "pushbutton" substitute for this. . . . such forces, with reinforcement where needed of mobile power, can save the people from the scourge of invasion if, perchance, deterrence fails.

He explained the meaning and force of the Congressional Resolution of March 27, 1957, which included this area as one of vital interest to the United States and as one that must be defended against aggression. He reviewed, too, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and added that the potential aggressor knew in advance that his losses from aggression would far exceed his possible gains.

Because of the uneasiness of the Turkish government over the incident that had menaced the Secretary's safety, an additional guard was stationed around the buildings where he was staying and working. Not since Suez had the danger been as great or the tension as high. It was to increase in the spring and summer months, in spite of the warnings and efforts of the United States and Great Britain.

Actually there was not much interest in the United States in the situation in the Middle East at this time. The newspapers and radio took little note of the meeting in Ankara. The Baghdad Pact was not considered of great importance, and few realized the interconnections of the national perils in this part of the world with the Far East and Europe. Afterward some thought that Khrushchev had already laid his plans with a careful appraisal of what he considered was the relative unimportance of these countries in the eyes of some Americans.

A continuous effort on the part of the leaders in Washington was required to keep alive any interest in problems that seemed remote and vague to the average man. The Richards mission had not attracted much attention. The heated discussions before Congress on the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 had been largely forgotten. Few seemed to understand the insidious nature of the subversion, the menacing use of funds, propaganda, and provocateurs operating in countries that were economically weak and not yet able to adopt a genuine democratic control of their national affairs.

The meeting in January was directed to real and present dangers. The discussion was full and frank. Once the meeting was ended, there was a sense of relaxation. The plane was airborne for home at approximately 9 P.M. "Let's break out the caviar," the Secretary

called as they reached cruising height. It developed that, in addition to some he had bought and more his staff had purchased, the Shah and the Prime Minister and other officials, knowing his love for this, the best caviar in the world (from the Iranian shores of the Caspian Sea), had sent presents of even more. They had all they could eat. Everyone joined in the gay supper party, which lasted for a couple of hours, until bedtime. The whole journey took about ten days, days that were filled with negotiations, ceremonial meetings, and hazardous flying. It was a typical and yet, at the same time, an unusually varied and interesting trip.

It was to be followed by nine other trips to a score of countries including, in March, Manila; May, Copenhagen; July, Paris, and then to Ottawa and, later in the month, London; in August, Brazil; October, Rome and Taipei; November, Mexico; and in December to Paris for NATO. In January 1959 the Secretary flew to Bonn and London.

The return was by way of the Azores. The plane stopped at Bermuda before going on to Washington. Because Foster had a cold, he broke his usual rule and did not swim, a real disappointment to him—though probably not to some of the others in his party, who would have found the water on the chilly side but did not like to leave him alone to his sport.

He was greeted at the airport by Under Secretary Herter, who drove with him to his house. This was Saturday, the first of February. Because of the bronchial cold he had developed on the trip, he stayed in on Sunday, on Dr. Daughton's advice.

The cold hung on for several days. He held his appointments in the house on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, catching up with the backlog that had accumulated during his absence.

On February 8, Foster wrote Bob Hart about a vacation:

Dear Bob:

I have your recent note. I am greatly distressed at your condition and of apparent failure to respond to non-surgical treatment.

As far as our own plans are concerned, we have after a period of some vacillation decided to go to Atlantic City. . . . Also I really need to be in closer touch with Washington. If you and Ann have nothing better to do you might join us at The Claridge at Atlantic City. We have always found the ocean there to be invigorating; it is fun to watch the gulls pick up and drop the clams so as to break them, and also indoors it is always possible to play bridge.

He spent, in fact, about five days at Atlantic City, leaving before Janet because of the increasing tension over Tunis. (The Murphy mission, concerned with Algerian border troubles, had been planned earlier and was to ease the situation toward the end of the month.)

The Secretary wrote his granddaughter on the 20th of February:

Dear Edith:

I was very happy to get your valentine and the sentiments it contained warmed my heart. You were sweet and thoughtful to remember me on this special day.

I spent a few days in Atlantic City, but had to come back to Washington earlier than I had planned because of developments here. Your grandmother remained on for a few days longer, but I expect her back tomorrow. It would have been nice to have you with us, although I am not sure you would have enjoyed the icy winds we encountered on our daily walks.

Affectionately,
Granddaddy

He wrote again to Bob Hart on February 24:

Dear Bob:

I wonder how you are getting along. We had a satisfactory stay at Atlantic City. It was probably just as well that I did not get into remote parts for I had to come back after five days. The Tunisian situation got rather acute, and with the President away, I thought I should be back. However, Mrs. Dulles stayed on and was there for ten days.

I do hope that your back is getting better. Now that the New Year is getting well under way, we look forward to being up at Duck Island. I shall be going to Manila in the middle of March and after that Duck Island will not be far distant.

A meeting of SEATO the next month carried on the work of the regional alliances. The SEATO pact itself had been signed in September 1954. He planned to attend the March conference—as he had the others—because he believed his regular appearances at these meetings helped to demonstrate to people everywhere the importance that the American government attached to their continuing work. This was not to be one of the easy trips. In a letter to Edith on March 22 he reported: “The SEATO meeting was, I think, quite a useful one. We discarded five different planes because of engine trouble during the trip. Your grandmother did not go along this time which means, I am sure, that she provides the good luck.” These delays and uncertainties meant danger over the calm Pacific—never

had he encountered such a series of engine failures in a short span of ten days.

In Manila, on March 11, the Secretary spoke with regret of the great loss incurred by the recent death of Ramon Magsaysay. He referred also to the recent rise to independence of Malaya, and reminded the group that in spite of aggressive Communist propaganda and possible plans for the area, no nation member of the postwar collective-defensive organization had been taken over by Communist aggression. In all the security and political efforts, he said, "SEATO has an indispensable part to play."

At this meeting Pote Sarasin of Thailand, Secretary-General of the Council of the South East Asian Treaty Organization, indicated what may prove in the light of future developments to have been the case, that Sino-Soviet solidarity was at its highest point. This cooperation among the Communists was to find expression four months later, in August and September, in the sharp challenge to America over the Chinese Communist position and the shelling of the Off-shore Islands, a threat already evident in March.

The meeting ended on March 13. The Secretary had time for only one piece of personal business—to see his tailor about some tropical suits, made up for him during the last two days of the meeting. In Taipei on his return trip, the Secretary had held a "Chief of Missions" meeting, one of the gatherings of considerable importance in keeping the men in these remote areas in contact with each other and with Washington. The United States ambassadors came in from all the Southeast Asian posts to be briefed. He also had a talk with Chiang Kai-shek.

His trip took just over ten days. The problems under consideration had been delicate. Military consultation and planning, economic assistance, educational exchanges, and antisubversion measures were discussed, and financial means to act jointly and cooperatively were reviewed.

Perhaps because of the multiplicity of organizations in Europe, there was little note taken in the papers of the organization in the Far East. It is clear that there was relatively little public interest in the work of SEATO, less even in the meaning of ANZUS, and not much glamour for the general American observer in the efforts under the Colombo Plan, which was to meet in Seattle in November of that year. Only the more negative aspects of the Far East situation claimed the attention of the public—that is, such matters as our failure to recognize the Peiping regime and our difficulties in Indochina.

At the Secretary's press conference shortly after his return on

March 25, not a single question was asked about the SEATO meeting! There was, however, a query on a statement on disarmament he had made in Manila, but no interest in the meeting of the ministers themselves. This lack of concern may have reflected both preoccupation with Europe and an absence of sensitivity to the dangers in the Far East.

In Washington, many matters called for immediate attention. The problems of disarmament and nuclear testing were to be particularly troublesome. The issue of the summit was looming. The Soviets were going to announce on March 31, in a propaganda gesture, the unilateral cessation of nuclear testing.

The first three months of the year had brought to the fore issues affecting every area and every country. There had been two major meetings abroad, in Ankara for the Baghdad Pact, in Manila for the SEATO Council meeting. The Secretary entered his seventieth year with more than seven hundred editorials of congratulation.

SEVENTY CANDLES

Foster, on his birthday, February 25, 1958, looked back with both nostalgia and satisfaction. He looked forward with eagerness and determination as his friends celebrated the day.

I suppose that when one gets to be seventy it is not only permissible but expected that one should be a bit garrulous and should reminisce.

The Secretary was speaking at a birthday function given in his honor by the Foreign Service Association.

As I stand here at the threshold of a new decade my thoughts inevitably go back to earlier thresholds of new decades. It is sometimes said of me that I always wanted to be Secretary of State. I can assure you that that is not the case.

As I approached the beginning of my second decade, at the age of ten, I had a very clear-cut ambition and that was to drive the locomotive of the New York Central Railroad, No. 999, which had achieved a speed, then unprecedented, of sixty miles an hour. [The New York Central sent him a small-scale model of their engine and an engineer's cap and scarf when they read this in the press.] Then as I approached the next decade, at the age of twenty, and was graduating from Princeton, I had to decide what to do. Well, again I was not clear about what to do and the result was I took a year off within which to make a decision. I suppose some people wish I had taken a year off to make all my decisions. [The guests laughed here.] And then as I attained thirty I was identified in a modest but still significant relationship with President Wilson, and I believed with the fervor which goes with that age, and should go with that age, that we really were waging a war that would end war and make the world safe for democracy.

Then as I was forty I had to carry somewhat unexpectedly the heavy responsibilities which, due to the premature decease of my elders, left me the head of one of the great law firms of the world. And I remember well my fiftieth birthday, with Mrs. Dulles, feeling

particularly concerned about conditions in Asia. We had gone out there in '38 and I spent that fiftieth birthday on a ship from Japanese-occupied Shanghai to Japanese-bombed Canton. Then at sixty I was cooperating in an effort to build post-war policies, and I recalled, as I spoke this morning to the group to which Mr. [Loy] Henderson referred, it was almost exactly ten years ago to the day, when I went with Secretary Marshall to the National Cathedral and inaugurated there a series of meetings held throughout the nation in support of the European Recovery Plan. And now as the next decade approaches I am here happily with you. . . .

Foster's seventieth birthday had begun with breakfast at the White House at 8:00 A.M. It continued with celebrations and speeches. He had no free time during the day, but he enjoyed all of it. His only disappointment was that he was forced to come late to the dinner given by his brother, Allen, at which he was to be guest of honor; he had already been asked to a dinner arranged to consider foreign economic problems planned by movie "Czar" Eric Johnston for the President. His birthday reflected the pattern of his life as Secretary, with emphasis on the making of foreign policy but with an occasional moment for relaxation.

His teen-age granddaughter sent him a birthday card picturing a locomotive, a car of ancient vintage, and a yawl—all symbols of his life. She wrote:

Dear Granddaddy,

I thought this card was perfect for you, because you have traveled all over in nearly every way.

Dad will be on his way up to Washington on Sunday, and I am going to have lunch with him there. Will he be in Washington for your birthday?

I hope you have a wonderful day and do not work too hard.

All my love,

Edith

And he answered:

Your card was "perfect" and your good wishes on my birthday reminded me again that you are a very thoughtful young lady.

There was a great deal of celebrating yesterday in connection with this event and your grandmother and I were busy keeping up with five birthday cakes at as many places.

I was glad your Daddy was able to be here for the dinner.

Affectionately,

Granddaddy

He wrote his son, Avery, two days later:

February 27, 1958

Dear Avery:

I have your letter of February 16 and greatly appreciate your remembering my birthday. As you say, this is a rather significant one. I read the enclosures from St. Ignatius, as did your mother. I am not sure that she appreciated the first parable. . . .

We continue to face plenty of problems. The French operations in North Africa [French planes were crossing the border from Algeria into Tunisia in "hot pursuit"] are of particular concern at the moment, and this is a situation fraught with fateful consequences. I hope I shall have the capacity to act wisely, but there is no easy solution.

Affectionately yours,
Daddy

He had spoken to a group of businessmen in the morning. He recalled his speech of exactly ten years ago, when he as a layman and General George C. Marshall as Secretary of State had defended foreign aid. The mission of the United States to share its liberty with the world was articulated, he said, in the *Federalist Papers*, as well as by George Washington, and by Lincoln. He referred also to the speech on his sixtieth birthday, when he said the ten-year program must be projected into the future for a number of cogent reasons, and that one of these was Khrushchev's recent announcement: "We declare war on you, not military war but economic war, and in that we are relentless and are determined to win. . . . Where in the world is the spirit [to meet the challenge of dynamic Communism] if it is not to be found in this country?"

The meeting with the Foreign Service Association was one of the high points of the day. It reflected what had been a gradual evolution in Foster's relation with his staff. Not only the words of tribute but the mood of the party in the Shoreham's Blue Room indicated the respect and affection he had won from those who worked with him closely. He had become a real "Foreign Service man." After reading several congratulatory telegrams—from President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, and from Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy—the president of the Foreign Service Association, Tom Wailes, went on to say:

As this is a "family party," Mr. Secretary, I should like to speak for a few moments on your connection with the Foreign Service

family rather than with world problems. Everyone is fully aware of the heavy load you carry in guiding the destinies of our country through the labyrinth of present day international affairs. We know you devote to these problems practically all your waking hours. In fact, it is quite a mystery to most of us when you find time to sleep and eat. I should, however, like to refer to a particular aspect of your contribution as Secretary of State that has a special significance to the Foreign Service.

In these past seven decades you have witnessed numbers of real revolutions, technological as well as political. In at least one of them you played a directing role. I am referring to the revolution that has taken place in the personnel policies and organization of the Department of State and Foreign Service during your administration. . . . to many gathered here today the effect has been direct and intimate.

Four or five years ago, Mr. Secretary, the morale of the Department, and especially of the Foreign Service, was, I think it is fair to say, at an all-time low. Congressional and public confidence in the men and women who represented the United States in the field of foreign affairs had dwindled to an alarming extent, on grounds that most of us felt were unjustified. The problems generated by a sharp reduction in force also adversely affected over-all morale, often to the degree of distracting attention in the job to be done. From this low point things turned for the better and have continued to improve so that now we look to the future with confidence.

Probably all of us in this room differ somewhat in our views as to what brought this change about, yet I think we all agree that you, sir, have had a great deal to do with it. Personally I look upon the report of your Committee on Personnel, often referred to as the Wriston Committee, and the implementation of that report, as one of the major items leading toward this new and marked upswing. A contributing factor, in my opinion, has been your appointment of Foreign Service officers to top-level positions, especially in the Department. Likewise we have had the privilege of getting to know you better and of coming to appreciate your remarkable qualities, leadership, your courage, stamina and intellectual capacity. At the same time you have come to know us better, in some cases as individuals, but perhaps, just as important, as a Service with all that that word implies.

We are proud of the increasing confidence you have shown in us, Mr. Secretary, and we hope that this state of affairs will grow and prosper under your leadership for many years to come.

The morale in the Foreign Service had indeed come a long way in five years since the chilly day in 1953 when a thousand or more

of the Department's officers and employees crowded the area where the new building now stands to hear a greeting from the new Secretary of State. No meeting of this kind had ever been held before. To most of those waiting to get a clue to his personality and to his policy, he was an unknown quantity. He had come to the office at a time when controversy and newspaper accusations threw about the bitter words of attack from the Senate building. There were hints in the press that many might be sacrificed to the critics on the Hill. They hoped for an almost personal word of encouragement.

The gusty wind snatched the words from the microphone. There was fear rather than hope in the atmosphere. As they listened, the only words that came through clearly to those in the outskirts of the crowd were "positive loyalty." For the majority, that day was discouraging rather than bright. Change was unwelcome to most of them and they dreaded the future. After the gathering had scattered, he asked me what I felt the reaction had been. I had worked under five previous Secretaries of State, and I tried to explain to him the extreme sensitivity of the group. Although the word "loyalty" was frequently used in a good sense, at this time of fear, I told him, it would be heard only in the context of the harsh attacks, and the word "positive" would be understood by some as a suggestion that their loyalty had been *less* than positive in the past.

No similar problem had arisen in connection with Dean Acheson, who had been accepted more readily than most incoming Secretaries because he had been in the State Department before he became Secretary, and because the attacks in Congress had encouraged an indefinite, and sometimes half-realized, feeling in the Department that he was "in the same boat" with a staff that was being harassed. Foster came, on the other hand, to most of them as an unknown figure.

In this climate of doubt, little could have been said that would have heartened the group. In the corridors in those days, even friends and relatives of the Secretary heard words of doubt and suspicion. The more seasoned officers bided their time. Some of the less experienced were heard to say that he would wreck the Service.

It is difficult for anyone coming from outside Washington to realize the problems of a take-over. Washington is in many ways "a small town," with one overriding interest, the government. With each new administration, thousands of strangers move to town, and scores of new faces appear in every department and agency. Each administration has various motives for wanting to get their men in and others out. The stronger the new policy, the more they fear trouble

in the lower ranks. Meanwhile, the Foreign Service officer, the civil servant, knows that there is little protection for him in either law or equity, despite opinion to the contrary. Each has made an adjustment to his former chief, and has felt relatively secure; each knows that the changes to come will disturb his ways of doing things. Though most are too concerned with their work and problems to brood about the politics or the administrative problems that they may have to face, a few are resentful, suspicious, prepared to dislike the new regime. For some, the newly elected and appointed men and women are "interlopers," many of whom will depart in a few years, to be followed by another wave of newcomers. The permanent staffs will try once again, painfully, to adjust, and to welcome back new or old chiefs.

There are few professional men so ill-prepared to changing their jobs as the Foreign Service officers. To some extent, they have lost touch with their homes, they have traveled in foreign lands, and their "clients," if they have any, are for the most part outside the country. They have not been able to save money. They often do not own a house and have little capital. They have, for the most part, because of their specialties, been kept from experience in the business world and shielded from public criticism. Few know how to run the type of office a business would have. Because diplomacy is often conducted quietly, out of the public gaze, they can rarely boast of their accomplishments. Their jobs and their merits are little understood outside the Service.

If, then, these officers are faced with the choice of resignation from the Service to which they have devoted years, they come into competition with men who are in a much more advantageous position to find good employment. As a result, they tend more than others to cling together as a group. A Foreign Service officer likes, whenever possible, to serve under and with other Foreign Service officers; theirs is an "old school tie" kind of fraternal loyalty, notwithstanding the lessened concentration of typically eastern-seaboard families in recent years. It was natural that in the change, after twenty years, to the new Republican regime they would be full of doubts.

It was natural, too, that they should be suspicious of a man described frequently as a brilliant "Wall Street lawyer," reputed to have money far beyond his actual financial assets. They recognized at once his strong will, his special competence in many aspects of Foreign Service, but they did not for some time understand the man. Some "scuttlebutt" contributed to the legends about his personality and policies.

During the two decades while the Democratic leadership set the pace and determined the policies in Washington, the most active, energetic, and imaginative civil-service and corps of government workers that the country has ever known were developing. These people had come to know each other, worked together like brothers, took their vacations together—when they spared time from their serious work. Some of them were linked by family ties and came to form close-knit groups. There was at least one such coterie concerned with foreign policy. These men thought they had special insight into the workings of the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, and other branches of government. It was hard for them to accept an outsider, as Foster seemed to them to be, in spite of the fact that he had already worked for the Department occasionally over a period of thirty years. It is doubtful if any of this particular group, though some of them worked in the State Department under Foster, ever fully accepted his leadership. Foster was aware of this, but he knew that these men had something to contribute. He also knew that if he opposed them on minor matters, it might be taken in a personal vein, and therefore might cost more than it might be worth and actually hamper attempts to achieve a fuller degree of teamwork. This posed a dilemma for him, but he was able to set forth his policies forcefully enough in important matters so that the hidden opposition was rarely brought to the surface.

Meanwhile, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's voice became more shrill. There were some who thought the Republican leadership would sell out to his campaign against liberalism, and mistake all the more independent officers for Communists. A mood of hysteria swept over Washington.

Foster's attitude to Senator McCarthy has never been made clear. As time passes, it may become more obscure or distorted by the constant repetition of accusations and explanations. The fact was he was against the Senator and his methods, and the corrosive suspicion and irrational fear that McCarthy had done so much to create. He was convinced, particularly as he began his new tasks, that he had to bear in mind the need for Senate support of diplomatic appointments, Congressional power over the budget, and thus over aid and defense spending, and the need of the President to have the American public with him.

During the Presidential campaign of 1952, I feared that my brother was underestimating the effect of McCarthy, so in mid-autumn I made a special trip to New York to spend an evening with

inflaming the passions of those who were already besieging the Department. It is certain that if there had been a better response to his efforts to induce discretion, some of the cases could have had a happier ending.

He was faced with a twofold task. He had to make a careful examination of the cases. He had to consider three types of "risks": those classified as "security," as "loyalty," and that category of men who, honest in reporting, did not show the insight and judgment called for by the rank and responsibility they had attained. Precautionary measures needed to be taken, even if, in the end, few Communists were discovered.

The second part of the task was to stop Senator McCarthy's onslaught. As a practical man and as a lawyer, he knew the importance of ascertaining the facts before engaging in a battle on the personnel matters with which Senator McCarthy was interfering in a destructive manner. It took considerable time for him to study the controversial cases, and this time had been taken in spite of the many other heavy responsibilities of his office. In the spring he found that McCarthy's action to take a hand in the Greek shipowners' pact to end all trade with Communist China was a definite incursion into the field of foreign policy and was entirely unjustified. He took advantage of this fact to request McCarthy to come to the State Department for conversations. He made it entirely clear this time that he would not tolerate irresponsible and unjustified interference in affairs of the Department. From this time on, the attack of the Senator on the personnel of the State Department ended. The exact nature of the discussion has never been revealed, but the strong impact on McCarthy was evident in his acts. He knew he must let the State Department and foreign policy alone.

The first case in which the Secretary felt sure he could win complete Congressional support came up soon. In April he fought to defend the appointment of Charles E. Bohlen as Ambassador to Russia with all the facts and arguments needed to win his case. The case was won; Bohlen served in Moscow the usual term of five years. McCarthy was angry over the second victory, but after this there was no McCarthy attack of any vigor on the Department—although the fear lingered on.

In some cases the Secretary had hoped to save the individual from attack, but events made this difficult. If, for instance, the man on the stand, who was usually a high-ranking officer, appeared to be evasive and lacking in candor under questioning, the Department had to consider whether in a hard negotiation with the Soviets he could show

the required firmness. It was my impression Foster thought at first he could defend several of those who resigned under pressure but that their testimony on the Hill made it awkward or impossible.

Although Foster was informed, too, about incidents of homosexuality, these were handled quietly and to this day are not known outside the small confidential groups that handled the interviews. The Department traditionally has been tolerant of personal morals. Every scandal is treated with care and discretion. Some transfers of officers who became too involved are easily explained on general grounds. Foster did not consider that he should attempt to deal personally with most of these cases—unless they became a part of specific political issues. More discreet handling was possible if he did not personally meet with the individuals. The State Department had no stake in imposing a particular standard of morality; the problem was rather that in sensitive positions, persons must be free from fear of blackmail.

I knew many of the men under fire, and I was a witness to some of Foster's long hours of studying available information. He knew that the whole disturbing problem should be handled as promptly as possible so that the men could soon get on to their proper work in peace of mind.

Dr. Henry Pitney Van Dusen, in his introduction to *The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles*, tells of a case of a "minor official" threatened with dishonorable dismissal and disgrace on charges of subversion, "one of the many victims of the witch hunt directed by Senator McCarthy and his lieutenants." The matter was brought to Foster's attention, after his appeal had been denied by the loyalty board and the Under Secretary. In spite of the Secretary's demanding schedule, he personally reviewed the case, overrode the earlier findings and ordered exoneration and complete restitution including the person's appointment to a more responsible position. He wrote the man who had brought this to his attention, thanking him and saying that "on the basis of convincing evidence the officer had been given a full and complete clearance."

Foster, during the time of McCarthy's attacks on the Department, had been faced with one of the most distasteful problems of his public career. He knew that the demands of practical politics could not be completely ignored by anyone, but to yield principles he had firmly held was repugnant to him. He did not know who Scott McLeod was until after he had been appointed by Under Secretary for Administration Donald Lourie. He understood that McLeod had been recommended as a person who knew about security and personnel matters.

When he became aware of McLeod's connections on the Hill and observed the problems of his performance on the job, he became increasingly concerned and made successful efforts to place him in a less strategic position. McLeod no longer exerted much influence in Washington.

Foster's problems were aggravated by the fact that one of the few areas over which he worried, especially in the early part of his work as Secretary of State, was in dealing with Congress. He had felt keenly the defeat of his campaign for the Senate seat, which he had held briefly in 1949, and which he had wished to regain in that election. He knew that there were many who claimed he did not understand the realities of politics, and therefore he felt under an obligation to listen to those who had had long experience in the field.

He had endeavored to find cases strong enough to defend in Congress, while permitting the less sure to resign as promptly as possible, to endeavor to remake their lives. He found these suitable cases, defended them, and won. When he indicated, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, his conviction that John Carter Vincent was not disloyal, McCarthy, not a member of the committee, had made bitter accusations. The Secretary knew that not only the men at lower echelons but he himself was being judged, both in the Department and outside. For him there was no court of appeal. He was in many quarters unforgiven and condemned by those to whom he could not reveal the facts or explain the decisions he had made. He had a fundamental feeling for justice in an imperfect world, but many who did not know this did not grant him the benefit of the doubt then or later. Only those who had not themselves suffered from the decisions could forget the painful period of early 1953 and, with few exceptions, appraise it evenhandedly.

Because in official Washington there was a wide chasm between those who only said what they thought he wanted to hear—a practice that irritated and frustrated him—and those who attacked him sharply, he sometimes called on friends whom he had known and trusted for years to advise him on sensitive matters of principle when they seemed threatened by the need for political expediency. His pragmatism—the confidence in what “works”—and his religious faith, with its reliance on enduring principles, sometimes counseled differing courses of action. He was at times inconsistent in his actions, but he was never happy in compromising his ideals for practical considerations. He knew, however, that he could not by himself evaluate all the reasons or foresee all the consequences of his decisions. He

knew he must take the ultimate responsibility, subject to the President's approval, but he wanted hard-hitting advice from friends whose intelligence and judgment he trusted. Fortunately, one of those who was available to him and never failed him in this matter was his brother, Allen. Another valued friend was Dr. Roswell P. Barnes, Executive Secretary of the World Council of Churches; he called him down to Washington on a number of trying occasions, and later also sought his support in the difficult last weeks of his life.

There is a certain amount of truth in the conclusion that Foster's deep understanding of the special problems and severe demands on the men who served under him began with his foreign travels. It is likely, too, that these men in foreign posts were the first to see the Secretary at close range and to understand his simple consecration to the same aims that they served. They realized that he could take the rough with the smooth. For his part, when he saw Ambassador Charles Yost and his mission working in tents in Laos, when he found men who could not buy cigarettes or get proper food or drinking water, when he saw those in danger of tropical diseases and threatened with malaria, which he himself had suffered, he came to understand in a more vivid manner the dedication of the men in the Service. Some had been separated from their wives and children because of the danger in the places where they were asked to serve. They were facing hardships he could understand. On his return from these trips he often spoke of the courage and willingness to serve that he had witnessed. Thus there was established over the years a mutual understanding that was to eradicate the first impressions of the troubled times of 1953.

This slowly won attitude of understanding was reflected in the Foreign Service luncheon on his seventieth birthday.

Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, speaking to the guests, said:

We have had much talk during recent years of the morale of the State Department and of the Foreign Service. In fact, Tom Wailes just mentioned a few minutes ago some of the main factors which have improved the morale of the Foreign Service in the State Department during the last four or five years. One of the factors has been some of the organizational shifts, for which the Secretary is primarily responsible. But to one who gained a certain amount of experience, while serving both in the Department and abroad under nine Secretaries of State, may I say that there is nothing which strengthens the morale of the members of the State Department

and of the Foreign Service more than the feeling that they are serving under a truly great Secretary of State. It helps us in coping with the frustrations, the disappointments and the inconveniences which inevitably attend work in the field of foreign affairs to have as our leader one who came to us so superbly equipped for his task, one who possesses the courage, the wisdom, the resourcefulness and the perseverance and at times, if you please, the rugged stubbornness which a great Secretary of State must have in these trying times. Your unfailing sense of humor and your cheerful confidence in approaching situations which would fill many of us with dismay are a source of inspiration to those who serve with you, Mr. Secretary.

The Secretary responded as he blew out the seven candles on his birthday cake:

This 70th birthday of mine is perhaps a bit unusual. Mr. Henderson said it started at 9:30, but he was not fully informed. It started at an official breakfast at eight o'clock at the White House and it continues through an official dinner until about 11 o'clock tonight. But I was insistent that I should at least have some moments of intimacy within this day, a day of some importance to me, and these are those moments. Now some people would not think that a gathering of four or five hundred people was an occasion of intimacy, but I think that it is because over these years in which I have been associated with the Foreign Service, and particularly during the last five years and more during which I have been Secretary of State, I have gained a feeling of fellowship, comradeship with the Foreign Service. So that whenever I am with a group of you I feel relaxed and at home and in an atmosphere of intimacy. . . .

I know that the Foreign Service of the United States is non-partisan, and that is the way it should be. Presidents come and go, Secretaries of State come and go, but the Foreign Service of the United States will and must go on forever, serving whomever the people put in the White House and whomever he puts in the Department of State. Your loyalties are not, cannot, should not be to any individual. But that doesn't mean that you don't have loyalties. You have a loyalty, a loyalty which is only inadequately understood, I am afraid. That is a loyalty to your country and the ideals for which this country was founded: ideals which, now more than ever, are required throughout the world if those ideals are themselves to be preserved. And you and your fellows throughout the far-flung reaches of this world are performing an indispensable service with loyalty, dedication and sacrifice, for our beloved country. Nothing could give me greater satisfaction than the opportunity on this, my 70th birthday, to meet with some of you.

E. Allan Lightner, Jr., Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Service Association, presented a document (later illuminated as a scroll) to commemorate the occasion.

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, he was born in the blizzard year of '88 and has lived in a whirlwind ever since;

WHEREAS, after a distinguished apprenticeship as soldier, lawyer, diplomat he was placed in full orbit as Secretary of State on January 21, 1953 and has since that time circled the globe at speed for a total of 445,935 miles of air travel, and

WHEREAS, he has, as an old woodsman, developed great skill in negotiating the rapids and whirlpools of international affairs and has been a resolute searcher for the quiet pools where true peace lives, and

WHEREAS, it is now clearly established that he will never be his age, even if he cannot fail to influence and leave his mark upon it,

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the American Foreign Service Association extends to John Foster Dulles congratulations and best wishes on the occasion of his 70th birthday.

Done in this city of Washington, D.C., February 25, 1958.

There had been several demands to "oust Dulles" in January and February. It was therefore a near sensation when, on February 24, in his testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, as James Reston reported in the *New York Times*:

"This, gentlemen," he [the Secretary] said solemnly and slowly, "is my final appearance before a Congressional Committee as Secretary of State"—here there was a long pause—"in the seventh decade of my life." The press reporters were starting for the door. . . . The last phrase turned their "resignation" into a birthday celebration. "I hope my statement [for the Trade Agreements Act] is received with more enthusiasm than my birthday is by me."

He was to have one more quiet birthday, his last, in Walter Reed Hospital a year later.

PROMISES ARE PIE CRUSTS

Foster liked a good negotiation. He liked the opposition of ability across the conference table, where each side had something to gain and something to give. He enjoyed seeing the strategy unfold and facts develop that showed where the other side might yield, where areas of mutual interest could be harmonized. His aides were amused to watch him, pencil in hand, doodling on his pad, or sometimes with his thumbs in the pockets of his vest, leaning back in a high leather-backed chair. Often he sharpened a pencil with a penknife—a habit Molotov is said to have found irritating. He listened intently however. He admired the skill of the Soviets. He said Molotov was one of the world's cleverest negotiators.

He did not, however, like a confused and unrealistic conference. He tried to avoid them. Above all, he did not like showmanship over matters of vital concern. He thought it could be a serious calamity if the President of the United States were pitted against an opponent who would use trickery, sly publicity, and impossible demands to place the head of the United States government in a position where people in many lands could be made to think of him as refusing measures that might be dressed up to look reasonable.

Winston Churchill was much concerned with "summitry," as indicated in 1953 when he discussed the responsibilities of heads of state to maintain the peace. He said that if these men speaking "at the Summit could agree the world could look forward to centuries of peace and progress." The address received more than usual attention, because preparations were being made for his meeting with the President and the French Premier at Bermuda. This meeting was postponed until December. In late June, Churchill had a mild stroke; the next year he resigned. But the phrase "the Summit" was picked up and repeated. It became a word of art.

When later there was to be a gathering at the summit in Geneva in 1955, it was intended to be a session to identify and list those prob-

lems that would be explored in great depth during the following months. The meeting, however, got bogged down on the issues themselves. It was clear from the start that the discussions could not safely be informal, and yet some of the participants were overoptimistic. Foster told his staff later that the whole endeavor was disappointing and indicated some of the dangers of meeting at the summit. In any case, it didn't work out as planned.

Even before 1958 he knew that Nikita Khrushchev was anxious to have a meeting with President Eisenhower. Khrushchev had been at Geneva with Bulganin in 1955. He had tested out his strength there. He almost certainly believed that he could gain immense prestige at home and stature abroad if he could have a summit meeting set up according to his chosen conditions. It was even possible that he could put the Western powers in a position where, in order to be "reasonable," they would yield a point or exhibit a divergence of policy within the alliance. From the Soviet point of view there was, thus, everything to gain and nothing to lose. They could completely control their own press—as they did later in the 1962 Cuba crisis—and yet could make various bids for publicity, which they reinterpreted at will for home consumption.

Although Bulganin signed the December 10 note, it was Khrushchev's move. Khrushchev had much to win in a meeting of heads of state. He would now stand before the world as the unquestioned leader of the Soviet Republics. He could wave the Sputnik triumph and rattle the atom; he could show himself as the international figure of heroic size he wished to be. The moment was ripe; as he often said of his proposals, "everything in due course." This could well be his year. He was flexing his muscles.

The Secretary for his part had real fears that the peace-hungry world would be deluded by the apparent chance of easing tensions. He knew that the heads of several of the new states did not have experience in negotiation and knew little of the Soviet aims and intentions. He knew that they were, above all, anxious to have a period of quiet in which to gain strength with which to sustain their newly won independence—to unfold development plans and new political and economic efforts. He knew that other governments more powerful and ambitious thought they could act as intermediaries if the Western Allies and the Soviets would bring their issues into a clear opposition. The pressures for a conference of "heads of state" were persistent.

During the year from January to September, the issue was one of paramount concern. There were dozens of notes from Moscow. There was continuing discussion between ambassadors; there was unre-

mitting interest on the part of the press. By September the Soviets lost interest and took a different tack.

On January 16, in his talk to the Press Club in Washington, the Secretary had explored the matter in considerable detail, explaining the situation as it then appeared. It was to change as the Kremlin varied its approaches and increased its demands throughout the next eight months. His discussion of the question in March was particularly active, and gave the limits and the possibilities. Throughout these weeks of consideration he was ever mindful of the President's statement, in which he fully concurred, that the President would go "anywhere at anytime" to meet with the Soviets if there was a real chance of peace.

In this speech he said emphatically that "there is a place for negotiation. . . . It would be the height of folly to renounce the use of this tool. This administration has not done that in the past and does not intend to do it in the future." His continued hope for some progress along this line is evidenced by his long-standing belief that negotiation must be at some time, in some way, an alternative to conflict, by the long hours he devoted to working and speaking on the subject, and by the President's own expressed views. He recognized the dangers of not having close working contacts if negotiation should develop. He said, "Also I believe the Soviet rulers, and I know that we, do not want our two nations to drift so far apart that there is increased danger that the cold war will turn into a hot war." He considered that during these months President Eisenhower had taken major steps to put forward a variety of proposals in the hope that grounds for an accommodation could be reached. The public, quite naturally, hoped that a conference at the summit could solve the world's urgent problems of war and peace.

Meanwhile, the Soviets were to increase their price tag for a summit meeting by adding new conditions to a point that rendered plain their real intentions and lack of readiness for a negotiated end to the cold war, and led to the remark by the Secretary on March 25 that "if the Soviets had laid down an ultimatum, then I think the situation looks very dark indeed."

Foster almost more than anyone who has dealt with the Soviets had had long experience in negotiating with many governments and had met many times with the Russians. His judgments of their proposals were not always popular; they were, at the least, based on a wealth of knowledge.

In the first place he was a constant student of Soviet intentions. He read their writings and their speeches with meticulous care. (Although

careful as he was with detail, he left the name Khrushchev short one "h" in a hurried note on the side of a briefing paper!) Partly because the shortage of time forced a choice on him, he did not read various writings of the commentators or secondary materials on Communism extensively. He wished to convince the American people of the nature of basic characteristics of the Communist doctrine as expressed by Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev. One of the most important of these to him was suppression of religious worship and the denial of religious freedom and freedom of thought. In his speeches, therefore, he stressed over and over "*atheistic Communism*," and the oppression of the individual in the police state. In response to Soviet dominance of pronouncements on the Hungarian revolution, the Polish uprising, and the East German revolts, he constantly underscored the will of the individual to be free and the brutality of the Communist state. He emphasized, also, the consistency of the basic drive behind the varying tactics, disturbed lest others be lulled to complacency by peaceful words and changing policies.

He realized that the neutralism he deplored was in part the result of the failure of the Western world to prove its case by its deeds. To achieve a better public understanding of these facts he gave unstintingly of his time, and sometimes risked misunderstanding and censure. His careful study of Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* is evidenced by the fact that he owned six or more pencil-marked copies, and kept one in each of his working places. He quoted Stalin's statements and watched for changes in points of view that he considered of vital importance in framing United States policy.

A study of his books showed that he underscored many passages. Foster noted especially Stalin's statement that "England and France have rejected the policy of collective security . . . and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of 'neutrality.' Formally speaking, the policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: 'Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can. This is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims.'" Foster's sensitivity to the noncommitment of many countries was in part the outgrowth of his study of Communist thought.

Another of the pages that he underscored related to the "extension of the principles of philosophical materialism to the study of social life." He marked Stalin's comment:

Further, if nature, being, the material world, is primary, and mind, thought, is secondary, derivative; if the material world represents objective reality existing independently of the mind of men,

while the mind is a reflection of this objective reality, it follows that the material life of society, its being, is also primary, and its spiritual life secondary, derivative, and that the material life of society is an objective reality existing independently of the will of men, while the spiritual life of society is a reflection of this objective reality, a reflection of being.

He was disturbed, too, by passages such as this:

First conclusion: the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be "complete" democracy, democracy for *all*, for the rich as well as for the poor; the dictatorship of the proletariat must be a state that is democratic in a new way—for the proletarians and the propertyless in general—and dictatorial in a new way—against the bourgeoisie. . . . The talk of Kautsky and Co. about universal equality, and "pure" democracy, about "perfect" democracy, and the like, is but a bourgeois screen to conceal the indubitable fact that equality between exploited and exploiters is impossible. The theory of "pure" democracy is the theory of the upper stratum of the working class, which has been broken in and is being fed by the imperialist robbers. . . .

He frequently asked his staff for appraisals of what the Russians had said and what they had done. He referred often to Lenin's phrase, quoted first in the December 23 *Life* article: "Promises are like pie crusts, made to be broken." This approach was to be borne out in 1958 by the changing nature of the proposals and demands, by the continuing record of talking peace while stirring up subversion, fomenting attacks, and refusing to engage in reasonable negotiation over the six airplane incidents in which U.S. airmen had strayed or been accused of deliberately flying over the Western nations' borders into Soviet-held territory.

The Secretary had seen war, and the costly attempts to reconstruct shattered countries and wrecked political systems after war. He knew that the losses in men and property were so great that some values could never be completely restored. Yet he recognized the growth of Soviet power. He was wary of the combination of threats and offers of neutrality and peace that were embodied in the Rapacki Plan—the so-called Polish Plan for a demilitarized Central Europe—and also of much of the discussion in the notes on a summit meeting.

As he said in his January speech:

The great gain for the Soviets would be to have a meeting which as I say will utter platitudes about peace. . . . "we are going to end all world tensions," with the implication that there is no need any more to have this military preparation, to pay taxes in order to have a

mutual security program and the like. If Khrushchev can get that, that would be the greatest triumph of his career or indeed the career of almost anyone because then we would come back here and the other free-world leaders would go back to the countries where the people would no longer be willing to support military programs, the economic assistance programs. . . . the inconveniences of alliances which require people to coordinate their policies with each other. All these things, it would be believed, could be thrown away because peace has been proclaimed. But the Communist Parties will go right on.

One point that always needs to be borne in mind is that when you negotiate with the leaders of the Communist-controlled states, you are not negotiating with the principals you are negotiating with the second-class people because the governments are run by the Communist Party and, unless you bind the Party you haven't got an agreement which, as to the broad policy, has any significance at all.

To this problem of the Khrushchev attack, the Secretary was, in 1958, to devote the results of his fifty years of experience and struggles for peace, his keen observation, and his increasing knowledge of the government apparatus for the execution of foreign policy. To keep the public aware of the dangers, he was to use his full understanding of the President's views, his influence with the leaders in Washington, his contacts with the foreign ambassadors, his Foreign Service officers at home and abroad, his meetings with heads of states and other foreign officials, his news conferences, his speeches, and his every personal and official influence. He was sometimes criticized for repeating his views too often, but as he said on occasion, his propaganda instruments were less effective than those of the Soviets; he believed he must throw his personal weight constantly in the balance, whether his critics liked it or not. Moreover, he appreciated that the appetite for novelty and the need for wisdom do not invariably lead to the same conclusions.

This year was the great opportunity for Khrushchev, and therefore his failure to advance during this period to delude, to conquer, or to progress in many countries friendly to the United States could be considered the great achievement in the career of Foster Dulles. There was a pause, a reconsideration, and a time for regrouping for the Soviets in the face of the strength of the Western Alliance, the expanding program of missiles, and a public thinking more actively about Communist intentions.

The formula for summit meetings the Soviets put forward had an attraction for many. They urged that the men with the most knowl-

edge and the most power should agree on their common interests and avoid being involved in detail. This sounded plausible. Foster approached this idea with the memories of the Paris Peace Conference of 1918-19. He had held at that time, and later, the strong view that Wilson lost much influence when he left the country, and that he regained prestige too late after his return to the United States. He reminded his listeners often that the President held a position very different from that of the party leader or premier in many countries. Thus a gathering with the prime ministers of England and France and the party chief of the Communists placed the President in a special, and clearly undesirable, position. If he was represented abroad by his Secretary of State, he could retain his full capacity to maneuver and was in his proper constitutional relation to his Congress and the rest of the government. From a practical point of view, it was, moreover, impossible for him to be out of the country for long—the need to sign legislation and to control internal affairs required that he be within reasonable distance of Washington, not separated by a wide ocean or thousands of miles of air space. To Foster, the conference to end World War I in Paris had been an impressive and perhaps conclusive lesson; he spoke of it in his conference with our ambassadors on May 9 in Paris.

He had memories also of the Moscow meeting of 1947. Here the foreign secretaries had gathered to work out a basis for the peace treaties with Germany and Austria. Long weeks of conversation, with dozens of experts herded in a windy ballroom crowded with desks and people for late meetings and sterile exchanges of words, without adequate agreement on any of the essentials, had led nowhere.

He remembered, too, the Berlin conference of 1954. This was mainly concerned with the problem of Germany. This meeting had been arduous and painstaking. The three Western powers had put forward concrete and practical proposals for the reunification of Germany. No progress had been made and no ground yielded that would weaken the earlier joint statements on Germany, including the Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill Yalta Pact of 1945 on the reunification of Germany, which still remained unfulfilled promises.

He could reconsider also the Geneva meeting of 1955. Here the difficult session had ended in the issuance of a four-power directive. In this the U.S.S.R., France, the United Kingdom, and the United States jointly instructed their foreign ministers: “. . . recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by

means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security." This clear statement had not influenced the Soviets in their further action and had been, in fact, disregarded.

The long hours spent in these and other negotiations revealed the fact that, unless the Soviets had decided in advance on a course of action such as the May 1949 lifting of the Berlin blockade, the process of conferring together, with all the publicity and the fanfare, would not give much promise of a change in their position. For this reason the period of preparation, which would indicate the field of interest and the topics with which the Soviets wished to deal, was of vital importance if the proposed meeting was to be more than a propaganda exercise.

Foster realized that in stressing this point he was not giving the appearance of a flexible, accommodating diplomat who was anxious to give much-desired encouragement in order to gain credit in the eyes of the anxious world. The issues before the possible summit conference seemed to him of vital importance, however, and one on which an inadvertent slip could have far-reaching results. He stuck to his line and was to repeat his warning several times in 1958.

At the press conference of February 11, he was asked about his meeting with Mikhail A. Menshikov, who had just arrived in Washington as Ambassador. "Was that a sort of Mona Lisa smile you were wearing [at the] pretty affable meeting with the new Ambassador?" The Secretary, with his mind on the difficulties in the field of disarmament, replied, "I haven't changed my views. They are 'almost' impossible to negotiate with. . . . I figure that I myself have devoted approximately a year and a half of my life during the last twelve years to sitting across the table with Russians and negotiating with them. So I have a considerable experience in the matter, and I know that it is hard, slow work. Now that does not mean that it shouldn't be done. I believe that we should be prepared to do it." And he added, in answer to a further question, "The one agreement that has stuck the best—I think you can say stuck, has been the Austrian State Treaty."

When the Secretary returned from Manila, he found a variety of appointments awaiting him, including a visit from the Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economics in Bonn, Ludwig Erhard. He called me in to ask what I thought of his mission, and of him personally. I told him that we all attached great importance of any visit by Vice Chancellor Erhard, who has been and would continue to be an im-

pressive figure, with a major role in the recovery of Germany. The Secretary indicated his satisfaction that the conversation could take place in view of the many developing problems in Europe and elsewhere. Germany was beginning to look beyond its borders as its influence in the world continued to grow.

The Secretary, like many others, was now looking to North Africa, where troubles were multiplying. Military border actions by the French and the Tunisians caused alarm. Bourguiba was protesting French action near the Algerian-Tunisian border. There were a number of conferences in Washington, and a Good Offices Mission, with Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy representing the United States and Harold Beeley, Assistant Under Secretary of State, representing the United Kingdom. From February 19 to April 20 the two men were charged with this delicate mission and achieved a degree of success.

On March 25 the Secretary held a news conference, answering a number of questions on Soviet intentions and the United States views on a meeting of heads of state. It was at this time that the increased Soviet price tag that had been developing in the course of the past few weeks was explained in some detail.

The Soviets had sent a number of notes on the subject. It was evident that they were devoting a major effort to achieving their ends. The Secretary had commented briefly on the February 28 *aide-mémoire* from Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, and on the fact that "it is really ridiculous the position the Soviets are in. They seem to get away with it, but in effect they are saying: 'we are not willing to have any agreements now unless there is a Summit meeting.' . . . The idea that there is some magic about a meeting of heads of government is not borne out by the facts. . . ."

By March 25 there were several notes to study and compare. The Secretary had taken home the translation of the Soviet note, but had not had time to study it carefully before his eleven o'clock press conference. He made a preliminary analysis of its significance, however, in the light of the previous January, February, and March messages, as well as the January 28 speech of Khrushchev in Minsk. He had jotted down what he considered to be the Soviet price tag for a meeting at the summit.

The news conference began:

Questions, please?

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you read the exchange of notes on the subject of a Summit Conference over the last week or so, it's difficult to find anything particularly new in this whole situation. How

do you estimate we stand now on the problem of a Summit Conference?

A. It has not yet been possible for me to study thoroughly and in detail the Soviet note. . . . It does seem as though the Soviets were seeking to exact a terribly high political price as a condition. . . .

I have jotted down here, quite hurriedly, some of the price tags that they seem to be putting on it. I would like to read these to you, if I may, to illustrate my points:

1. The equating of certain Eastern European governments such as Czechoslovakia and Rumania, with such Western governments as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy;

2. Acceptance of the legitimacy of the East German puppet regime and acquiescence in the continued division of Germany;

3. Ending the agreed joint responsibility of the four former occupying powers of Germany for the reunification of Germany, a responsibility that was reaffirmed at Geneva in 1955;

4. Acceptance of the Soviet claim for numerical "parity" in bodies dealing with these matters, such as disarmament within the competence of the United Nations General Assembly—a "parity" which if conceded would give the Soviets a veto power in many functions of the General Assembly, enabling them to evade the will of the great majority and thus further to weaken the United Nations by, in important respects, importing into the General Assembly the same weaknesses that have crippled the Security Council;

5. The acceptance of an agenda so formulated that virtually every item—nine out of eleven—implies acceptance of a basic Soviet thesis that the Western Powers reject.

The questions went on probing a matter on which the Secretary had traditionally taken a consistent stand. One newsman queried whether, in view of the Soviets' "progress in enlisting support in the neutrals and even among our Allies," there was "danger that you might have to cave in." The Secretary answered, "I do not think there is any prospect of what you refer to as a 'cave in.'"

There had not been ambassadorial talks on the recent terms, he said; if there had been he might not wish to tell them, because this would expose "the early infantile hopes to the harsh rays of the sun." The reporters laughed. Someone asked whether this would turn the proposed summit into a "spectacle." He said, "I would say that if these terms were accepted, it would turn the Summit meeting into something much worse than a 'spectacle.' It would mean that on the way to the Summit we would have lost our shirt. Perhaps that would result in a 'spectacle.'" There was more laughter.

The Secretary indicated that it would be undesirable to bury the items discussed at the previous meeting in 1955 and narrow the agenda to a point where there was little hope of a constructive outcome. The problem of parity, which the Soviets seemed to think would consolidate and strengthen their position, was particularly worrying at this time and was to be fought until its elimination from Soviet proposals some weeks later. This problem introduced an almost impossible obstacle to negotiation.

After this lively and informative news conference, the work on preparation for a summit conference continued, intertwined with the questions of disarmament and nuclear testing; and the exchange of notes went on, contemporaneous with a harsh exchange over aircraft incidents.

The President, in a news conference on March 26, stressed the aspect of the matter that he and the Secretary had referred to frequently, the desire on the part of the Soviets to achieve a propaganda victory and to "impress the world at large" that the Soviets were the ones who sought to have peace. This explanation was followed by a three-power declaration issued on the 31st of March, which indicated the need for careful preparation at the ambassadorial level, a point that had been made and agreed to previously. This position was clarified further by the Secretary's reply to a question in the news conference of April 1. Diplomatic channels could certainly serve a purpose to examine the position of the respective governments on the main issues, "whereas a prolonged meeting of Foreign Ministers to discuss the pros and cons of all these issues is the last thing in the world that I personally would want to get into."

On April 2 the White House issued a partial list of proposals that had been rejected or ignored by the Soviets. These included:

- (1) the Baruch plan for international control of the atom
- (2) preparation of realistic measures of inspection and control
- (3) Open Skies proposal
- (4) peaceful use of outer space
- (5) transfer of nuclear-weapon stocks to peaceful uses
- (6) freedom of travel
- (7) limitation of United Nations veto.

All of these matters had been the subject of serious discussion, imaginative development, and considerable hopefulness on the part of the United States government. Unfortunately, no progress was made on these seven proposals.

In April the Soviets agreed to limited diplomatic exchanges on the question of a summit meeting. The United States for its part had ex-

pectations of certain modest achievements. This possibility was discussed by the Secretary at the news conference of April 15. He commented: "Last December we had a note from Chairman Bulganin which was replied to in January." This was taken up with NATO, a procedure which of course prolonged the discussion, so that the reply was made in January. He added, "I believe and think that almost everybody believes that it is worthwhile to maintain our alliances, particularly in this matter, our NATO alliance." The further use of the issue of a *meeting* for propaganda purposes continued to distress the Secretary. "Now there are a good many people, particularly in the newly developing countries, the newly independent countries, who are just for the first time getting into the stream of international affairs, who haven't had the opportunity to become mature in these matters, and Soviet propaganda initially is having a kind of a field day in those areas. I don't think that this is anything permanent. I think we can deal with it."

While the more than forty notes and comments on the question, as well as the citations above, indicate clearly the seriousness with which the Administration was taking the possibility of a meeting of heads of state, it is clear that after the first onrush of Khrushchev's effort, the complications, demands, and obstacles increased seriously. These tended to reconfirm the Secretary's view, as expressed on April 15, with regard to the adequacy of the normal procedures of negotiation, at least in the early stages of preparation and exploration of possible agreements.

. . . when you use what historically had been the established means whereby people communicate with each other for vital purposes of trying to reach agreement and maintaining a condition of peace, when you turn those processes into instruments of propaganda, I think you're doing a great harm to the real machinery whereby the world has historically endeavored, inadequately, to keep the peace. Time after time those processes have served a very important, indeed a vital purpose. And I hate to see them converted just into instruments of propaganda.

It would be a partial repetition of the essential elements to quote further from the Soviet notes and United States replies in the next five months. They cover considerable ground and can perhaps best be indicated by a listing of the broad categories of agenda topics handed to the Soviets on May 28, 1958: Disarmament, European Security and Germany, International Exchanges, Freedom of Travel, and Other Topics.

The notes from the Kremlin became more and more repetitive and tended to undermine the efforts being made by the ambassadors. In a long and wordy letter to the President the Soviets criticized the draft agenda. The Secretary's comment on June 17 indicated that the careful preparation was probably going to amount to nothing:

I don't think that their [the Soviet leaders'] basic attitude has varied, their tactics have varied. They have wanted and still, I guess, want, to have a Summit Conference if they can have a conference on their own terms, where they could score a propaganda victory, where they could give the free world the impression that the cold war is over. . . . Now, they have squirmed quite a lot while still holding to the broad strategic concept. . . . Now it looks as though they had come to the conclusion that a careful diplomatic study of the matters that might be discussed would disclose such a disparity of views that there would really be no solid, logical reason for having such a conference.

The painstaking work on the agenda went on through the summer. Ambassadors furnished the channels. The Soviets proposed a treaty on July 15. This was described in our reply as a "reflection of proposals already made on May 5 about an agenda." The preparations for a summit meeting came to a halt. The State Department's Historical Division, in *American Foreign Policy Current Documents*, said, as of August 22, "At this point in the exchanges between the United States and the U.S.S.R. regarding the holding of a summit conference, the developing crisis in the Middle East diverted the attention of the two Governments to an examination of the possibility of holding a high-level conference to consider this problem by itself, since no agreement had been reached on an agenda of topics covering all major aspects of East-West tensions."

The struggle of Khrushchev to gain dominance throughout the period was not obvious to the general observer. To those on the inside, working constantly with the problems, it was evident that it was a major effort. Similarly, the countermoves by the President, the Secretary, and his staff called for unceasing watchfulness.

To the press, the neutrals, the uncommitted countries, the people who hoped for lower defense costs, the Secretary and the President had to say in effect, "Keep working, keep paying, keep watchful, and keep your powder dry."

The Soviets often said publicly that the Secretary was a threat to world peace. Yet in 1957, after Chancellor Adenauer visited Moscow, a friend of mine in Bonn reported to me that the Chancellor brought back word that Khrushchev did not fear Foster as a danger to peace

—though he did indicate a fear of other American leaders. He had concluded that Foster wished peace. This was interesting, because at this time the Soviet press and newspapers elsewhere were referring to Foster as an advocate of brinkmanship and a warmonger.

EUROPEAN HORIZONS

Ten years before the period on which this story is focused Foster set forth his view of what American policy toward Europe should be. His concern was a part of his preoccupation with the security and welfare of the United States. It was to influence his words and deeds in these months of 1958.

In a speech in Paris before the American Club on November 18, 1948, when he was representing the United States at the U.N. General Assembly, then meeting in the French capital, he said:

In reality, American hopes as regards Europe are precisely the opposite of those which unfriendly sources impute to us. We want Europe to have so much political strength that neither the United States nor any other power whatsoever will ever be able to use Europe for purposes alien to the free development of Europe itself. We want Europe to have so much economic strength that it will be prosperous in its own right and not be dependent on economic grants from others. We want Europe to be sufficiently unified so that, practically, we can work with it. We want a Europe that has so much moral and intellectual dynamism that, in the tradition of the Magna Carta and Declaration of the Rights of Man, it will continue to arouse men everywhere to strike off any shackles that curtail their self-development. We want a Europe capable of inventing a new Industrial Revolution that will continue to multiply the productivity of human labor. We want a Europe which will again produce great literature, music, and art and such religious movements as have, in the past, inspired and enriched the world. . . .

In May 1958 the Secretary and his party took off for Europe from Durham, New Hampshire, for a busy series of meetings, after a speech on the "Strategy of Peace," which stressed an "enlightened collective concept" designed to prevent "the weaker nations" from

"being picked up one by one." They landed in Scotland, drove through the country of Robert Burns while the crew rested, then flew on to Copenhagen that Saturday afternoon for the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty foreign ministers. After Foster and Janet attended service in the Lutheran church the next day, he discussed preparations for the NATO sessions with his staff, talked with Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister, and with Heinrich von Brentano, from Bonn, and several other ministers.

The meetings of the NATO ministers around the green baize tables on May 5 though 7 were relatively informal, but long and tiring.

The Copenhagen conference was held at a time when there was considerable doubt and even confusion with regard to Soviet intentions.

Questions over the Berlin situation had been raised in England. The Rapacki proposal for a neutral zone seemed similar to a few to the "Eden Plan" of 1954 for a demilitarized central zone in Europe, although the Rapacki Plan would have taken Germany out of NATO. Would a melding of the two plans bring a "solution"? The leadership in France was changing and uncertain—what possible effect would this change of direction have upon relationships with Germany? Some statesmen had raised the question of whether the free world could afford to pay the price tag for a summit meeting. The United States position on aerial inspection was only half understood. (The proposal for inspection by aerial photography to ascertain the extent of military installations and preparation had been developed by the President with the help of the Secretary, and also, it was said, as outlined by Nelson Rockefeller. It was a new approach and seemed promising.) The political and security aspects of the newly inaugurated Common Market, or European Economic Community, were being hotly debated. Altogether, it was a time when the views expressed by the statesmen were deflected from the central purpose by both hope and fear.

As the Secretary saw his own task, it was to bring these views into harmony by sharpening the focus on Khrushchev's intentions and by rekindling enthusiasm in the central cause of unity in the aims and plans of the free world in general, and the NATO countries in particular.

There was little time to enjoy the renowned food of Copenhagen and no opportunity to wander in the delightful city. There was a dinner Monday at Wivex, one of the most famous restaurants. But even in the midst of matters of state, the Secretary found a change of pace. There was in the conference building in old Copenhagen one

of those strange elevators made of small boxes, revolving on a continuous chain. These are called "paternosters," because many are scared to jump on and off for fear they will be caught at top and bottom—they imagine themselves flattened like cookies. The name comes because persons are said to pray a Pater Noster as they get on. This contraption amused the Secretary. He seemed to be going to see his aides more often than usual, and they concluded that he found the perpetual motion rather entertaining. They were a bit worried because a slip could be dangerous, but he was sure of foot and enjoyed the unusual exercise.

The formal meetings were followed by more intimate conferences, with free and unrestrained debate on the significance of the Kremlin's shifting pronouncements since the December meeting. If there was pressure to get agreement, it was more obviously exerted by one or two European leaders than by the United States.

The Secretary was anxious to explain the serious desires of the United States government for a meeting at the summit, if it could be well prepared and could be held without giving ground by the very agreements that would precede and make possible such a meeting. When he reviewed the long and complicated notes, most of them sent by Khrushchev to England and France but not to the other NATO countries, he found that, as he said later, "there is not the same emotional fervor about the Summit as there was."

In order to balance this emerging disappointment for some of the representatives over the postponement of a prospect of a significant easing of tensions, he emphasized the constructive and hopeful aspects of the alliance.

If the propaganda aspects of recent Soviet moves had to be brushed aside, if there were dangers in a "free zone" in Central Europe, if the proposed nonaggression pact was intended as a distraction from the policy of strength, if the reduction of troops in Germany would weaken all Europe, and if there was no dependability in the Soviet's announced cessation of nuclear testing, positive efforts of the Allies could nevertheless still safeguard the peace, he felt. This was a period when, as author Stanley High said, perhaps paraphrasing the Secretary's book *War, Peace and Change*, "the dynamic prevails over the static." The United States had made clear its increased efforts in the field of missiles. The Secretary was to urge renewed efforts, not only in the fields of military preparedness, but in the diplomatic exchanges and in the economic cooperation he considered a central issue for years just ahead.

It was agreed that there should be unremitting efforts in the

technical discussions that must be the groundwork for disarmament proposals. There must be ever closer and more frequent intergovernmental consultations. Even the possibility of occasional frustration should not be permitted to limit the scope of the effort.

The Secretary had created an atmosphere of "coordination without the sacrifice of independence," a goal he described later that week. Drew Middleton said in the *New York Times*, "Dulles' prestige among governments allied with the United States is probably higher now than at any time since he first became Secretary. This stubborn, proud man has, in a comparatively short span of six months, seen both his stubbornness and his pride vindicated." *Life* referred to the NATO meeting as "a diplomatic triumph."

The London *Daily Telegraph*, in reporting on the sessions, said, "he stood out from his colleagues like a gnarled tree stump . . . at Copenhagen it was the gnarled tree stump that seemed congruous and seasonal." *U.S. News and World Report* on May 16, speaking of NATO, said, "Suddenly there is a widespread agreement in Europe with John Foster Dulles' method of doing business."

The problems of the Common Market and the growing economic cooperation were less difficult than the problems of countering Khrushchev, which had dominated most of the early sessions. Here Foster's long preoccupation on unification in Europe was known to men like Spaak, Schuman, Monnet, de Gasperi, Fanfani, Lloyd, von Brentano. Thus, when he hailed as a major achievement the early work on the Coal and Steel Community, and the first steps of the Common Market taken in January 1958, these men were not surprised.

Over the years, since 1903, Foster had traveled in Europe. His interest in bringing together the small and large nations had its origins in these early experiences. They were reflected in his speeches and activities ever since the end of World War I and subsequently, when he stated in his brief for the United States delegation's use at the Paris Peace Conference that trade and economic cooperation were more important than reparations and the payment of war debts. His views in these later years were colored by his experiences in diplomacy, business, and law, and in his work with the Council of Churches. His early studies and travels abroad had made him aware that the many instances where national boundary lines cut across mines and fields, and separated industries and markets, had created currency and migration problems.

Although his first visit to Europe when he was a boy was mainly

for pleasure, he was alert even then to the artificial divisions of the areas he visited. His work with his grandfather at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 has been referred to often, probably because it is rare for a young man of nineteen to participate in such a conference. Here, too, he had been interested in national tensions, particularly between the Germans and the other nations after the Berlin proposals had been given short shrift. At the Peace Conference of 1919 he had worked with John Maynard Keynes and with Jean Monnet, both economists of broad vision. Thus what was now emerging in Europe in 1958 he saw as the culmination of several decades of efforts, persistent though interrupted by war.

Many concluded that because the Secretary did not often concern himself with the details of economic planning and was present at only a few of the meetings, the time he assigned to these matters, as Secretary, demonstrated a lack of interest. This would be a mistaken judgment. I had talked to him about economic matters over a period of years. He had an intense feeling that growth and expansion were both possible and inevitable, and that the forces holding them back were certain institutional factors as well as the inhibiting theories of some academicians—a lack of imagination on the part of international economists. He felt there should be a more simple, direct approach to the question of supply and demand, putting surpluses to work. Markets should be broadened and financial arrangements made more comprehensive.

These thoughts were in his mind when, in the winter of political turbulence and bitter cold of 1947, George Marshall asked him to take two days off from the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London and undertake a confidential mission to France. He was to talk to various leaders, including de Gaulle, Schuman, and Monnet, about their ideas of the future of Europe and the possibilities of working with Germany once the postwar problems had been partially liquidated and Nazi influences eliminated.

Because of the delicacy of the issues to be covered, it was agreed that the trip across the channel would ostensibly be given a more frivolous purpose and that Foster would appear merely to be indulging Janet in her desires to buy a new hat. It was considered prudent, however, to deposit a copy of the official orders in the safe of the Hotel Claridge, where they were staying in London, so that if any accident occurred and Foster did not return, the nature of the mission would be substantiated and the record would be clear.

Foster had increased the time and effort he devoted to government work as contrasted with private business and law throughout

the forties. It was natural that General Marshall should have turned to him. It was also inevitable that he should support the Marshall Plan both while he was a Senator from New York in 1949 and later, before he became Secretary, when he defended its purposes and methods before Congress and the public.

In the Paris speech before the American Club in 1948, he had said, ". . . those in Europe who today fear have numbers, quality, institutions, resources and propinquity, such as to make it ridiculous that they have to fear. They ought to constitute an unassailable citadel of freedom and well-being. Only disunity makes them weak."

His first extensive talk with General Marshall was probably in March 1947, when Marshall stopped in Berlin on his way to Moscow and met Foster and others of the delegation, who had arrived separately to consider drafting the Austrian and German treaties. Their first conversation together and alone was about the peace treaties for Germany and Austria. It took place in a growing dusk at the Wannsee Guesthouse in Zehlendorf, a residential area in Berlin. Foster had been questioning me about Austria and its future prospects when the General came in. I left the two together for a private conversation. Foster was to work in close collaboration with Marshall on diplomatic and economic matters not only in March 1947 but also in December and January, and through the years until General Marshall resigned. These were two men who would lie in the hospital in neighboring rooms of Walter Reed in 1959, their missions accomplished, or nearly so, but then, in 1947, facing more than ten years of work for reconstruction and peace.

On May 8, 1958, Foster had breakfast in Copenhagen, lunch in Berlin, and dinner in Paris. He had gone to Denmark for the NATO meeting and now was at work trying to help tie members of the alliance more closely together in their common tasks.

The day called for split-second timing. The Secretary regarded the Berlin visit as important, and yet he could not give more than five hours to the landing ceremonies, the tour of the city, the meeting in the House of Delegates, and the other functions. The Mission in Berlin had carefully worked out the tour he was to take: close to the sector border, by the Brandenburg Gate, by the prospective site of the new United States Embassy near the ruins of the old embassy, by the modern-style Congress Hall, the newest and finest of the buildings erected mainly with United States money and initiative, and on to the Town Hall of the former ancient city of Schöneberg. Minister Bernard Guffer and two of his aides had made a dry run to perfect

the schedule of the tour. The people would be waiting. The Secretary had not been in Berlin since the conference of 1954.

The plane skimmed in over the rooftops to the Tempelhof Airport—the largest one in the world located in the middle of a city. Here the coal- and wheat-laden planes had let down during the 1948 airlift, approximately ten years ago. Here the hungry, excited children had stood watching for the packets of candy the pilots dropped as they circled for a landing.

The high-hooded roof of the semicircular building stretched out over the apron to cut out wind and weather. The plane wheeled in close to the United States soldiers, drawn up in formation, at exactly eleven o'clock. Mayor Willy Brandt, smiling and hatless, stood at the foot of the steps, flanked by his commissioners, as the Secretary came quickly from the plane to greet the Germans and the Commandant, General Barksdale Hamlett, the ranking resident American in the city, and David Bruce, Ambassador from Bonn. Foster spoke to the newsmen and to the representatives of the French and British forces. The welcoming group were drawn up in a hollow square; the Secretary and the General reviewed the waiting troops, sharp and erect with immaculate silk scarves in the spit-and-polish style of the Berlin garrison, proud of their part in the defense of the city.

Cars had been drawn up, with the Mayor's open car just behind the motorcycles, and the procession drove on the edge of the landing apron through the tunnel under the building and out to the open streets where the people crowded on the curb and at the base of the soaring memorial to the flyers who died in the airlift. Along the ten-mile route the cheering people stood several rows deep. To them the visit of a man who thought of Communism as they did was another sign that the people of the United States cared. They shouted "Dulles," "America," "*Willkommen*," and "*Freiheit*." In Berlin perhaps more than in any other city, the voice of the citizen raised to cheer his friends from abroad in the last few years has been loud and clear.

The line of cars drew up in the cobbled market place in front of the old-fashioned, massive Rathaus, which served as capital building in the divided city, and the guests and officials streamed up high stairs to the reception room above. Here every seat was assigned and filled. A hush came over the throng as the Secretary came into the legislative chamber and began his speech, which was followed by a German translation. He reaffirmed the persistent policy of the United States to protect the security and welfare of the city and to regard any attack on Berlin "as an attack upon ourselves."

At noon the Mayor stood beside the Secretary as the Freedom Bell in the high tower began to ring. This bell, with the inscription based on Lincoln's words, "That this world [Lincoln had said "nation"] under God shall have a new birth of Freedom," had been bought after the airlift, in 1953, with the pennies of school children throughout the United States. It could be heard every day in the East beyond the sector border; it called to many who came across the artificial line before the 1961 wall.

After a brief reception for the delegates and guests in the dignified hall of the old building, lunch was served at the fine house the President used when in Berlin. The table was gay with small American flags at each place; the toasts were intimate and jocular, yet had a serious undertone. Coffee on the terrace overlooking the lawn and one of Berlin's many small lakes gave a moment of relaxation before the Secretary joined Brandt and Ambassador Bruce and several key German officials for a quick review of the situation. The morale in Berlin was high but constant reassurance was necessary, Brandt said.

The crowds were still waiting in the streets at three, when the group came down the steps.

Mrs. Dulles had come in from visiting their son Avery, then at Münster continuing his studies in the Jesuit priesthood. She arrived at Templehof by separate plane and had joined the group at the Rathaus. She and the Secretary, and Andy Berding, Livie Merchant, Frederick Reinhardt, Loftus Becker, and I and a few others said good-by and boarded the waiting Air Force Constellation for Paris's Orly Field.

We could look down on the sprawling city of West Berlin, its many new buildings, its parks, lakes, and busy traffic stretching for twenty miles on each side of the airport, and we could distinguish the grays and browns and almost empty streets of the other half of the city as we flew out over the Communist-held East Zone on the twenty-mile-wide Berlin-Frankfurt air corridor.

Orly Field, far out from the center of the city, held little of the drama of welcome of Berlin, and the people on the streets and in the cafés on the routes to the Place de la Concorde took little notice of the passing limousines. But behind the scenes a government crisis would lead to the spectacular return of General de Gaulle in a matter of days.

The United States Embassy residence, inconveniently located and expensive to maintain, was still a fine building, with beautiful reception rooms and living quarters. The Secretary said that even the

bathroom—where he could read, write, or telephone—was one of the finest.

His good friends Ambassador and Mrs. Amory Houghton were hosts at dinner that night, but the guests left soon after the coffee and cigars. A busy day lay ahead.

As always on such trips, the Secretary worked early in the morning at the residence with the Ambassador looking over the cables and writing a few for Washington. There were three series: the general cables, the roundup of news, based in part on intelligence sources; SECTO and TOSEC were outgoing and incoming, which were screened by the official party and referred to the special purposes and meetings for which the trip was planned; and a third series, less generally used, TEDUL (incoming) and DULTE (outgoing), which were specifically for the Secretary, and were not distributed throughout the embassy except to the Ambassador himself. They were treated almost as were the "Eyes Only" cables, which the Secretary rarely used and did not encourage.

Then, as sometimes was possible on a trip abroad, the United States ambassadors from sixteen or eighteen countries were called in from their various posts for a briefing and an exchange of views. The meeting was scheduled some weeks in advance and was eagerly anticipated. A few of the embassy staff and one secretary were there to record the discussion. The library was crowded as the ambassadors grouped around the long table. The Secretary now summarized the meetings of the past seven days and followed with a *tour d'horizon*.

In a meeting of this sort, his direct, simple phrases, the evidence of purpose, and his understanding of agreements and disagreements made their impact. He would search the faces around the table, then lean back with his hand on the pencils in his vest pocket, seeking the exact phrase. The five- or six-point agenda lay before him, with a few scribbled words added to the typescript. Always he was thinking out the problems with his officers and friends. He was at his best when talking with his associates in intimate circumstances such as these, and hearing the informal questions and comments, trying to give a balanced judgment and to appreciate the difficulties each country had to face. Thus, to me, his statement about Europe and Britain on May 9 to the United States ambassadors was a real confession of faith in the power of the recuperative capacity of Europe, the healing of the wounds of Suez, the importance of close co-operation.

The Secretary left Paris on the afternoon of Saturday, May 10.

He was to visit Europe five more times. The long flight from Paris to Minneapolis-St. Paul for the centenary celebration of the founding of the two cities was delayed by head winds. There was an air of relaxation on the plane. Some read, some played bridge, and the Secretary, busy with his notes and his speech revision, would break off from time to time to come through the cabin and joke with those of us who were taking the night and day off. Bunks were made up early and we had a long sleep as we flew westward to land, some four hours late, in the Midwest.

In the Minneapolis stadium thousands waited in the hot sun for the speeches and ceremonies for Foster Dulles and Lauris Norstad and Judy Garland, which preceded the gay Scandinavian folk festival. He affirmed in his speech that the NATO meeting had "provided a good demonstration of consultation and coordination without the sacrifice of independence." He drew a parallel between the growth of the United States from the original thirteen colonies to the wider NATO union.

Walter Lippmann wrote later that "Dulles was trying to escape from the bitter truth of Western political decline." It is true that the Secretary had confidence in the future of Europe and of the West generally. To him the West meant not only a geographical area but the culture and the values of democratic society. The Secretary often indicated his belief that the ideas of freedom and individual dignity would eventually triumph everywhere. To him the patient work on the defenses of the democratic nations and untiring efforts to hold together the Alliance of the Atlantic Community were essential to the preservation of peace and justice.

While there was much criticism of his theories on the "rollback" of Communism, he never abandoned his conviction that the spirit of revolt once evidenced in Hungary and East Germany, and of the refugees fleeing from tyranny, was characteristic of man's real aspirations. He was forced by experience to revise his expectations and adopt a new timetable, but he never saw Western democracy as the victim of slow, inevitable decline. He thought, rather, that the forces for good would regroup and emerge in time with renewed and increased strength.

The Secretary's trip to Washington was busy. Millie Asbjornson had flown out from the capital to meet him with a batch of official papers, and so after the five-hour flight he was prepared to confer with Herter, Dillon, Bill Macomber, and others. The troubles of Indonesia, Peru, Venezuela, Lebanon, Yugoslavia, and Spain re-

quired attention, and preparations had to be made for the visit of Chancellor Julius Raab, of Austria.

May had been a troubled month, with disappointment over the failure of Arctic inspection and worries over the growing complexities of planning for a summit conference. He had taken time from his busy schedule on May 19 to guide his sister, Margaret Edwards, and her two granddaughters, Margot and Joan, through his private office and his small hideaway, Room 5157. He showed them a few gifts on the shelves, some with hidden drawers and automatic buttons. As Margaret says, "His day was filled with appointments with high diplomats and department officers discussing momentous issues. But between eight-thirty and nine he appeared as carefree as a school-boy." On the 23rd he made a quick trip to the clinic for routine X rays and tests, then on the 27th went to New York to register for voting, attending the graduation of his daughter Lillias from Union Seminary that day. He flew to Duck Island the next day with Janet to celebrate her birthday, May 31. This respite, an honored anniversary, was one that meant much to them both. The travels, the speeches, the press conferences, and the negotiations had been arduous, but Foster was in fine physical shape. Many marveled at his capacity to endure. There is no wonder that the subject was raised in his press conference of May 20, in the following exchange:

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been suggested that maybe some of the problems of the United States arise from the fact that you are overburdened. I'd like to read a comment by a very prominent commentator in this morning's paper saying that "Mr. Dulles has more problems to decide than any man can possibly attend to and know about and master." Would you care to give us your reaction to that? [Laughter.]

A. Well, I'm afraid my reaction might be prejudiced. [Laughter] I think only you and ultimately history can give the answer to that question.

DIPLOMACY IN THE SPRING

On June 2 Foster and Janet returned from the fresh spring days on Duck Island. President Heuss, from Germany; Prime Minister Macmillan, from England; Prime Minister Daud Kahn, from Afghanistan; and the Shah of Iran, among others, were to come to Washington to share in the views being developed in Washington. Charles Malik, Lebanese Foreign Minister, was to urge recognition of the dangers of the Middle East.

There had been beautiful days and nights at the beginning of June. The dinner for Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, at the Pan American Union on June 4, had been particularly delightful. The building, set in a formal garden, was reminiscent of an old Spanish palace. There was a moment of formality when the guests moved slowly up the sweeping marble stairs from the terrace outside, where they had gathered. The evening was almost too hot, but a breeze blew through the arched doorways and the high-ceilinged room. At the end of the horseshoe table, which seated some hundred guests, the scholarly President, with Janet beside him, and the Secretary presided with urbane dignity. The friendly warmth in the atmosphere, welcoming the new era of friendly cooperation between two great nations, was echoed by the toasts of the two men. A dinner the next night at the German Embassy, somewhat less formal, was also pleasant and easy. There was no difference in view on any significant question affecting the Western Alliance and the policy toward the Soviets. President Heuss, who did not himself have specific responsibilities for foreign policy, did, however, reflect the spirit of the new Germany.

The Secretary went to the airport on June 6 to see off President Heuss and to welcome Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who arrived shortly thereafter.

President de Gaulle had invited Foster to visit him in Paris, and at the same time came the announcement that a conversation with

Macmillan in Washington had been planned. Apparently, as Macmillan thought over the many world crises and the significance of this first meeting between the new President of France and the Secretary of State, he decided a meeting to consider many world problems was indicated. In Washington they reviewed some of the questions that might arise in Paris.

On June 6 Foster also went to the Hill to testify before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. It was important to try to set the lines of American policy and direction clearly before the committee. His statement on aims and policy was released in a variety of forms, but they did not perhaps attract the notice they deserved. There were in this review six main points:

(1) The peoples of the world universally desire the establishment of a just peace.

(2) The designs of aggressive Communism pose a continuous threat.

(3) Security can only be maintained by the spiritual, economic, and military strength of the free world in partnership.

(4) Change is the law of life for nations as well as for men, and no system can survive unless it proves its continuing worth in the face of change.

(5) The effectiveness of collective-security measures depends on the economic advancement of the less developed parts of the free world and their sustained independence.

(6) In all international associations of the free world, of which the United States is a member, it considers all nations as equals; the sovereignty of no nation will ever be diminished by any act of the United States.

He stressed the fact that United States foreign policy is designed to protect and promote the interests of the United States—which include the lives and homes of our people, their confidence and peace of mind, their economic well-being, and their ideals. These interests “and the facts and assumptions listed,” he said, “are not mutually exclusive; rather they are overlapping and interdependent. Yet, of them, ideals rank first. Our people have never hesitated to sacrifice life, property, and economic well-being in order that our ideals should not perish from the earth.” These words were directed not only to the Senate and to the American people but to Khrushchev.

The chilling note from Nikita Khrushchev on June 11, questioning the real desire of the powers for a summit meeting, had been foreshadowed by the communications of April and May. The Secretary had been questioned again in his news interview of June 10

on the relation of the German policy to the preparation for a summit conference. A recent issue of *Newsweek* had quoted him as having told associates, "I seem to be much stronger for unification than he [Chancellor Adenauer] is." He denied this view in his answer to a question. "I do not think I am stronger for German reunification. . . ." He explained that the Republic of Germany "does not want to be in a position of blocking disarmament by saying unless there is first a reunification of Germany nothing can be done in any field. None of us wants to take that position." He added that the United States, having participated in the Geneva conference in 1955, had to maintain the position that not only the reunification of Germany but also the integrity of agreements was involved. This led to differences in emphasis, which were sometimes misconstrued. The United States was not willing that agreements already made "be wiped off."

At about the time President Heuss was leaving Washington, a United States Army helicopter in the air over the Republic of Germany strayed off course on its way from Frankfurt to Grafenwöhr and inadvertently crossed the zonal border, making a forced landing at Zwickau. According to the four-power agreement, the United States had the right to aid its personnel in such circumstances, but the authorities in East Germany chose to ignore this agreement. The Soviets denied their responsibility for the detention of the pilot and crew.

The major problem involved was the level at which conversations could be held with officials of the East German regime without implying recognition of its authority over the severed eastern territory. There was in the Department a difference of opinion as to how the matter was to be handled and what the consequences were likely to be. The Secretary, in close consultation with the President, made the decision on which action was taken. The men were released and the episode was soon forgotten. Neither the Soviets nor the East Germans attempted to make an issue of the way in which the arrangements were concluded.

The news conference of June 10 had been concerned with the German question, summitry, and the Macmillan talks. There was apparently little alarm about the Middle East—interesting in view of the fact that the Secretary had spoken of the matter several times and had explained to various groups that "the political situation in Lebanon, which for some time had been unstable, reached crisis proportions toward the end of the second week in May." He had commented on the fears of Lebanon on May 20. An assassination, a

strike, and President Camille Chamoun's alleged intentions to remain in office in defiance of the constitution limiting the term of the President had rendered Lebanon particularly vulnerable. In view of indications of outside interference designed to promote civil strife, the United Nations Representatives, James W. Barco and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, on June 6 and 10 urged quick and decisive United Nations action. An Observation Group was dispatched to Lebanon on June 11. Foster, in his news conference of June 17, referred to the United Nations 1949 resolution on indirect aggression and the Congressional action of March 1957 proclaiming the Middle East to be of vital interest to the United States.

In commenting on the Macmillan talks in his news conferences of June 10 and 18, Foster said, "The talks so far, I might say, if it does not involve disrespect, have been of a rambling character . . . a little more pointed up in terms of the economic and financial problems of the world." There was in 1958 considerable concern over the recession, which a few feared might develop into a depression that would complicate all international relations.

The Secretary, however, wished to stress mainly the unity of spirit and the informality of the conversations. President Eisenhower said on June 18, ". . . for five years I have tried to create the possibility that heads of government could have informal talks among themselves without creating great expectations . . . without the necessity for . . . an agenda . . . and finally getting out one of these customary communiqués. . . ." Eisenhower said that "as individuals and as governments, we have remarkable unity of outlook . . . we certainly hope to be helpful with our friends and associates. . . ."

On Friday, June 13, the Secretary was able to forget business for a while as he and Allen, since 1953 head of the Central Intelligence Agency, flew to Princeton. He was attending his fiftieth reunion, Allen his forty-fourth. Foster had had a talk with his doctors on June 9 and was declared in good condition. He was anticipating the reunion with keen pleasure, for he had always felt a deep affection for his college. Foster and Allen had many things in common besides Princeton. They loved to talk into the late hours. Foster would call Allen for a brief telephone word or to ask him to come to the Department or his house on any occasion when conditions presented him with a new problem or a growing crisis. Although their views diverged on occasion on the evaluation of an issue, they respected and admired each other, and neither "held his punches." When the two men were together, one noted the differences; when they were apart the similarities were striking. Both had keen minds; each had a

careful way of speaking, a flash of humor, an impatience over inaccuracy or careless phraseology. Both hated extreme, unverified statements. Each had a hearty laugh. Both liked a good game of bridge and an occasional highball. Both were courteous and friendly and attentive to their assistants. Both loved a family reunion.

One noted a number of surface differences—Allen smokes a pipe; Foster was forbidden to smoke after his thrombophlebitis. To the casual observer, Allen seemed more relaxed, perhaps a trifle easier in his approach. Foster was a doodler, a pencil sharpener and room pacer, but usually relaxed with family and friends. Foster as a young man used to twirl a lock of hair as he thought or talked. The family teased and imitated him until he stopped. Yet even years later he would occasionally reach back and give his hair the old familiar twist.

Allen had a different kind of protection—the security of an intelligence organization—from the press; however, this did not prevent—perhaps it encouraged—a sudden increase in tension if he were pushed on a question. Foster, always potentially exposed to the press and always subject to quotation, seemed to have perfected a guarded approach, and never or rarely showed a change in manner except when he laughed. His laugh often began as a chuckle. Sometimes he would throw back his head in an unself-conscious gesture of pure enjoyment.

It was a fine gathering at Princeton. A large number of Foster's class was back. After the class meeting they sang the old songs, with an accordion to help swell the chorus.

There was a lively breakfast on Saturday, when the Kiltie Band arrived. Foster had spent the night with a classmate and good friend, Gerard Lambert; accompanied by another college friend, Bob Clothier, and identified by a button and with the hatband, necktie, and cane of the class he stood on the steps of old Nassau Hall for the class picture. Following a buffet lunch the reunion group went by buses to join the "P-rade," which was a high point of the June celebration. Foster was in the picture but not in the "P-rade."

After his father had taken him to Europe in 1903 and then again in 1904, Foster had entered Princeton in the fall, at sixteen. His father and several of his uncles had graduated from this Presbyterian-founded college. His uncle, Joseph Dulles, also a minister, who had baptized him long ago in Watertown, was librarian of Princeton Theological Seminary. Princeton was therefore an inevitable choice.

Foster thought later that he would have gained more if he had gone to college when he was older, but there is no doubt that his

studies of logic and philosophy, of Greek and Latin and other courses, were of lasting value to him. He debated with vigor in Whig, one of the two debating societies, a practice that stood him in good stead later. While his accounts of his days there were mainly of lying under the trees in the sun and playing mumblety-peg—a pleasant way of doing nothing by oneself—it is likely that he did a great deal of reading on the darker, colder days. Despite his nonchalance in talking about his Princeton days, and his tales of climbing the rainspouts of Nassau Hall to seize the bell clapper (he said that on his second try—the first was successful—the waterspout bent outward, and he was forced to make a dangerous and disconcerting descent), Foster was in fact in serious mood when he was at Princeton. One of his friends at that time says, “Foster and I were ‘polers’—quiet harmless folk who concentrated on studies—he was number two in the class at the end and I was number three. We had few friends of the lively type. . . .” (Foster’s good friend, the late Dr. Bill Finney, was number one in the class.)

Foster was younger than all of his classmates except Bill Finney. Foster had come from a simpler background, with a sterner discipline than some, and was not in fact used to what were becoming modern ways of living. He had seen few cocktails, and his social life had been mainly canoeing, picnics, small dances, and house parties in the country. He had had little pocket money and had no car, though he had occasionally driven a friend’s White Steamer and later a lumbering twenty-mile-an-hour Packard his grandfather bought.

He was valedictorian of his class. His father was there on June 10, 1908, to hear him. To my mother it was one of the great disappointments of her life that she could not hear his oration—my sister Nataline had scarlet fever, a disease that had earlier taken the life of two of my mother’s sisters.

His education, he felt, was for a purpose.

It would have been hard to grow up in our home without developing a sense of purpose. The family atmosphere had been lively, adventuresome, and calculated to develop a spirit of independence and self-reliance. There was no likelihood, of course, that all the five children would follow the same course in life, but it was relatively certain that the religious training, which was congenial and natural, would leave its mark.

Allen Macy Dulles, our father, one of the kindest and gentlest of men, had a firm sense of duty and of the obligation to serve his fellow men. Righteousness was a word he often used. He had a profound

influence on all his children, most perhaps on his oldest, his son Foster, who admired him greatly. He had steered Foster into speculation on the nature of truth and reality, and such names as Berkeley, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hegel, and Bergson grew familiar early. Foster became increasingly interested in the work of the pragmatist William James when he was in college. And I remember when I was faced with a trivial disappointment one spring when I was nine (I had saved up my allowance to buy a hatpin with a blue stone, and when I got to the store the hatpin had been sold), he explained to me, in a first lesson in behaviorism, that I was unhappy because I cried and not crying because I was unhappy. I was so surprised that I began to laugh. At Princeton, he was a student of Professor, later President, John Grier Hibben, who was specializing in pragmatism, and he wrote a senior paper on this subject in 1908, though the paper shows a highly critical view of that philosophy. Roswell Barnes told me that in later years, when they talked about broad political and economic problems in his study, Foster would go to the shelves and get down a worn copy of a treatise on philosophy—perhaps Plato or Aristotle—and turn immediately to a passage on the nature of man and the destiny of the human race. His interest in philosophy was lifelong.

All the time he was adjusting to Princeton and mastering his studies he had been thinking of his future career. There were a number of ministers in the family and he naturally thought of this as his possible lifework. When he meditated on his father's life, he came to a conclusion—which he did not often discuss but which I knew was a genuine feeling—that he could not follow adequately in his father's footsteps. He said he didn't think he was "good enough." He was not sure that he could serve in the same spirit as my father had. He questioned in his mind whether he could give his best service to a church in a small city, whether he had the deep devotion to the ideas that had been a part of his father's and mother's life and which had sent his grandfather as a missionary to India. The tradition was there and it was to last as a firm support throughout his life, but he doubted if this was the way he personally could be of most use. His father was a liberal who had been up for censure in the church because of the statements he had made on the doctrine of the virgin birth, and also because he did not hold the strict line on divorce.

In 1925, at the Presbyterian General Assembly, Foster followed the example of his father and took the modernist side in the fundamentalist controversy in which the ordination of Harry Emerson Fosdick and Henry Pitney Van Dusen was challenged. These chang-

ing currents interested Foster and perhaps made him feel that he could serve the church best as a layman. Whether he foresaw and hoped for this kind of responsibility at this time is not, of course, clear, but he was all his life active in the work of the Presbyterian Church—he became an elder in the Park Avenue Presbyterian Church of New York, which later merged with the Brick Church, and was a Director from 1945 to 1953 of Union Theological Seminary.

After talks with his grandfather, John W. Foster, and with his father, he decided to accept the Princeton Prize in Mental Science (philosophy) and study in Europe at the Sorbonne under Henri Bergson. At the end of his European trip Foster had a long talk with his father, mother, and sister Margaret. He discussed with them a concept he had of being a leading lay churchman and combining work in the church with the practice of law. He said that he thought the activities of the nonclerical members of the church community could be developed extensively in the years ahead. The family was delighted with the decision and with the long-range view of his contribution. He decided to study law at George Washington University, where Allen also studied later. The family was very pleased.

Foster completed the course of studies at George Washington in two, instead of the customary three, years, without bothering with his Bachelor of Law degree. (It has been reported that he received the highest marks ever given. They gave him his diploma after he had been Secretary of State, predating it to 1912, the time when theoretically he would have fulfilled the residence requirements.) He began in 1911 at Sullivan & Cromwell, and said to one of his younger friends late in his life that the practice of law in New York was one of the greatest intellectual exercises and a rare opportunity, one for which he would ever be grateful.

Throughout the years the desire to continue his education, the determination to work with the church, and his will to serve his country in international affairs dominated his decisions. They brought together in his life the central purposes of his family over the generations.

In the family environment in Watertown, Auburn, Henderson, and Washington, there was something unique that left an indelible mark on all of us—not only a deep faith in central religious truths, but also a sense of the obligation of such a faith toward each other and toward those distant people who were striving to gain new light and freedom. We knew that we had had education, travel, and pleasure beyond the normal scope of our limited financial means.

We felt that we owed, in service of some kind, more than we could hope to give in a lifetime. Foster, I think, realized this especially deeply at the time of our father's death in 1930. As a young man of forty-three he was virtually head of the family. He was greatly moved, for he knew he had lost the man to whom he had always looked for guiding principles, for an unswerving sense of direction—a man he loved. After our father's death Foster devoted more time than he had previously—perhaps because of an intensification of his own sense of spiritual values, perhaps because of his growing experience with men of strength and purpose—to work for the church and the interchurch movement.

Since his days at Princeton Foster had been constantly preoccupied with the ideas and fate of Woodrow Wilson. He was haunted by Wilson's tragic failure over the League of Nations. This deep sense of admiration stemmed from the time he began to think in terms of universal philosophy and world problems. Wilson, like himself a descendant of Presbyterian ministers, had also graduated from Princeton and studied law and, while Foster was there, was president of Princeton—in fact, its first nonclerical head. Wilson was involved in a number of heated controversies, and when he got the nomination in 1910 as Governor of New Jersey, he decided to retire from Princeton. He, too, was deeply concerned with national government and international justice. Robert Lansing, our "Uncle Bert" (who was married to our mother's sister Eleanor), was his Secretary of State in 1915, after his 1914 election as President. The family was predominantly Republican, but Uncle Bert was a leading Democrat in northern New York. Foster worked in Washington during World War I—he had tried early to get into the Army, but his eyes kept him out of combat duty—with Military Intelligence and then at the War Trade Board, and later in Paris on the Treaty of Versailles, but he had virtually no direct contact with the President, nor did his appointment to Paris come at the President's suggestion or with his knowledge. Nevertheless, Wilson remained a strong influence upon him.

As the momentous drama of the League of Nations unfolded, he saw Wilson lose contact with those groups with whom he had no intellectual sympathy, and who used tactics that seemed to dim the inspiration of his ideals. He witnessed his bitter defeat at the hands of Congress. The hopes and plans of the time were doomed to failure; the United States had rejected what might have been the means of peace and international cooperation and had lapsed into a period of unproductive isolationism.

When his granddaughter asked him about Wilson in 1958, he wrote:

As regards Wilson, you could read a chapter in Bemis's "Diplomatic History of the United States," which is probably available to you.

There is a three-volume book by Ray Stannard Baker called "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement," which is probably too big. There are two recent volumes called "Woodrow Wilson, American Prophet and World Prophet," the latter of which might be useful. There is a booklet called "The Wilson Reader," published by the Oceana Publications, 1956, which contains some good material on Wilson, including a speech by me.

Thomas Lamont wrote a book called "What Really Happened at Paris," which is also useful. Another book is "The Peace Negotiations" by Robert Lansing.

Affectionately yours,
Granddaddy

Wilson was an influence upon him all his life and contributed to his own strong anti-isolationism.

Because of his views on internationalism, Foster, though he liked both Robert and Charles Taft and had known them since his youth, disagreed with Bob on various matters. He took a reserved position as to the prospective nominations for the Presidency—Bob was still in many respects an isolationist, who disapproved of some of the new international organizations like the Bretton Woods Banks and was not overly pleased about NATO. James Reston, of the *New York Times*, wrote once that Foster had brought "the Republicans from isolationism to internationalism with the extension of United States commitments across half the world." The party's change under Foster's stimulus, he thought, "will be a future source of wonder."

Educated in the days of Wilson's new outlook for the world's international cooperation, Foster also believed colonialism was wrong. From the days of the United Nations Charter—his work at Dumbarton Oaks and in San Francisco in 1945—he had fought for the broadest policy, through trusteeship, on the early abolition of colonies. While his concentration on Europe sometimes overshadowed his statements on the newer emerging countries, there is no question as to the nature of his view that these nations must be free. The founding fathers and the American pioneers had lived and died for principles of freedom, and these he believed, and frequently said, were dear to the hearts of every sentient human being. He knew that there were those who would compromise personal independence

for the sake of a meal or a wage, but this was not wholly comprehensible to him; he recognized the fact only in a general way.

He recognized and regretted late in life that because the circles in which he moved were composed of persons of similar backgrounds and capacities, his knowledge of the struggles of the average man was limited, and he tried, to the best of his ability, to compensate for this limitation. Most of those he knew were well trained, sifted from others by the relentless pressure of keen business and intellectual competition. Although not always financially wealthy, they were accustomed to a high standard of living.

In the country more than in the city he came into direct personal contact with those from whom he heard about limited opportunities and hard struggles to make ends meet or even survive, but he told a friend toward the end of his life that he wished he had worked in a factory in his youth, as "my sister Eleanor" had. In spite of his other preoccupations, he struggled to comprehend the problems of people with backgrounds different from his own. He had to endeavor to grasp intellectually what he could have learned earlier at the lunch counter or the workbench.

He recognized that approximately ninety per cent of the world's population was too preoccupied with anxiety over where the next meal was coming from to turn their minds to the principles of freedom and justice and the programs of international policy, but he did not know it intimately. He was generous to those he knew were in financial difficulties, but he assumed that their problems were temporary or were in some cases even due to their unwillingness to face practical reality. The hundreds of millions on the borders of subsistence, for him as for many, became largely abstract and were not a living problem. Though he knew pain and tragedy himself, he did not know extreme poverty, the hunger, dirt, and long hours of meaningless work that made it difficult to believe in the bright but elusive hopes of the future. But if his imagination was less vivid toward economic trouble, it was intense, even fierce, in its conviction of racial equality. As he said to some of his close friends, he did not see how he could carry on successfully an enlightened foreign policy while, in the United States, discrimination, oppression, and segregation kept men from their rightful heritage.

The Secretary needed to get back to Washington early on Saturday, June 14, so he left Princeton with Allen by plane shortly after two on Saturday—the Lebanon crisis over internal unrest and subversion from outside was becoming alarming. Under Secretary Herter met

him at the airport, and he and Allen went back to the office for an afternoon conference. The interlude of relaxation was over.

Sunday, June 15, the day after the Secretary's return from the Princeton reunion, was one of those incredible days that everyone knows occurs from time to time, but no one who has not lived through one of them can reconstruct in imagination.

The Lebanese situation was becoming more unstable. News from the United Nations observer group was not reassuring. It was necessary to have a specific and direct statement from President Chamoun that would permit the United States to prepare to help. It was not certain Sunday that a crisis could be avoided. The first State Department officers to join Foster—Bill Macomber, Bill Rountree, and Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Director of Near Eastern Affairs—came to the Secretary's home at ten. Others arrived shortly. Lord Samuel Hood, the Counselor of Embassy for Great Britain, drove up about noon. Phyllis, who had been there for some hours, took down the results of the earlier conversations dictated in the adjoining room by the Secretary, in the presence of "about five men," according to Phyllis's daybook.

The Secretary stayed in the library telephoning while Phyllis and Janet began their lunch. Jerry Greene and Johnny Hanes joined the group, as did Freddie Reinhardt. Chris Herter was there most of the afternoon. Foreign Minister Charles Malik, of Lebanon, President of the General Assembly, came in for a short conference after several telephone conversations. After a number of conversations with the President, Herter and a half-dozen of the staff went to the White House. The Secretary remained at home, telephoning a good part of the time. Allen Dulles, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles, and General Nathan I. Twining joined the group in the White House, and the simultaneous conferences continued, with a dozen or more telephones busy. Plans were developed in great detail; they were to stand the government in good stead in July.

But the June crisis calmed down in a few days, and the Secretary went into Walter Reed for a check-up, following a schedule that had been established on Monday morning. He was at home for lunch and then went into a series of conferences; he was invited to dinner with the Soviet Ambassador before seeing a performance of the Russian Moiseyev dancers, but indicated that he had a previous engagement to dine with Allen and a group of others, including the Charles Wrightsmans, John Walker, director of the National Gallery, and his wife. After the performance at the Capitol Theatre they went

backstage to congratulate the dancers on their beautiful production.

But June 16 and 17 brought their full round of demanding appointments. There were more than thirty separate conferences or interviews on each day, including a press conference, a welcoming reception at the airport for President Carlos Garcia, of the Philippines, and a formal dinner at the White House for the visiting President. The Department issued a statement about the tragic execution of the Hungarian patriot Imre Nagy the previous day in Hungary.

By the time the National Security Council meeting was held on Wednesday, June 18, the situation in the Middle East appeared to have become somewhat more calm. It was not to catch fire again until the Iraqi revolution on July 14.

The Secretary had to testify before the Senate Finance Committee on Friday, June 20. On Sunday he spoke on the Mutual Security Program at Washington National Cathedral. On Thursday, the 26th, he gave what proved to be one of his most interesting press interviews, to Edgar McInnis, of the Canadian Broadcasting Company.

At the interview, in answer to the question "Do you see much prospect of an easing of tension?" he answered, "I am sorry to say I do not." To the question ". . . what will we pay for coexistence . . . ?" he replied, "Once you pay tribute for coexistence . . . that moment you're lost." There were forces at work within the Soviet bloc that may lead it to concentrate more on the welfare of the peoples within the bloc, he said, "but I do not say we should count on this happening soon . . . the free world can maintain for a long time an adequate military deterrent."

"The Soviet Union has changed its methods," he said, "very largely because we have blocked them off by what you might call the military method . . . a military network of security treaties . . . also their economy has developed and become stronger, they have relied more and more on the economic offensive." "We have got to recognize that changing conditions involve changing methods [for us] . . . and must demonstrate to the rest of the world what can be done in a free society."

As he explained his views on the struggle with Communism, he was on the threshold of decision, not sure whether Khrushchev would turn to the soft or the hard line. He feared the attraction that the idea of coexistence had for peace-hungry nations, and was apprehensive lest terror, aroused by the possibility of atomic annihilation, would prevent action calculated to lessen the risk. He knew that in both directions lay dangers, but he felt that decisions thoroughly

prepared by constant survey of the whole perimeter of the free world must be swift. The testing was to come soon, with Khrushchev, in the second half of the year, turning to the hard line.

Since few have time to read and study the Marxist doctrines, a special responsibility lay on him, he believed, to keep the attention of the statesmen and people focused on the continuing threat. This task was easier to carry out after Khrushchev temporarily abandoned his more subtle approach, as he did in 1958.

During 1958, many in the free world considered they were faced with the mounting threat of a war of extinction and that response to any outright challenges of the Soviet regimes would bring the final disaster in the satellite countries. The Secretary stressed increasingly the importance of the yearning for freedom among the younger generations. His idea of the "rollback" had to take a different form and be cast in a different mold as experience yielded more information on United States capabilities and limits to action. The time schedule, in his mind, had to be modified. The anticipated steps toward freedom differed from those he had first envisaged.

The changing phases of Soviet and Chinese Communism could not be ignored. On June 23 he said to Edgar McInnis:

The world is undergoing immense changes. You have had this whole change over from the colonial system to widespread independence of the 20 new nations [later forty] and 700 million people since World War II. You're having the change from splitting of the atom and new sources of power; . . . man can use outer space. . . . There are forces at work within the Soviet bloc. . . . Stalin . . . said that in their foreign policy their primary reliance was upon their growing economic, political and cultural strength. He put that as number one twenty years ago. And they are doing that. And I think we have got to be more responsive, not only to the Soviet threat but to meet the new conditions in the world. We should be meeting them even if there wasn't a communist threat.

From his conversations with his family and friends, sometimes sitting by my small swimming pool in McLean on a Sunday afternoon, I knew he was worried by the slowness of many in the nation to take hold of the opportunities that emerged as Africa gained increasing degrees of freedom, as Latin America turned to us for help, and as Asia was troubled by Communist subversion and military pressure. He did not think most people had gained the perspective needed to deal adequately with these problems. Our sense of timing and our awareness of purpose had been blunted by Communist propa-

ganda, he felt, and the press often lacked the patience or the space to give subtle treatment to the less dramatic events and the more carefully analyzed statements that could have served as guidance. These meditations and anxieties he expressed from time to time.

He and Janet came to McLean for lunch on June 29. There was little talk of policy and of the problems with which he had been dealing. He plunged into the pool and swam with energy and enthusiasm. Afterward, in a bright Hawaiian shirt and a canvas hat, he poured drinks and enjoyed the hors d'oeuvres in the bright sun. The meal was served inside because it was cooler, instead of at the glass table he had given me some years back, now shaded by a large cedar tree at a corner of the terrace. He took a short rest on a screened porch and then, after a visit of just over two hours, he went back to Washington to work in his study, and to attend an informal dinner given by Vice President Nixon.

Prime Minister Mohammed Daud Kahn, of Afghanistan, had in the meantime visited Washington for consultation and had been entertained in appropriate fashion. Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, the Shah of Iran, came on the 30th of June. Foster attended the dinner the Shah gave for the Vice President and other officials.

The July trip to Paris to see de Gaulle had been announced, and Adenauer wished to see the Secretary. However, Foster had written to Adenauer on June 20: "I can only spend 24 hours in Europe." He had to crowd this trip to France into his schedule before his journey to Canada with President Eisenhower. Both the Chancellor and Foster recognized "the need to keep our thinking in harmony." Adenauer had not yet talked with de Gaulle. Foster, in referring to the various problems they would discuss, said that the inherent difficulties of the world situation were immensely increased by the fact that "we are dealing with those who are utterly undependable—" the Communists, "who can make agreements which they can later break to our undoing." He added that it was possible some measures might be accepted by the Soviets that could prevent the growth and spread of nuclear-production capacity and lessen the danger of surprise attack. Aerial photography, he said, was not enough, "but there should be some ways of minimizing the awful risk of massive surprise attack." These were matters on which the opinions of de Gaulle would be reported in detail and, with no delay, through Ambassador Bruce to the Chancellor, in response to his request.

On Thursday, July 3, Foster and Janet, with a number of Department officers, took off for Paris, and landed at Orly Field on the

4th. He told President de Gaulle a few hours later that our national holiday reminded him of how much the United States owed France in the struggle for independence.

He continued his conversation with a strong statement of how much France needed de Gaulle, recalling their previous meeting in 1947 during the dramatic period when the possibility of the Communists taking over France was a real danger that concerned them both.

The urgent present problem caused by Communist dynamism—Soviet progress with missiles, subversion, and a variety of threats to the smaller nations—was to overcome a degree of inertness, to close the missile gap, to prepare for local defense, and above all to strengthen community security measures. In particular the Secretary stressed the importance of NATO. The vitality of NATO during peacetime, he urged, could only be maintained by extending its political consultations and widening its scope. This cooperative action he considered essential. There was no question, he said, that the United States would be willing to use its strategic power rather than see the world conquered bit by bit, but what we intend is scarcely more important than what people—our allies and our enemies—think we intend. Moreover, it was essential to create situations in which nations threatened will not fear that their safety depends on strategic power under the control of another country and also fear that such strategic power would not be used in an emergency.

Knowing de Gaulle's increasing interest in nuclear power—it was already reported that a test blast would soon be set off in the Sahara—he spoke at some length about NATO potential: there was need for further development of a concept and practice for modern weapons to be available in the NATO area, under such conditions that the countries would have complete confidence that they would be used according to plans made in advance and not dependent on political decisions made at a distance. He spoke of the Polaris missile and of the importance of French submarines. There must be a broad approach to these problems so that member states would not feel compelled to develop independent nuclear weapon potential.

President de Gaulle's reply was in general agreement with the Secretary's analysis. He stressed the increasing power, influence, and responsibility of the United States, and a recognition that in the present circumstances this was inevitable and right—it is America's era. He agreed that there was no rivalry between France and Germany, that France had suffered much, but in spite of recent demoralization, must play an increasing role in Europe. France would not have a significant nuclear potential for more than two decades; he added

that this created a delicate problem with respect to the conditions under which the United States distributed nuclear weapons. He indicated little interest if the control and order for use of such weapons had to come from the United States.

Both men agreed that the apparent desire of the Soviets for a summit meeting must be regarded as a desire mainly for propaganda. There was agreement on the lack of promise on the disarmament talks and the dangers in the suspension of nuclear testing. Nuclear weapons might be disposed of, but in view of the increasing nuclear development for industry and for other reasons, such weapons could quickly reappear. The Secretary indicated the possibility of some progress with respect to a nuclear-free international inspection zone in the Arctic to guard against surprise attack. The possibility of disarmament must not be rejected, however. In this and other connections the Secretary emphasized that the large powers must avoid dominating the smaller powers, and must be constantly aware of their views and of helping those nations emerging from colonialism.

De Gaulle returned at the end of the talks to the need for NATO reforms and the importance of French participation in talks with the Soviets—who kept trying by private conversations to drive a wedge between the Allies.

As de Gaulle in thanking the Secretary said, no nation has greater responsibility than the United States in this age, to which Foster replied that the importance of the Western world's tasks and of France's role in them was evidenced by his visit to de Gaulle, closing the conversation by again emphasizing close cooperation. The main conference was followed by a lunch, after which the two men talked together, without their aides, in French.

Foster considered this early conversation of vital importance. He was aware of de Gaulle's great achievements; in a short space of time de Gaulle had gained a leading position in his country and brought France to a new threshold of opportunity and power. Ambassador Houghton and Minister Cecil Lyon, as well as Minister Louis Joxe, who was close to the General, indicated their appreciation of this resumé of current issues by the Secretary and later expressed their admiration for the way Foster had explained the attitude of his country toward NATO, toward Africa, toward the small countries, and toward numerous cooperative ventures. The group discussion as well as the private conversation were fully reported to President Eisenhower in a cable that Foster dictated.

De Gaulle had given an impression of strong intentions, which bore out the earlier impression of his will to restore France to a posi-

tion of leadership in world affairs far beyond that which the nation had enjoyed in the last few decades. Now, after ten years, France was again to have her place in the sun.

This aim that fired the new President was one the Secretary understood and appreciated. It was not the moment for reaching specific conclusions but, as so often in the development of delicate foreign relations, a time for a full and sympathetic exchange of views between men who had to work together, whether in disagreement or in concord, through months of crisis and decision.

De Gaulle and Foster always had, during their brief and occasional encounters, straight and meaningful conversations. Neither concealed his main purposes or views from the other. Their aides, who were present at conversations like those on July 5, indicate that the impressive strength of each man was strikingly apparent to everyone there.

There was, as always, some embassy business, and after a round of conversations, the group took off for Bermuda and Washington. There was a chance for a swim—while the crew was taking a brief rest and before the flight to Washington. Under Secretary Herter met the plane and briefed the Secretary on the events and information of the past three days and on his forthcoming trip to Ottawa between July 8 and 11 with President Eisenhower. The first days of July were spent traveling in the air, and in conference rooms. The Secretary was never more than a night's flight away from the next crisis. The Soviets were preparing a new test of strength. The Sunday of July 13 was quiet. The events in the Middle East had not yet broken into violent revolution.

“THE TIME TO ACT”

Sunday, July 13, 1958, was calm and warm. Foster went to the Presbyterian church at eleven. It was an ideal day for luncheon on the terrace at 2740 Thirty-second Street, so after church he dictated to Carolyn Proctor, one of his secretaries, and at lunch showed her how to eat some of the green almonds he had brought back from France. There were few visitors or telephone calls. A number of the State Department officers were out of town—some sailing, some in the mountains, some on brief vacations with their families. Others were at their desks in the Department, watching events in areas where trouble might strike.

One of the letters Foster wrote on this Sunday was to a school in Texas from which one of his granddaughters would graduate the following spring.

The day you mention, May 31, is my wife's birthday and we have always spent this day together at our Island on Lake Ontario. I am confident that you will understand the priority which I give to this occasion.

He would not be able, next May 31, either to speak at the graduation or to celebrate his wife's birthday. His strength would not hold out that long.

On this July day there was a mountain of information on the troubles in the Middle East. What was not known in Washington or elsewhere was whether, when a particular action would be undertaken, the leaders of the opposition groups in various countries would pursue a harassing, slow course, eroding a situation that seemed likely to go their way, or whether there would be a swift, treacherous thrust of violence.

Between the time of the assassination of a prominent newspaper editor, Nassit el-Metui, in Lebanon on May 8 and the crisis in mid-July, the world was close to war, although the fighting on the Lebanese-

Syrian border seemed to many remote and unimportant. The leaders in Washington and London, in New York and Paris, knew that the prestige of Khrushchev and of Nasser was involved. They had known for weeks that unrest over the succession in Lebanon and matters involving persistent religious strife and long-standing antagonism made the situation explosive.

Efforts had been made earlier to ease the situation through the United Nations. The Swedish Essentials of Peace resolution of June 11 provided for an Observation Group in Lebanon—to bring an end to the alleged foreign interference in Lebanese civil and military life and to ensure that there would be no illegal infiltration. Response to the resolution had been immediate. Various members of the group selected by Dag Hammarskjöld arrived in Beirut on June 12 and 14. Reports were rendered to the Security Council on June 16, 28, and July 3. The first meeting of the group was held in Beirut on June 19. Plans were laid and information gathered with jeeps and helicopters. The jeeps, painted white and with United Nations insignia, appeared in as many areas as possible as soon as possible on “trips of uncertain and dangerous nature.” In some cases they proceeded without advance Lebanese pilot vehicles. Their task was complicated by the fact that only a small part of the Syrian frontier was controlled by Lebanese government forces. The group advanced as far as Tripoli, Baalbek, and the main Damascus road. As of June 26, ninety-four officers of eleven countries were serving as military observers under the Observation Group and had established a regular patrolling system. In view of the grave nature of the charges and the possibility of an outbreak of widespread hostilities, Dag Hammarskjöld himself went out to Lebanon for a few days.

The group had been able to observe a variety of activities and witness the destruction of property, the mining of roads, the use of imported arms, the firing around the border areas. They were not, of course, able to determine the nationality of the opposition forces. The troubles took the form of civil disturbances. In any case, acting under the Essentials of Peace resolution, they exercised, by their presence, a restraining and warning influence.

Foster had discussed these matters in his news conferences of June 17 and July 1. He had been watching events from day to day, from hour to hour. His talk with Hammarskjöld on July 7, after the Secretary-General had returned from the Middle East, had given him the impression that there was hope for a quieting of the civil strife and a lessening of the intervention under the influence of world public opinion and the careful system of observation. The two men talked

together in the Secretary's small private dining room at the Department of State, prior to the imminent trip to Canada and after Foster had reported to the President on his conversations with de Gaulle in Paris. As he flew north over the lake, passing not far from Duck Island, where he had spent many happy hours, he had hopes that the use of force by the "so-called great powers" could be avoided. As he was to say later, restraining action through the United Nations was preferable.

One of the smallest nations in the Middle East, almost surrounded by Syria, Lebanon was soon to be the scene of one of the most dramatic events in postwar history. This vulnerable nation had been under pressure from the United Arab Republic in the form of violent skirmishes on the borders, and under indirect pressure through propaganda and infiltration.

It is perhaps fortunate that the constitutional crisis, occasioned by the proposal of President Chamoun to override the proscription of a second term, had led the Lebanese to press for help. Chamoun himself was aware of the danger of assassination, and knew that his army was not completely reliable in a time of general unrest. Jordan, too, appeared threatened by internal revolt; King Hussein had thrown off British support, and yet was unable to assure independence in the face of Nasser's activities and in the face of Communist propaganda and funds.

The State Department was well aware of the fighting, of the Communist incitement to revolt, and of Nasser's ambition to extend the UAR at the expense of the still independent states, particularly those bordering on Syria. But there had been so many appeals for help and so many reports of disturbances that a specific program was difficult to determine in advance of some major event.

The dramatic wave of violence that had been feared since early 1957 and for which the Eisenhower Doctrine had been developed began to sweep over the area.

Shortly after the royal family had retired on the night of the 13th, a group of Iraqi Arab nationalist army officers headed by Brigadier General Abdul Karim el-Kassem surrounded the palace, overthrew the government of Premier Nuri as-Said, mowed down King Faisal II and the Crown Prince. Only Crown Prince Abdul Illah was reported to have returned fire on the attackers from a balcony. Prime Minister Nuri as-Said alone escaped in the confusion, first to a haven provided by friends, and thereafter to wander disguised as a woman

for a few hours before he was discovered and killed in the narrow streets of Baghdad. The monarchy was declared dissolved and a republic was proclaimed in its place.

It was a shock but no surprise when the match was thrown on the haystack in the Middle East and reverberations of the shooting of the Iraqi King by a group of revolutionaries spread. The British Embassy was fired upon, and its information office and consulate looted and burned. Several foreigners, including one of the British Embassy staff, were killed.

The revolution had occurred in the country that, because of its location, could be assisted from the outside least easily of all those in the Middle East. Moreover, the coup in Iraq was so swiftly executed and so definitive in the elimination of key individuals, including the King and his Prime Minister, that any reversal of the action was impossible.

It was natural that Jordan and Lebanon were near desperation after July 14. They declared that only immediate support from the West could save them from revolution. Their armies had to be induced to remain loyal, despite some traitors in their ranks. The people had to be held back from panic. The governments of neighboring countries had to be given reasonable assurance of functioning in conditions of security. Washington for its part was watching carefully to see that an explicit request would make intervention justifiable legally and in the eyes of the outside world.

As Eisenhower was to say a few hours after action was taken, "President Chamoun made it clear that he considered an immediate United States response imperative if Lebanon's independence [was] to be preserved."

These same factors were described in President Eisenhower's special message to Congress on July 15, in his radio and television address, in Ambassador Lodge's speech in the United Nations, and, later, in the Secretary's news conference on July 31.

The first news of the revolution in Iraq reached Washington at three o'clock in the morning of June 14. The information was somewhat indefinite and confused. By breakfast time in Washington the imminence of trouble and the need for action were evident. The machinery of consultation and planning in double-quick time was put into operation: the State Department staff, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the ambassadors, the White House staff, the meeting with Congressional leaders, all these began to act. The decision to land United States troops in Lebanon was made by

five o'clock Monday afternoon. The quiet Sunday of July 13 was followed by a tumultuous Monday. Action in the State Department fell into a well-planned pattern.

Very early the Secretary got the fragments of news coming into the Department. He was in his office at 8:15 for the intelligence summary and a look at the most urgent cables. Lampton Berry and Stuart Rockwell, long-standing experts on the Middle East, were with him during the next half hour. Richard H. Sanger, of the Middle Eastern Bureau; Bill Macomber; Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., of Intelligence and Research; and Elbert G. Mathews brought in appropriate summaries and their own appraisals of the situation. By 9:15, several officers of the armed services had joined the conference in the Secretary's office. General Twining, Assistant Secretary of Defense Mansfield D. Sprague, Donald Quarles, and Departmental Counselor Reinhardt were there. The problem involved the most momentous decisions, both locally and throughout the world. Speed was imperative. Deputy Under Secretaries Robert Murphy and Loy Henderson, both experts on the area and seasoned Departmental veterans, came to the meeting. Allen Dulles and Norman Paul, of CIA, were called in before ten o'clock.

By 10:30 the majority of these men had left for the White House, where the Vice President; Gerard Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning; Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty; and Brigadier General Andrew Goodpaster, White House Secretary, joined others to hear the Secretary's presentation. Then, as recalled later by Gerard Smith, the Secretary outlined the worldwide implications of United States action or inaction. There was a brief pause and then the President asked for his conclusion. The Secretary did not hesitate. He recommended that the U.S. military forces, in ships already deployed in readiness off the Lebanese coast, be sent in.

The President said that he knew from the first few sentences what Foster would recommend. He agreed that the United States had to act. The stage was set for the Presidential order that was to be issued in a few hours.

There was still much work to be done after the two-hour meeting with the President. The President's television and radio statement for the next day had to be prepared. So, too, the special message to Congress. The military officers hurried back to the Pentagon. Jim Hagerty and several others returned to the Department with the Secretary. Press Officer Lincoln White was called in to be briefed on questions from the press and to help prepare the "advice against travel in or through Lebanon and Iraq except for imperative reasons,"

to be issued July 15. Henry Cabot Lodge affirmed that the "integrity and independence of a nation is as precious when it is attacked from inside by subversion and erosion as when it is attacked in the field by military action." The Eisenhower Doctrine was designed to thwart aggression, whether direct or indirect. This doctrine indicated United States acceptance of responsibility to support nations in the Middle East on their request.

Foster, in his news conference of July 31, was to recall "the succession of events of aggression, both direct and indirect, against small nations that led up to World War II." The 1958 action by the United States was taken, as was that of the United Kingdom, on July 17, pending the assumption of the necessary degree of responsibility by the United Nations, which the United States hoped would be soon.

The Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy, Lord Hood, came in to the Department at 12:30. The French Ambassador, Hervé Alphand, with Charles Lucet, Minister of the French Embassy, and the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Charles Malik, came later. There is no indication that there was time for lunch that day, but probably the Secretary had a quick bite from a tray. The bipartisan leadership of Congress was summoned to the White House to confer for two hours with the President, the Secretary, and the Vice President.

Other conferences in the State Department followed. Ambassador Manlio Brosio, from Rome, was called in for a briefing. Ambassador Howard Beale, from Australia, had been invited for dinner, but there was scarcely time to eat between the telephone calls, telegrams, and further meetings. The last conference began at 10:30, when Lord Hood came to the house with Jerry Greene, Foster's aide, for some late conversations. The British paratroops were scheduled to land, at the request of King Hussein, of Jordan, on Thursday, July 17. Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown, of the American Sixth Fleet, had his orders.

When five thousand Marines, in Operation BLUE BAT, ran down the ramps of their snub-nosed landing craft, launched from the ships of the Sixth Fleet, at three o'clock in the afternoon, they were in full battle dress. They waded up sun-hot beaches near the airport, not knowing whether they would be shot down by machine-gun fire or welcomed as friends. They took up combat-ready positions on the level sands and were astonished and relieved when the ice-cream vendors swarmed around them eagerly, clamoring to sell refreshments. Soon there was a picnic atmosphere on the beaches strewn with guns and battle gear.

The loungers at the Khalde airport, always curious and eager for any new events, had been puzzled by the gathering warships and by the small landing boats coming their way. Few, if any, of the casual crowd of bathers or waiting travelers were aware of the seriousness of the revolution in Iraq, of Chamoun's alarm, or the planned United States action.

Many did not realize the problems resulting from President Chamoun's proposal to continue as President in opposition to the constitution that limited his term to September. However, they were increasingly conscious of the violent feelings in the country between Christian and Moslem and of the fighting near the Syrian border. Some knew of plots and counterplots. But one can almost say that the Arabs and Christians and Jews in this area were so accustomed to trouble that they lived from day to day in crisis and at the same time in apparent calm and indifference.

In contrast to this complacency, President Chamoun and General Fuad Chehab were in a state of alarm amounting almost to panic. They had sent their urgent messages to Ambassador Robert McClintock, who was watching for clarification of the confused and tragic information coming to his telegraph room. Chamoun at first said he must have help from the United States in forty-eight hours. Then, on further information that there was a plot to assassinate him and a similar plot to kill Jordan's King Hussein, he cut the deadline to twenty-four hours. He was unaware that Washington had already taken preliminary steps and that the fleet was standing offshore ready for the landing order.

Many concerned in these matters in Lebanon and its neighboring countries thought that Vice Admiral James Holloway, Jr., and his seven ships were cruising in the neighborhood of Spain. They were surprised when at one o'clock, in less than the twenty-four hours named, the ships were sighted a mile or two offshore.

The Vice Admiral had been given advance warning that some of the Lebanese military had been subverted and that there were hostile groups in the army. He had to be prepared for various emergencies. Adding to his difficulty, communication between the Navy and the diplomatic representatives on shore was incomplete for several hours. The fact remains, however, that the Vice Admiral's action was competent and successful and that the Ambassador, with his quick response to various aspects of the emergency, added to the success of the operation.

As news from Iraq flashed across the border in Beirut, the opposition gathered in secret meeting places. The United States Am-

bassador reported to Washington that there might be trouble if the soldiers came into the city. The Vice Admiral had his orders, and the troops were deployed for the march down the Beirut road. This was the most precarious moment, it seems, in Operation BLUE BAT.

The Ambassador and his staff, who had been following every fact and sifting every rumor, had learned from authoritative sources that most of the artillery and a large part of the troops garrisoned in the area, under orders of insubordinate junior officers, were, after the landing on the 16th of July, lined up along the road in positions from which they could fire on the columns of Marines. The Ambassador sent a signal to Vice Admiral Holloway. The progress of the troops down the road to the city was delayed for an hour. Meanwhile, McClintock met General Chehab at his headquarters and persuaded him to accompany him in his car. The chauffeur, the General, and the Ambassador then drove toward the road intersecting the main highway. On the airport road the United States Marines had halted within sight of the Lebanese troops. The Lebanese had their guns at the ready. General Chehab sensed the dangerous nature of the situation and left the car to talk to the field officer in charge. There was a brief conversation, in which the Ambassador joined. Then he and the Lebanese officers went to a nearby school from which they could put through a call to the general staff in Beirut. Instructions were issued to disperse the artillery and the armored cars. Arrangements for the peaceful entry into the city were made, and followed without objection. By early evening of July 16, the United States Marines and Lebanese soldiers together patrolled the streets of the city, maintaining order.

The crisis was over. Few but the principals knew of the nature and acuteness of the danger. Frantic rumors were circulating in the bazaars, but the urgent and overpowering reality was that the United States was supporting the forces of law and order in the ancient city. The cooperation of the large nation and the small Middle Eastern country was at this moment visible for all to see. No person was injured. No shot was fired.

The troops stayed for three months, but they were withdrawn by the President when the Lebanese felt there was no longer need. General Fuad Chehab was elected President and inaugurated on September 23, 1958.

The meeting of the Baghdad Pact group, which soon changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), was an occasion for reviewing these events in London on July 28 and 29. At

first the group assembled in a spirit of gloom, but the declaration by the United States of its increased concern and support, as well as the Secretary's frank and full statement of the events from before the Iraqi revolution in the middle of July up to the end of the month, quickly changed the atmosphere to one of confidence. The American declaration of cooperation was "pursuant to existing Congressional authorization and constituted an agreement to cooperate with the nations making this declaration for their security and defense." The United States announced further that it would enter promptly into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation with the nations of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. Thus, the ministers on leaving London were more secure in the knowledge that they had support from the United Kingdom and the United States. Shortly thereafter, the United States decided to recognize the new government in Iraq, after the dead had been buried and calm restored. This was done on August 2, through the United States Ambassador, "taking note of the assurances transmitted through the Secretary General of the United Nations that Iraq declares itself bound by the United Nations' Charter and its other international obligations."

The meaning of the Lebanon crisis was clear, even though the details are now largely forgotten. The Secretary on several occasions outlined the principles and underscored the importance of the show of Western strength in the Middle East. On July 15 he had briefed the twenty Latin American ambassadors, close to the time the Marines would be bivouacking on the beaches some four thousand miles away. Foster had told the group of ambassadors that on the return of Hammarskjöld from the Middle East in early July, after the U.N. Observation Group had begun to function in the area, he had anticipated that there would be a lessening of conflict and a greater feeling of security among the rulers. As he said, explaining the quick implementation in July of the plans made earlier and put in operation with a knowledge of the grave risks involved, ". . . it was only the events of yesterday [the revolution and brutal slayings of the Prime Minister and entire royal family in Iraq] that changed my mind. I had hoped for a quiet solution of the internal crisis and an abatement of the external pressures."

He described, with care to guard the secret sources of his information, that there were many reasons why action was required to reinforce the urgent requests of Jordan and Lebanon. These included the vitriolic anti-Western radio broadcasts that had blanketed these small countries, the subversive influence on the press, the subversion

of military attachés, and the fact that a large number of teachers from Russia and from Egypt were working against the existing regimes. Substantial sums of money from the Kremlin had been sent into the area, and agents had infiltrated in significant numbers. All of these influences were well known in official circles; all rendered the rule of the kings and presidents and the stability of governments precarious.

Foster also had a long and informal "backgrounder" at the Georgetown home of Richard Harkness, of the National Broadcasting Company, on July 19. The twenty-five newsmen there were intensely interested in his story, for the information coming through was somewhat complicated.

When he was in London for the Baghdad Pact meeting on Monday, July 28, he told another group of reporters what he thought the Middle Eastern events meant. He discussed the relations of the United States to the Baghdad Pact countries and the parallel agreements, similar but not identical, to safeguard their security. This idea of new bilateral security agreements was his own idea, without benefit of any previous staff work, and approved by a quick telephone call by Foster to the President during a lunch break in the conference. He said it was important to give new assurances now, in a declaration fully authorized by previous Congressional action, rather than proposing a more formal agreement that would not be valid until ratified by the Senate.

Foster told the newsmen he had seen an article that gave the impression that the British did not realize the active part played by President Eisenhower; in fact, he said, the President had been alert to every phase of the Middle East crisis and had offered many constructive ideas. During the Baghdad Pact meeting just ended, for instance, there had been several transatlantic telephone calls between the Secretary and the President. The Secretary discussed the difficulty of holding a summit meeting because of the growing Soviet practice of indirect aggression. He evaluated diplomatic successes and failures for the newsmen: the failures in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Czechoslovakia, where no firm stand had been taken; the successes in Greece and Turkey when Truman responded to the need without delay. He said that the nonaggressive and neutral countries before World War II had failed to take positive action against aggression and that their apparent indifference was in part responsible for bringing on the war. Stalin had said this himself, March 1939, and his prophecy had become true. Now, although direct aggression had eased since Korea, there was cause for new concern. There was no evidence in the strict sense of the term that the Iraqi revolution had been

directed from Moscow, but it was possible to draw inferences from a pattern of past events and from their immediate recognition that the new government had been picked "in some mysterious way." He did not, however, make a charge of complicity.

Probably Lebanon needs the U.N. shield, he said, although United States forces had been sent in because there wasn't time for the United Nations to act. The conviction that the strong and free countries should protect the small and weak—one of the ideas behind the founding of the United Nations—was the main motive behind Foster's fight for the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. It was the first and only time it was applied. He believed that the risks of action, however great, were less than the risks of inaction. He said to an associate, "Don't think I wasn't scared." But as he also said, on another occasion, "The Soviet knew I would fight if necessary." During these hours after the United States and British landing (the French, in token participation, limited according to agreement because of their trouble with the Arabs in North Africa, had sent the SS *De Grasse*), the extent to which Khrushchev or Nasser would go was completely problematical. Nevertheless, it was clear that if these small countries were swallowed up by their larger neighbors, not only the Middle East but the weaker nations everywhere in the free world would consider that they were betrayed.

The Lebanon crisis exemplified the general behavior of the Department in times of emergency and danger. There was a pre-established scheme of action. The watch officer in the cable room, always a highly responsible person, had a complete list of the telephone numbers of the first, second, and third persons primarily responsible for the country at the Department. When a NIACT (Night Action) cable came in, or one that seemed to him important, he would begin telephoning. The first man reached could judge from the skillful hint with regard to the nature of the contents of the cable whether "night action" was in fact possible. Often at two or three in the morning he would throw on a coat and jump into a pair of pants, sometimes over pajamas, to drive to the Department. Meanwhile, code-room officers would alert the others, perhaps those already on the list of persons named by the first desk man. A dozen or more officers might be at their desks within fifteen or twenty minutes. Sometimes the news came first from CIA. Sometimes a cable answer would be drafted; often the Pentagon and CIA would be alerted. If the news were serious, the Secretary and Under Secretary would be notified without delay. Almost always when the cable had been read by the

desk officer, the Assistant Secretary would be called and told the nature of the problem in guarded language (we never assumed the telephone lines were secure), and the time and possibility of next steps would be discussed.

Cables came into the Department sometimes labeled "Urgent," "Eyes Only," and "Night Action." These also carried various security classifications. Sometimes the degree of pressure put on the receiving officer was necessary, but sometimes the sender failed to take account of the fact that action in the middle of the night was unnecessary or impossible. Matters of this sort did not come to the Secretary's attention, and occasionally an irritated officer down the line would counter the incoming "Urgent" with an outgoing "Night Action," which would get the first sender out of bed, and thereby bring to the officer in question a more sensitive awareness of time.

If the cable coming in was long, it was sometimes necessary to go to the outer room of the cable office and read the sections as they were decoded. If trouble was anticipated or if word "from the field" was expected, some of the men most concerned would sleep in the Department on couches or cots. One would tell the watch officer in advance where the key people could be found. I know of no case, after Pearl Harbor, when action was delayed by the failure to assemble the right people to take immediate steps.

If the steps were sufficiently clear or the nature of the problem of lesser importance—perhaps a position to be taken in a committee on economic matters—the desk officer could reply by cable in the night. More often, the position papers, contingency plans, and outlines for alternative decisions would be taken from the safes by the desk officers and laid out for action a few hours later by the high officials.

Most emergencies cast their shadow before them sufficiently in advance so that the choices of action are narrowed to a few possibilities.

Foster, in a crisis, was completely calm and short in speech. He induced the same mood in those around him.

It was imperative that he preserve his calm even if catastrophe came from unexpected quarters. The sun never sets on the problems on which the State Department works. The assassin is often at large during the night as well as during the day. The response to revolution, disaster, and death cannot be confined to normal working hours.

In his personal as well as in his official life he seemed to be unperturbed. I remember when the old catboat was sinking in a ris-

ing wind; we were some miles out, north of Gull Island, the nearest land. As the boat heeled far over, the usually dry seams were strained and the calking began to drop out. We had one hand pump and a bucket. Allen was at the pump, Foster at the tiller, I was on the sheet and bailing, my friend Mary, the fourth on the boat, almost a landlubber and not used to this kind of sailing, took the bucket to give me a rest. As the boat heaved she let the bucket go overboard. Neither Foster nor Allen said anything. They managed to get the boat on a different course so that the pitch was lessened, and we came finally under the lee of the island. "If the boat had sunk, when would we have been rescued?" Mary asked. "Tomorrow," Foster replied.

In law school he had approached examinations tense but disciplined of mind. Before looking at the questions he would write an outline of the course with the important cases cited and then, after looking at the exam, build his answers around these cases. He did not want his grasp of the course thrown off balance by anxiety about the questions and therefore listed his assets while his mind was cool. He was by no means without anxiety in crisis, however. Tension sometimes would build up in Foster before a speech or before a news conference as it had as a student before an examination. As a graduate student he disliked the grandfather's clock that kept him awake by striking each quarter of an hour. "How could I get to sleep when the chimes would tell me the time was getting shorter and shorter?" he said to me. Nevertheless, he got the highest marks.

It was much the same in international crises as on the water and in school. He doubtless felt anxiety, but, recognizing that the danger was great, he bent every ounce of his strength to hold the direction chosen without explaining all the reasons or without commenting unnecessarily on the risk. His calm was contagious; almost, to some, exasperating. He did not underestimate the possibility of failure and he admitted being scared—but after the die was cast.

FULL-CANVAS SAILOR

August was a month when Foster was to shift from days of arduous work to a brief but completely satisfactory vacation.

The visit to the Baghdad Pact meeting in London, which had begun in the President's *Columbine* on Saturday, July 26, ended in Washington on Tuesday, the 29th, in the evening, just in time for Foster to talk to Amintore Fanfani, Prime Minister of Italy, and to hold a dinner in his honor.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev went to Peiping, and the Chinese began to shell Quemoy. The *Nautilus*, the atomic-powered submarine, traveled from Alaska under the icecap and surfaced near the North Pole. The Secretary carried out his planned trip to Brazil to confer with the handsome and dynamic President of Brazil, Juscelino Kubitschek. Kubitschek wished to defend his idea for Operation Pan America and to ask priority for Latin American needs. These requests were large; it is possible he did not fully recognize the vast requirements for a number of other underdeveloped countries. There was considerable talk of the Chinese Communists, who had shown an interest in revolutionary movements in Brazil. The students of Brazil, as students often do, had planned to stage a riot during the Secretary's presence in Rio de Janeiro. According to eyewitness observers, however, there was little excitement.

Foster flew with Janet and the rest of the party to President Kubitschek's recent creation, the city of Brasilia in the central region—a modern, spectacular, and at that time largely uninhabited capital—and from Brasilia back to Washington, where Chris Herter met them to discuss certain rising tensions in the Far East. The Secretary flew on to Youngstown, New York. There he joined his cotrustees of the Dulles Trophy and their wives, who were to be on General Clinton F. Robinson's yacht, the *Ybor*, to follow the Dragon sailboat races not far from the Niagara River. (The Dragon, a new racing boat in these waters, first introduced by the Canadians in 1950, was narrow,

fast, and "wet.") The Secretary presented to the victorious Canadian skipper a Corning Glass etched cup, which he had donated when the class was started at Chaumont in 1955. It is still given in his name, and his brother, Allen, succeeded him as cotrustee.

On August 18, he spoke in New York to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, when he was awarded the Bernard Baruch Gold Medal. On the 19th, he attended the emergency meeting of the General Assembly, called in response to the Lebanon crisis, and stayed in New York, where on August 21 he spoke in defense of United States policy in the Middle East and, specifically, the Norwegian resolution on Lebanon.

There was some uncertainty as to whether the shelling of the Off-shore Islands, Quemoy and Matsu, would lead to a crisis and, among other things of greater importance, prevent the cruise on Lake Ontario to which he had looked forward for many weeks—his first (and last) cruise on Lake Ontario since disposing of *Menemsha* in 1941. However, the lines of action on the Quemoy-Matsu situation were clear and the Department officers were thoroughly informed, so the Secretary took off on Saturday, the 23rd, for the Watertown airport, where he was met by Bob Hart. At Bob Hart's house in Chaumont he telephoned the President and his own office—while he was away, Herter was Acting Secretary of State. He was assured that the policy was "on course." Meanwhile, Bob Hart outlined for Dick Benson, the pilot of the amphibian flying Widgeon, the areas in which they would be cruising. Both knew well the manner of sailing and the favored night anchorages of the Secretary. Hart indicated how and under what conditions Benson should come to take the Secretary back to Dexter for Washington if there was urgent need to take the plane. With the knowledge that he could enjoy a few days' respite, and with the tiller of a fine cruiser in his hand, Foster plotted his course.

Foster's yawl, the *Menemsha*, bought in 1927 and named for the town on Martha's Vineyard, had been a sturdier and safer boat than most, with sleeping accommodations and a galley—not a yacht, but a good sailing craft. It was not a sleek boat, but relatively broad of beam for its length. It had all the essential comforts but no place for fancy equipment or luxuries, which so often seem to be a part of pleasure-boat fittings. Foster had skippered it to Anticosti Island in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and down the Atlantic Coast, exploring Nova Scotia, Bay of Fundy, Maine (New England and New York), and sailed twice to the northern shores of Lake Superior, and into Georgian Bay off Lake Huron. His longer cruises were between 1933

and 1940. He was particularly fond of the craggy islands and rocky shores, with pine and spruce hanging over the crystal-clear water of northern Superior. But he sold the boat when he thought war conditions would make it impossible to continue the type of cruising he had particularly enjoyed.

The sense of man against the elements, the challenge of strong wind and mounting seas, was entirely to his taste. He liked a stout ship with simple gear, without many winches or gadgets. He preferred the leadline to the electric depth finder, which he did not consider reliable. He did not want to rely on radio—the trip was an escape from Washington's problems—nor did he like special electrical equipment on the boat. It was not only that he thought the complicated instruments likely to get out of order, but he thought, also, that more reliance on one's own resources and use of judgment and experience led to more worthwhile sailing techniques. The *Menemsha* was able in heavy weather, although some of his city-bred guests were often seasick; it was able to hold on course in strong winds and carry a fair amount of sail without reefing. He rarely changed his plan of sailing because of a rising wind or high seas. It was the ideal boat for his wishes and his temperament; in fresh and salt water it had what he thought a mariner needed. It answered well to the helm.

Sailing is not a casual sport in which the novice can go far, or one in which the expert takes chances with his boat or his crew. Bob Hart and Art Eldridge, as well as others who sailed with him on his more strenuous cruises, spoke often of his judgment, calling it uncanny. They said that while he liked fast sailing with water over the bow, he did not take serious risks. He felt that there must always be sure control. He respected the elements with which he had to contend and the value of the equipment he was using. His crew knew that he had an eye for their safety and, within sporting limits, for their physical comfort. He kept morale high even when the going was tough and the effort exhausting. Many times the sailors were wet and tired, hungry and temporarily frustrated in their efforts to find a protected harbor and a sure anchorage. All this was for him a tremendous pleasure, and his own enjoyment in dealing with difficulties became infectious.

The cutter *Cirrus*, owned by Robert W. Purcell, set sail from Cape Vincent on the St. Lawrence just east of Lake Ontario on the afternoon of Saturday, August 23, in a brisk wind. Aboard with Foster were Bob Purcell, Art Eldridge, and Bob Hart, who had sailed many

years with Foster on the *Menemsha*. On the starboard spreader flew the Secretary of State's flag, ordered by Bob, with the permission of the State Department, to give pleasure to the Secretary. The sail was close-hauled with a westerly wind, setting out for the wide mouth of the St. Lawrence, where the river received the vast flow of Lake Ontario on its way to the sea. They cut through the water south of Wolfe Island, meeting some motorboat traffic and a few lake steamers moving up the river with their black plumes of heavy smoke.

All was informal on board, and on a basis of strict equality.

Each shared the responsibilities of sailing, for standing watch and potato peeling and cooking and dishwashing. The ten days were to be unspoiled by work, full of sport and the skill of seamanship. When he stepped aboard the *Cirrus*, he had not carried his worries with him. As much as a serious man could, he forgot the troubles of the cold war, and kept his mind on the tug of the wheel and the set of the canvas. This was the alternating rhythm he needed—as only those who were close to him fully understood.

The first night, Saturday, August 23, was spent at Basin Harbor, a small, fully protected berth on the east end of Grenadier Island in United States waters. Once the sails were furled in a safe mooring, the boat was made ready for dinner. Before the cocktails were served, everyone had to swim—not even the excuse of galley work was considered a sufficient reason to hesitate—and all four plunged from the boat into water not too cold and yet not “too warm,” for the northern waters are somewhat colder than the New York State shore, perhaps sixty-five degrees. Dinner was likely to be chicken, steak, or fish—a good meal the more welcome because Foster frowned on indulging one's self by taking time for lunch, and teased those who ate more than the traditional piece of dry bread, cheese, or a banana. After dinner everyone turned in early, unless the boat was under sail.

One of the sources of amusement during the day and the evening was the “five-cent betting.” Almost everything, from landfalls to the exact time of sunset, was the subject of a five-cent bet. (Even as a student at Princeton Foster is said to have calculated the odds on any contest at the drop of a hat.) Foster won all but two of these bets, and although he paid up as a man of honor, he protested one of the decisions that he held, after research in the almanac, to be of doubtful justification. He also called attention in a short legal brief to the unfulfilled obligation of one of the crew to pay five cents on a bet decided, after consultation, to be in the Secretary's favor. Foster had, according to Bob Hart, an uncanny sense of the weather, the prospects of changes in the wind, an extraordinary memory for rocks

and shoals, currents and sheltered anchorages. He used his knowledge to good effect.

The second day was a hard buck to Duck Island. They sailed south and west from Grenadier Island to Duck Island. Although it was Sunday, there were none of the usual weekend fishermen around. Few had ventured out so far in the unfavorable weather. The reefing breeze—that is, a breeze when many would reef but a few might decide not to—was, in fact, to the Secretary's liking. He held his course, being the helmsman for most of the day, with green water coming over the gunwale.

They took the boat into the small inner harbor, lying west and east, for a calm quiet berth. They ate and slept on the boat—it was not in the spirit of the cruise to sleep on land. Foster had not been to the island since he was there with Janet on June 2, and he was eager to see the cabin. He and Bob Hart left their two companions and walked over the moors to the bluff facing the north. They picked up some gear they had left there; then they walked back to have dinner with the others.

The next day there was both sun and wind. The four set out after a brief swim off the shelves of rock and a hearty breakfast of eggs, bacon, toast, coffee, and fruit, taking a northwest course toward the Canadian mainland and the bays lying off the small town of Picton. Here Foster went ashore to telephone again to Washington. His call was reassuring, at least to the extent that affairs were proceeding according to agreed policy. Thus, in spite of all the problems he faced the day before setting sail and those awaiting him the hour of his return, he could anticipate the weather and plan the rest of the cruise with an enormous zest.

The next night, Tuesday, August 26, they anchored farther west, in the Bay of Quinte off Massasauga Point. As the bay narrowed they used the auxiliary motor, for the water was not wide enough for tacking. They passed through the ten-mile-long canal, leading to the lake east of Toronto. There was no reason for hurry. They stopped at Presquile and Foster telephoned Washington before heading down the lake.

The night of the 27th the *Cirrus* was again headed east toward the Main Duck. They were navigating by compass through the clear, blue darkness from Presquile, with stars bright most of the night. They made the landfall and rounded the point of the Main Duck lighthouse, sailing farther north and east until they passed under the bluff, heading southeast. At approximately four in the morning they dropped anchor in School House Bay.

Foster and the other three had shared watches, two sailing while two slept. They swam from the boat in the early dawn. Then on August 28, with a brisk, favorable west wind and a "bone in their teeth," they set forth in a northwesterly direction toward Prince Edward Point, crossing shortly to Waupoos. This was one of his favorite anchorages, which he had advised me to visit when I was cruising in a small motorboat. These shores were at that time unspoiled. Few persons were about, and only an occasional boat came in sight.

Later that day, at Waupoos, he spent some time walking along the shore and investigating the state of supplies in a small crossroads store that served the fishing fleet of that area. He found great amusement in bargaining back and forth with two women who also wanted to buy less than the usual bushel measure of peaches and potatoes. The women bought the peaches and Foster the potatoes, and each divided both equitably.

On the 29th they anchored in Prinyer Cove, off the Canadian shore.

Several times during the cruise he telephoned to Janet at Maine Chance, where she was having her own vacation. This call he could manage when he went ashore to call the President. On the 30th the Secretary made his fourth call to Washington, doubling back in the direction of Kingston, a charming old town on the north shore of Ontario. He was anxious to keep informed because of the mounting crisis in the Far East. He was, in fact, never long out of touch with his home base. He was eager to have the latest news, hoping that he would not have to fly back before the end of his outing and before the approaching Labor Day weekend. The President was in Newport at the summer White House; the Secretary found he was not needed in Washington.

Horseshoe Island, a small half circle on the chart, was the anchorage on Saturday night, the 30th. Then the sloop sailed south in the direction of Henderson Harbor. They had explored the more interesting inlets and harbors of the east end of the lake under varied and excellent sailing conditions. They had crossed their own course in a big X, taking advantage of the winds for good speed and sport, revisiting islands and shores that Foster and Allen had learned to know in their adventurous voyages in the *Number Five* and in the *Duck*, the two catboats they had used, in succession, from 1906 until 1931. They had gone far in unprotected waters and sailed by compass in storm and fair weather.

On this 1958 cruise, the last full day of sailing was a beat and a

reach to Henderson Bay, rounding Sixtown Point, the island near the mainland that the family had owned (my island now!). The distance to be covered was approximately fifty miles on a nearly straight course to the point.

In the old days, the small motorless skiffs could cross the bar between two of the near islands, shortening the course from the outer islands. It was in such a boat that Will Stevens, the wise, silent man, had taught him the art of fishing. He and the other children and grandchildren had learned from Will to listen and to watch, for talking in boats was not the right way to note the signs and find the fish. Fishing and sailing were both acute pleasures and exacting occupations.

Foster cherished this bay and the familiar islands. It was here, on the southern shore of the bay, that the two children and the several grandchildren of John W. Foster had built their cottages and their cabins. Since 1894 they had visited and vacationed there. Often as many as twenty-five or thirty of the family would be there in mid-summer.

No one who had such early memories and a rich knowledge of the shores and islands of this lake could fail to take the opportunity to return from the press and burden of work in the city, from the overwhelming responsibilities of government in a time of crisis.

The troubles over a sailboat that came ashore one night broken loose by a storm from its mooring, the usual family arguments (the quarrels that can be remembered were few, but the atmosphere was of course not always serene), the competition to be included in the games and expeditions—all gave a balance and reality to what now seems, on looking back, an idyllic summer life. It is probable that the orderliness instinctive to my grandparents, the discipline, and the importance of cooperation, central to my parents in bringing up five lively children, tended to convey a sense of values that gave to golden days and balmy nights on the lake a special magic.

Life went on in a well-devised fashion in the small towns of Watertown and Auburn in the winter and Henderson in the summer within the close circle of family and friends. There were toboggan parties in winter, sleighing, skating, and snow houses, and, in spring, bicycle riding for miles, boating—not much canoeing in those days—and sailing and fishing. The family banded together to make our first tennis court. In the fall, there was nutting and walking in the woods, and camping. Henderson was accessible by bicycle and horse-back, for we had one or two ponies for a few years.

Oddly enough, one of the games we took most seriously was croquet. The croquet field lay between "Underbluff," now owned

by J. B. Johnson, of the Watertown *Daily Times*, the old rambling red frame cottage, where we lived, on the south, and, north, the three-room green cottage, "Linden Lodge," where Aunt and Uncle Bert lived. There on many a warm afternoon and sunny evening, my mother and my aunt, Eleanor Lansing, my father and Foster, or some other combination of four, would give battle. There were strict rules about allowable shots, and no one thought of taking advantage of a doubtful decision.

The younger children were allowed at times to play croquet, but in general the main contest of the day would be between the best players, with others of the family sitting on the grass as critics. Foster loved these games and saw that the wickets were straight and well lined up and that the posts were firmly set. The rivalry was keen, but any feeling of disappointment was soon forgotten in the joking over a foolish shot. The only break in the standards was when my great-grandmother, Mrs. Eliza McFerson, joined the game. She had been a well-trained schoolteacher widely known in her day—she was the only girl in a family of twelve boys, who vied in teaching her—but as she got to her nineties, she wanted to win the game more than to keep to the rules. We pretended not to see when she covered her ball with her long black silk skirt and walked it toward the wicket.

This general spirit of indulgence applied when in the evening she played anagrams with my mother and others of the family and was the only one permitted to make two-letter words, and we would give her points she had not fully earned. As she approached her mid-nineties, her sight failing, she could barely see the dice in backgammon; by skillful maneuvering we managed to have her win most evenings. Sometimes we spelled each other, for it was hot under the oil lamp and pleasanter to be with the larger group on the porch over the lake, talking of fishing and of foreign affairs and watching the western sky dim as Orion and the Dipper came up, often mirrored in the dark blue waters.

At Henderson, as well as in Watertown, in the days between 1900 and 1908, when Foster graduated from college, we invented games, wrote plays, and dramatized scenes from books we had read, sometimes aloud, around the fire. When I was too young to have a memorable role (I was seven years younger than Foster; we were, in order, Foster, Margaret, Allen, Eleanor, and Nataline), the older children and some friends recalled the adventures of the knights of King Arthur at a "round table" set up in the large attic of the house on Mullin Street. This was the best attic for shuffleboard, hockey, and King Arthur in our neighborhood, so we were especially popular.

A major production was to be a rendition of *The Merchant of Venice*. This we gave in the dining room to a small group of friends who paid a nickel for their tickets. Foster was Shylock, with a raffia beard taken from a flowerpot decoration. My sister Margaret was Portia, lovely in a sweeping robe made of a large red shawl. The other children, Allen and Nataline, had speaking parts; I was Nerissa, and I believe there were one or two friends in the supporting cast. We had learned by heart considerable parts of the play.

As our dramatic standards rose and we stopped producing and writing plays, there was a family substitute in the saga of the cruise, of island camping and trips to Europe. Every "ancient mariner" returning from anywhere had to tell his tale. Foster used to embroider his stories of open-boat exploration with many an episode of Allen overboard—or losing an anchor. A favorite, which was often recounted as a reminder of potential peril, was the story of an angry bull who chased Margaret over the field to the fence, while Foster, braving the snorting beast, lifted her over the bars. Another was the encounter with the ram on Timber Island that "endangered" Allen's life. All of these stories had a humorous twist, with a hint of real danger.

Foster's love of adventure was not foolhardy but rather to test his ability to achieve a goal that seemed to him to have merit. One day he decided to go after a bird's egg in a nest in a very high maple tree leaning out from the bluff behind the Henderson cottage—he had accumulated an extensive collection over a period of years, and was always careful to take only one egg from a nest. In this case he made a careful study of the branches of the tree to judge which would hold his weight. The family watched with some apprehension as he worked his way up and out to the nest. Then he put the egg in his mouth and hand over hand let himself down successfully.

In much the same spirit he prepared for the long swim, well over two miles, across Henderson Bay. He practiced until he knew what his strength was and then set out in the open water for the island, his father following in a rowboat to guard against unforeseen accident. In these instances, as in his sailing, he took full account of the facts and then applied his experience and skill to achieving his goal.

These early days were rich in stimulus and in lessons of distinguishing the reasonable from the foolish risk. The word "danger" was real and meant much, but it was rarely synonymous with turning back.

Vacations in those days were real escapes from work. While Foster was in college and before Margaret went to Bryn Mawr, they planned

house parties together for their lively young friends. Nor were their guests above practical jokes of a slightly daring nature. One day, when the girls disappeared temporarily, the men scaled the high stone wall on which the girls' cottage was built, took some of the lacier articles of clothing, and hung them like Christmas decorations on special ropes and on the trees. The girls retaliated when the men, in a casual moment, left their own cottage unguarded. Soon socks and ties and other personal items festooned almost unreachable branches along the shore.

But there was a serious side to our life as well. We were encouraged to read classical books in addition to our favorite books of adventure, and a minor crisis—and the occasion for the beginning of a family joke—occurred when my brother Foster was finally forbidden to read *The Swiss Family Robinson* again, for perhaps the tenth time. It was taking too much time from his reading of Tennyson, Wordsworth, Milton, Shakespeare, and *The Pilgrim's Progress*.

The older children learned a number of passages from *Pilgrim's Progress* by heart. It became a game to find in the landscape around Henderson places that could be identified with the book, such as the Slough of Despond (the steep bluff, for instance, was nicknamed the Hill of Difficulty), and to re-create in their talks with each other the story of Valiant. Foster's reading of John Bunyan's classic explained in part the fact that one of his favorite hymns was:

Through the night of doubt and sorrow
Onward goes a pilgrim band.
Singing songs of expectation
Marching to the promised land.

This and "Onward Christian Soldiers" were well attuned to the rhythm of the boat quartering a high sea with the wind abeam. Sometimes the struggle with the lines and tackle took all one's breath away; when we settled down to a stiff windward beat, Foster would often break out in the lively round "The night was dark and dreary, the wind was blowing a gale. The captain said, 'Antonio, Antonio, tell us a tale!' And thus the tale began: The night was dark and dreary . . ." or in a different vein, a hearty "Work for the night is coming . . . when man's work is done." Other, more melodious Stephen Foster tunes came on many a moonlight sail.

Our singing in family groups was led by the clear, true voices of my mother and father and followed with enthusiasm by those of us who had less tone sense but who thought singing hymns as well as the old traditional ballads was fun.

The life at Henderson was a simple outdoor life, one with church on Sunday and prayers most mornings, usually at eight o'clock. We used a little pocket book with hymns and selections from the Bible, which had been prepared by my father's father for the soldiers of the Civil War. Almost every day at the turn of the century the children would sit on the hard wooden benches under the window while we united in the day's reading, sang the chosen hymn—we learned a hymn a Sunday, all the verses—and heard a few words from my father. Then we would kneel as my father prayed.

Our mother, too, was a woman of strong personality, effective in action, fond of competitive games, and with unusual executive ability. She had served on many boards and committees, and worked harder than most professionals once her brood of five children were in school. The two parents kept the home lively and full of fun, without neglecting the serious purpose that they felt should guide them in their decisions and their way of living.

On August 31, 1958, the family on the mainland at Henderson knew that Foster was on the lake, and had been watching from time to time to see if the boat would come around Sixtown. This favorite island, with a curving pebbly beach, was the point a boat coming in must round. They spotted it when it was two miles away, hoping that he would come into the harbor. There was general excitement when the sail was seen off Lime Barrel Shoal, so named because a ship carrying lime barrels sank there and the lime had hardened. The boat was heading for the cottages. Soon it anchored at a safe two hundred yards off the shore and launched a dingy. Meanwhile, two small canoes paddled by some of the children went out to meet the sailors.

Only Foster came ashore. He asked Bob Hart to ferry the young boys and girls of the family and some of the grownups to look over the cutter. While the boat was at anchor he walked over the lawns and terraces to see the cottages, and to observe what damage winter ice and recent storms had done to the docks. With five different groups of the family together, there was always something building and something going on. He had not been there since his sister Nataline served dinner one cold October evening in 1955 when he preached in Watertown.

He asked about the local corn crop, and though the family had some ears to give him, he wanted to pick up his own and see the shore farm. So he drove with Nataline to Rockledge Farm a mile way. Georgia Belle Reed, a friend and neighbor, sold him the corn, but she did not notice who he was. When she started to make change, she was

so excited at recognizing her customer that she gave him change for a dollar, not for five. He hesitated, and laughed to ease her embarrassment as she pressed the other four dollars into his hand.

Foster liked simplicity and did not relish formality. When, in his tweeds and jacket, he was strolling around the docks at Fisherman's Cove on Duck Island one day, he saw a boat come in. The skipper called to him to ask if there was any ice; he wanted a hundred pounds. Foster got the large prongs and went into the ice house. "I am really in a hurry," the man said as Foster brought out the heavy blocks. The boatman looked at him with a curt thanks and held out a dollar.

"No charge," Foster said. The visitor looked surprised and asked, "Are you the caretaker?"

"No," said Foster, "the owner." Foster never expected to be treated differently because of who he was, and never disabused people like the boatman who mistook him for a hired hand. In fact, he rather enjoyed it.

This Sunday he saw again the family home at Henderson. It was also the last time he saw the group of his nieces and nephews and their children, many of whom knew nothing of his job. To some he was only a tall, friendly man, warm and humorous, a Henderson and Lake Ontario sailor. He refused an invitation to supper, for storm clouds were gathering in the west over White's Bay. Shortly after he was back on the *Cirrus*, the boat moved to the western shore for safe anchorage, and a violent wind swept down the bay, pounded the docks, lashed the boats, and piled the waves high on the shore. This was a violent and somewhat unusual squall, with winds up to seventy miles an hour. The rain poured in a solid sheet, blotting out the shore and hills and hiding the boat at anchor. The fury passed in a short hour, giving way to a quiet and peaceful autumn night. The family could see the boat swinging on its mooring in the dark, with riding light at the bow, not far from the ring of cottages and the summer people—but standing alone like the man aboard, independent, self-sufficient, and battered down for any weather.

With anchor aweigh in the early morning and a fresh southwest breeze, the *Cirrus* held to a broad reach most of the twenty miles to Cherry Island, just outside the narrow harbor of Chaumont. The crew took their duffel bags, Foster's blue, others khaki, and went ashore. The cruise was over.

On Monday, the 1st of September, Foster left the Dexter airport for Washington to meet the Joint Chiefs of Staff in preparation for flying to see the President the next day. Red China's bombardment of

the straits between the Offshore Islands and the mainland had intensified. A Chinese convoy from Formosa had been turned back by a barrage of shells.

The cruise from which Foster had returned was different from most of those he had taken on the lake, and yet it was similar in its interest and challenge. There was no thought of age or station; he was perhaps the strongest man aboard. He was set apart, by his gusto and humor.

He looked forward to other trips. He wanted to explore farther, particularly the northern shores of Lake Superior. He asked Bob Hart to look for a boat he could charter suitable for such a trip the following summer. He also had plans for sailing again the rugged cold waters of the mouth of the St. Lawrence. On the whole he preferred the lakes, with their fresh winds and little fog, to the Atlantic Coast.

Foster had the capacity to switch from the serious to the amusing, from intense concentration on a problem to complete and lighthearted absorption in a game, with full awareness of the tactics of his opponent and gay camaraderie with his partner. While even in games he did not let a foolish move pass unnoticed, he had no sense of resentment if the cards did not come his way or if they were not played the way he thought most skillful; and he could win or lose with hearty enjoyment.

His tolerance of others' errors in sailing judgment, too, was notable. Bob Hart told of various times when Foster saw a boatman, perhaps someone unacquainted with the rigors of the outer lake, in trouble off Duck Island. Perhaps the man had been careless, perhaps he had handled his boat inexpertly. Foster did not consider the reason until after he had gone to the rescue. Sometimes he would go in his small boat, sailing, rowing, or perhaps with his outboard motor, to lend a hand or give advice. While his high standards might have been offended by careless action, he never said a word of criticism, but tried to indicate out of his long experience how the problems of wind and wave could be handled.

It was this transition from the moment of total application on an issue to the mood of escape into another world that renewed his strength and refreshed his thinking. His deliberate rhythm of life sustained him.

When he was "on duty," focusing his mind without reserve on a problem, he shut out people and things that at the moment seemed irrelevant. This habit was sometimes taken for coldness or indifference to people. Those who saw him thus concentrating, sparse of words and

perhaps looking off into the distance as he scribbled a few key phrases or as he doodled in geometric squares and triangles on his yellow pad, and who did not see him between meetings, occasionally called him self-righteous and even unfeeling. But when between urgent tasks there was a minute or two, he would stroll into the outer office for a word with Phyllis or one of the other girls, to compliment Mary Butler or Jane Rothe on a new hairdo, then to the room to the right, where several aides sat in cubicles, and with an eye to the traffic in and out of his office, he would joke with them about their preoccupations or ask their opinions on the latest happenings.

Some thought this delight in recreation—and his almost hedonistic appreciation of good food, good drink, and play—was inconsistent with his serious attitude toward life. Even though he felt a tremendous weight of responsibility to do his utmost in the service of his country, an attitude characteristic of Puritan culture, he was not, in fact, a Calvinist, if that be taken to mean an ascetic view of life.

The swing of the pendulum in his life did not permit long periods of refreshment, but they were to be of immense importance. That is why sailing and Duck Island as well as a game of bridge or a meal with friends meant so much to him. His working life was one of intense concentration on major ideas that seemed to him of crucial importance for the peace and freedom of the world. On these he focused his powerful energies and the full force of his training and experience. To these he gave every ounce of ability while he was at his task. It was thus of the utmost importance for him to move away from the abstract and the analytical, and the preoccupation with world problems, to the concrete realities of the halyards and lines of a sailboat, the joys of fishing in a sheltered cove, the repair of damage to a tree, contemplation of the balance of nature, observation of running deer and migrating birds. Here there were none of the troubling problems of compromise with the aims and ambitions of others. The winds and the waves and the recurring changes in nature were to him signs of a continuing and universal reality above the day-to-day struggles in the outside world.

II

DETERRENCE IN THE FAR EAST

Monday afternoon, September 1, Foster was back in Washington, fresh and vigorous from his vacation. After conferences with his special assistants and advisers on Tuesday, he had a long meeting with Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, Donald Quarles, and General Nathan Twining, and other political and military officials to prepare for his meeting with the President. He telephoned Eisenhower several times.

On Wednesday he made a quick trip to Newport to lay the facts before the President, and afterward gave a "backgrounder" for newsmen. He was in Washington again in approximately five hours. There were varied types of actions to be taken. One was the decision to send General Curtis LeMay to the Far East immediately. Another was preparing a statement by the President reiterating that the United States would use force in defense of the U.S. position when, in the President's view, such was necessary. Other actions related to the supply of the Offshore Islands. A decision was made, recognized both in its meaning for the Communists and its risk for us, to have the Seventh Fleet escort Nationalist convoys. Almost at once the Secretary stated, ". . . if deliberately hit the ships would return fire." The Reds became more wary and withheld their fire.

Dean Acheson, in the *New York Times* of September 7, referring to the statement by a "high official" from Newport as being "Dulles," attacked "the Foreign Policy involved." A formal statement from the summer White House placed the crisis in a broad context and affirmed the American aim to keep Southeast Asia free. On September 8, the *New York Times* published an editorial approving, for the first time, the United States action.

Foster, studying the problem of world peace, had been increasingly concerned with the lack of appreciation in the United States

of the importance of China. He had been deeply interested in that area since his boyhood. He knew of the assignment his grandfather, John W. Foster, had undertaken in 1894 at the request of the Chinese government, and with the satisfied concurrence of the Japanese, to go to Japan to aid the Chinese as they sued for peace. Stories of this experience enlarged the family's vision of Oriental affairs, already stimulated by the recollections of a different sort from my grandfather Dulles's writings on the years he had lived in Madras as a missionary.

Those of us who were in Washington were to remember also the time when Li Hung-chang, special ambassador to the coronation of Nicholas, Czar of Russia, came through the United States. He called at the Foster home to show his appreciation for services to his country. These were later to include the recommendation for the use of the Boxer Indemnity payments for exchange students—the suggestion of my grandfather and the first operation of this kind undertaken. Later another mission brought presents to the family; in the good Chinese custom, they had provided for any probable number of persons, including the children. I remember they brought furs and silks and, for me, a cloisonné napkin ring and some embroidered silk handkerchiefs. My grandfather had written of all these events, particularly in two of his four books, *Diplomatic Memoirs* and in *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, recognized classics in the field.

The family's interest in Oriental affairs was further encouraged by my uncle, Robert Lansing, who had carried on the negotiations leading to the 1917 Lansing-Ishii agreement, dealing with Japan's conduct in respect to China during World War I. Thus the Orient was, to Foster, a reality and not a myth. It was to occupy many hours of debate and policy making in his later years and to constitute one of the main fields of action for which he will be remembered.

The family house at 1323 Eighteenth Street in Washington, where we often stayed, had many Chinese brocades, jade objects, and large tablets showing progress of man to the heavenly regions—several handsome ones of black ebony, with multicolored semiprecious stones in designs of people, birds, and flowers. These tablets were later to hang in Foster's own living room on Thirty-second Street. He never forgot his grandfather's influence and the many talks as a boy with returning missionaries and educators from India, China, Korea, and Japan. He and Janet went to Japan in 1938; from there they took a Japanese troop ship to Shanghai and a German ship to Hong Kong, where they spent Foster's fiftieth birthday. Janet stayed in Hong Kong for several days. Then Foster took the somewhat perilous journey to Hankow for a long talk with Chiang Kai-shek. He

came and went in small planes—on the flight from Hankow a large Chinese businessman yielded to provide space for him.

At this time Foster gained very definite ideas about the chaos in China, the confusion among the war lords, the aggressive activities of the Soviet Communists, and the danger of losing China to the dangerous forces he considered were talking reform while enslaving the people.

In 1938 he was still working on *War, Peace and Change* and wanted to know more of the situation in the East.

As a result Foster always had a special feeling for the need in our national diplomacy to face toward the East as well as the West. Hence his interest in SEATO and his growing concern about the relation of the United States to Nationalist and to Communist China.

He had said to the press a number of times, notably in June of this year, 1958, "I do not mind adapting myself for pragmatic reasons to the situation that exists. . . . But what is the pragmatic reason . . . with respect to the recognition of China? . . . I think you are entitled to take into account whether these things will actually serve our interest or not. I accept the pragmatic formula." The practical Dulles speaks louder in this case than Dulles the theorist. His foreign policy, like his philosophy of life, was a balancing—some would say a tension—between, on the one hand, the pragmatic and workable solutions, and on the other hand ideals and theory, between feasible action and perfectionist aims.

The only practical answer to the "house of cards" danger of a spreading threat to security, he saw, involved many diverse elements. The threat of Communist China called for concerted plans and prompt action, so that possible collapse beginning with the Offshore Islands, followed by threats to Formosa, the Philippines, and Australia, and involving Japan, Indonesia, and Hawaii, could be prevented. Unity of policy, with the United States serving as an anchor point by reason of commitments, was designed to impress the Communist bloc. It could also give a sense of security to the weaker elements standing alone washed by the wide Pacific and the China Sea. The SEATO pact that was evolved was a typical expression of two of his cardinal beliefs: one, that there must be acceptance of responsibility to maintain the peace by all countries in the free world, and, second, that only by showing a willingness to resist, by denying easy advance to the aggressor, could one avoid miscalculation and disaster.

In his testimony on the proposal for the Middle East before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1957, Foster had explained

what he held to be the crux of our policy to prevent Communist advance. He began with the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947: ". . . totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct and indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." This he believed. He went on to expand these basic ideas by saying we have thus "proceeded to the progressive development of collective defense arrangements—in 1948, NATO, ANZUS in 1951 and in 1955 SEATO."

Far away from Lake Ontario with its peaceful islands and untroubled border, almost elbowing Red China and under heavy enemy fire, was the relatively small island called Quemoy. Not far away was another with a sprinkling of smaller islands, Matsu. They were about one hundred miles from Taiwan—Quemoy five and Matsu ten miles from the mainland. These had stood since the 1949 revolution as a kind of Gibraltar in the Pacific. They were in fact the last battleground of the Chinese civil war after Chiang withdrew from the mainland. These islands were the nearest point to the homeland of many thousands of Chinese living and working under the flag of Nationalist China.

Here, in August, Communists with artillery and a few planes in the air began a long period of harassment of the peasants, the fishermen, and the Nationalist garrison. Never during this period of some ten weeks did the Red Chinese air force launch an attack on the islands, never did the planes of the Nationalist government bomb the attacking batteries. The U.S. fleet quietly waited nearby in the dangerous waters. Constantly, conferences in Washington were considering the nature of the menace, not only to Taiwan but to the Philippines and to the whole Southeast Asian position—to Pearl Harbor itself. The danger was evident in August; it became acute in September.

The relations of the Soviets to the Communist leaders in China are hidden from our view. Nevertheless, it was apparent that the trigger to this grave threat to the free world had been Khrushchev's visit to Peiping. "In this effort the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union appear to be working hand in hand," the President said on September 11.

There is every reason to believe, as the Secretary stated in public and in private during this ten-week period, that the pressure on Nationalist China was a serious probe of the firmness of the Western position in the Pacific. It was also in all likelihood a diversionary movement to shift the spotlight of world opinion from the Middle

East. In Lebanon and in Jordan, August was calm, and the welcome stability was a clear justification of the British, French, and American support of the moderate local pro-Western elements. The subversion had diminished, even if it had not ceased; the legitimate governments were in control. Even the regime in Iraq established by revolution was governing in a reasonably acceptable manner.

It was altogether in character that at this moment Khrushchev should push again. Perhaps he may have concluded that the leadership in Washington, and the position of Dulles in particular, had created apprehension in the Western camp; perhaps he thought public support for the President and for the Secretary had weakened. The usually quiet days of August were an opportune time to take the initiative on the Far Eastern flank of the free-world defenses. It was also, some thought, a time of unusual political sensitivity, since the American Congressional elections were in the offing. Here was a chance for the Soviets to show the strength of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This was to be a coordinated Chicom-Moscow operation. Perhaps there were not to be many more.

In the inner councils, the SEATO ambassadors, the ANZUS leaders, and the representatives of several governments, including Japan and India, quietly requested the United States to stand firm, as the Secretary was to indicate to some of his confreres. They expressed their views in such phrases as "Thank God for the United States" and "It is essential to have Dulles hold his position." There were reasons why it was not considered wise in some of the capitals to support the Secretary's position openly.

The United Kingdom, for example, had recognized Communist China and was limited somewhat by that fact. Some of the other countries felt vulnerable because of their location and could not take a strong stand. Some, on the other hand, fearing a global war, thought they would exert their influence to hold back an "impetuous" Secretary. They had incomplete knowledge of the searching appraisal of the military action of the Chinese Communists and the potential of the United States, which had been revised, reviewed, and checked with the military and the intelligence commands daily.

The whole complex set of relationships was hidden in the United States behind a partial smoke screen of essential secrecy and colored by press stories of a strange and frightening situation.

While the Administration was clear in its intent, early in August many and conflicting reports had confused some of the public and left unclear the Communists' intentions. On the one hand it was reported in the *New York Times* of August 12 that the aggressive

Communist "Liberate Taiwan" propaganda, which had been at its highest peak since the Korean War in the previous month, had slackened, as if the Chinese Reds were weakening, and this change was attributed by some to the advice of Khrushchev to Mao not to attack the island. At the same time, there were news stories of menacing air activity along the Southeast China coast.

Pote Sarasin, from Thailand, Secretary-General of SEATO, warned of the danger of overt Chinese aggression. Two MIG's were reported shot down over the straits on August 14. There was some shelling of the Offshore Islands. There were exchanges of fire between ships, of alarming though still limited scope. There was also talk, particularly out of Warsaw, of close military agreements between Khrushchev and Mao. All of these matters were under constant scrutiny in the State Department. They were the subject of the Secretary's telephone calls from Canada as he cruised in the cutter *Cirrus*. It was crucial to appraise the Chinese Communists' intentions and to judge the timing of action and the exact wording of the verbal exchanges in letters, releases, and news conferences. The basic policy was firm.

By early September it looked as if the islands might be starved out. It became apparent that the blockade of the straits was causing an acute and distressing supply problem. The 125,000 inhabitants were on short rations. They were difficult to sustain without outside help and without full use of the fishing fleet.

It was urgent to send food and ammunition by air, but sufficient equipment was not immediately available to make enough air drops. An eyewitness report in the *New York Times* of September 2 told of a Nationalist ship convoy being turned back by a barrage of shells when attempting to reach the islands. The United States Seventh Fleet was standing by.

On September 9, Tuesday, at two minutes past eleven, the Secretary strode down the aisle of the small amphitheater of the State Department to face what he knew would be one of his toughest sessions. The room was crowded with newsmen looking for a sensation. He had seen the cartoons; he had read the editorials. He knew that even his supporters in some countries would for various reasons keep silent. John Hightower has said that the debate over Quemoy was the only time the Secretary showed signs of fatigue or irritation to newsmen.

The basic elements of the situation had already been explained several times over. The United States would defend what was, in the

best judgment of the leaders, its vital interests in the area. It would not declare any particular point indefensible and by so doing invite attack or encroachment up to that point. It would not use force to compel Chiang to give up any ground he had continuously held and which he regarded as Nationalist territory. It would give logistic support to those who were withstanding unprovoked aggression. All this had been said at Newport on September 4 and was echoed by the further White House statement of September 6. Both statements reflected the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the National Security Council. The Secretary's words were familiar:

Of course the vital point is—I think it is understood, though perhaps it should be made more understood—what is at stake there is not just two pieces of real estate, Quemoy and Matsu. Obviously, if that was all that was involved, there would be no basis for action on the part of the United States. What's involved there is the whole position as I pointed out earlier, of the free world in the Western Pacific; and the vital interests of the United States are involved.

One of the cardinal principles of diplomacy was referred to by the Secretary in his more private conversations and was reflected in his news conferences. One must endeavor always to leave one's opponent a way out.

This escape hatch for the Chinese Communists had been pointed to in the statement of September 4, in which the hope was expressed that the matter could be settled by peaceful means. The September 6 summer White House statement had taken note of the fact that the Chinese radio had reported that Chou En-lai was prepared to resume talks. These the United States had sought earlier, on July 28. The American government said that Jacob Beam, the United States Ambassador in Poland, was now ready to meet with the Chinese Communists at Warsaw and to deal with them "without prejudice to the rights of the ally, Nationalist China."

This information had been available to the public and the newsmen before the news conference on September 9.

The growing fears in the United States and abroad of a serious outbreak of hostilities, the feeling, based in part on the fact that many consultations had to be kept secret because of the delicacy of the situation and on the notion that the President and the Secretary were acting almost alone, led the reporters to prod and probe the one man they thought might give them the story of the behind-the-scenes discussions. They knew there had been a series of such discussions. It is rare for a high-level meeting to be held at the Department or at the Pentagon, to say nothing of the White House, without

keen observers knowing the names of the participants, the length of the meeting, and deducing from previous actions and the expertise of those involved what subjects have been explored. Many an enlightening story is developed on the basis of a reporter's ingenuity.

It seemed incredible to them that the Secretary could, for a full forty-five minutes, answer every question on one subject and not, by a variation of phrasing, give them a peg on which to hang a new and spectacular story. The twisting and turning of the subject and the question—Is the United States committed to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu?—always led to the same basic answer: The United States is committed to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores, not the Offshore Islands “as such,” but positions “related” to the defense of Formosa. This was the classic phrase to avoid drawing a line. Except for the unvarying impression of determination that the Secretary manifested and which added a dimension to the releases, they could have reviewed their notes and reread statements from Newport. But the discussion had been unquestionably lively and thus interesting.

One bit of information he was able to tell them, though it was not a complete surprise, was that at ten o'clock that morning in Warsaw the Communist Chinese Ambassador Wang Ping-nan had been informed that we were prepared to carry forward the talks in Warsaw. From these talks, “I do not think it is too much to hope,” he said, “that there can be a *modus vivendi* or cease fire agreement reached which would assure that the issues would not be resolved by violent, aggressive action which would risk a world war.”

It was one of his longest and most intensive news conferences. He dodged only one of the fifty-one questions. A reporter asked if he would comment on Mr. Acheson's statement that the United States was drifting into war without friends and allies and had lost control of the situation. To this he said, “No, I have no comment on that.”

One questioner asked about the lead article in the *Wall Street Journal* reporting that many Americans were opposed to his Formosan policy. The Secretary responded:

. . . it is essential that a policy which involves grave decisions of this kind should, so far as practical, have the support of the American people. But also, I am aware of the fact that the elements which go into making final decisions are so delicate, oftentimes not subject to public appraisal, that there lies a responsibility upon the President and his principal advisers which cannot be shared with the general public.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff backed the President's words and actions as reported on September 10 in a public statement. On September 11 the President, aware of the great anxiety that naturally prevailed in many quarters, addressed the nation with further affirmations in order to follow up his statement of September 4. Although he said there would be no appeasement, he did stress hopes for negotiations. He appealed to the U.S.S.R. to restrain the Red Chinese.

The Secretary's much discussed style and manner of formulating decisions and then adhering to them stood him in good stead at this time, diplomatically speaking. While many of the conferences within the Department, with the Pentagon, and with ambassadors and officials elsewhere were secret, the fact of the extensive study and consultation must have been known. The conversations with the American officials and representatives of foreign governments were played down by the critics. He had therefore more room to maneuver than he might otherwise have had. The attacks on the policy in no way limited his own freedom of action. The President had the authority from Congress from 1955 to take a strong stand. He could order the fleet to the area, support the Nationalist government, and at the same time see that negotiations in Warsaw had a moderating influence on Formosa. The very reputation for stubbornness that was applied to the Secretary may not have been an attribute likely to lead to popularity, but it helped him to be convincing, and it reinforced the position of the President, not himself subject to similar attack.

In fact, throughout the whole public debate, which continued for two months or more, the Secretary did not involve publicly any persons or governments whose leaders did not wish at this time to make a clear declaration of the policy they actually advocated.

The one theme that ran through all his conversations on the subject was that the confidence of the leaders on Formosa must be maintained. "We have to maintain good will and good relations and the morale of the governments that are our friends and allies in that part of the world," he said. The Communist demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy from the Taiwan area was of course unacceptable. On the other hand, the suggestion that the United States would not escort ships in convoy if the cease-fire were a permanent condition was not without effect. Chiang, who was a key figure in the whole tactical maneuver, was sensitive to any implication of criticism from the Administration of his positioning of troops. What seemed wise to the leaders in Washington could not always be explained to the world without the danger of public misunderstandings. On October 2,

the Secretary reassured Chiang that American policy had not changed. The message was sent just before he and Janet left for a few days of respite on Duck Island.

Peiping had, it appeared, on news from some quarters, offered a cease-fire if the United States would stop convoying ships. The United States indicated that if the cease-fire were permanent they would cease their convoys.

Upon his return to Washington on October 7, Foster made the following statement at the Washington National Airport:

The Chinese Communists, after having brutally and incessantly bombarded Quemoy for over six weeks, now say they will be humanitarian and peaceful for one week. It is not easy to evaluate that statement, but at least for the moment there is a cessation of the [shelling]. This the United States has been vigorously seeking, and also the development assures world-wide condemnation of the Chinese Communists if they again resume the fighting.

On October 13 the Communist Chinese announced that they would "suspend the shelling for another two weeks," declaring: "The American nation is a great nation. . . . They don't want war. But among the U.S. government workers, there are some people, like Dulles and his ilk, who are indeed not so smart. . . ."

These shifts and changes in the situation in the Far East give a somewhat confusing picture, particularly in view of the fact that some of the considerations could not be injected into the public discussion. These weeks were a constant strain on those responsible for political and military action.

Through it all, the President and the Secretary maintained, along with their closest advisers, unbroken coordination and unity of spirit. They remembered that "the mandate from Congress in 1955 had been given by an almost unanimous bipartisan vote." They also knew that they were supported by Britain, France, and virtually all of the countries most closely affected. There had been far more consultations than there were public statements and news conferences.

Even though the policy of the United States government on China was basically the same then as it had been from 1950—and in fact to the present day—many intelligent people thought and think it should be changed. They argue that Red China and the Peiping regime constitute a large land mass and hundreds of millions of people, and that to leave them out of the normal diplomatic and economic relations is to ignore important realities. The fact that the United States government has negotiated with the Red Chinese, in

Geneva and in Warsaw, does not seem to them an adequate answer. They fear also the loss of information important to our security and urge that those who are treated as outsiders become increasingly difficult to deal with. They point out that there is no strong moral or security argument for the policy of nonrecognition and for barring membership in the United Nations.

In the discussion of the Offshore Islands, some critics disagree even more strongly with the prevailing line. In fact, even some of those who defend the support of Taiwan and oppose early recognition of the Peiping regime argue that the islands are too near the mainland for defense, that they do not form a necessary part of the free world's security system, and that the risks in standing by these small "pieces of real estate" are out of proportion when one considers the limited advantages to be gained by denying them to the Red Chinese. Involvement in nuclear war is, emphasized critics of the Secretary, the real danger.

Congressional apprehension had been indicated by an August 22 inquiry from Thomas E. Morgan, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Secretary responded to him on August 23: "It would, I fear, constitute a threat . . . if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to change the situation by force," and it could not "be a limited operation." In this published letter he expressed concern over the Chinese military build-up. The President had also made a statement at his news conference on August 27 regarding the support of Taiwan. There had been a telephone conversation with the Secretary from Presquile, where the cutter dropped anchor in the Bay of Quinte, near Prince Edward Point. The President noted the Chinese Communists' radio announcement of their intention to take Taiwan itself, and pointed to his earlier statements that this would be a highly "hazardous" plan for the Communists.

In addition to the conferences with the military, and with intelligence and political officers of the State Department, there had been a notable meeting on September 3 with the diplomatic representatives of the SEATO countries (Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, Pakistan, France, the United Kingdom) and later with Japan and Nationalist China.

It was at this time that someone asked whether the ambassadors should try to evade the reporters waiting to catch them in the lobby. It was decided not to dodge but to go out the front door and say simply that "there had been an exchange of views." They would leave it to the Secretary to make a statement to the press. In effect

this meeting was reported in two carefully phrased statements on September 4 and 6. The President's address to the nation on September 11 was comprehensive. His answer to Khrushchev's long rambling letter of September 7, in contrast, was short and to the point. He said that he did not see in Khrushchev's letter any language that could facilitate the lessening of the danger existing in the current situation. "On the contrary, the description of this situation . . . seems designed to serve the ambitions of international Communism rather than to present the facts." He again urged the Soviets to persuade the Chinese Communists to exercise moderation.

The United States was unwilling, here or elsewhere, to accept the extension of territorial ambitions by the use of force. In addition to this basic foundation of American policy, there was the realization that miscalculation by the enemy would bring danger to the peace of the world. There could be no yielding, the Secretary felt, to any inclination to show softness in the face of criticism by friend or foe. But, also, it was essential to make clear the willingness of the United States at all times to resume talks and to attempt through negotiations to restore peace. In the Law of the Sea conference in February, the United States had not agreed to the twelve-mile limit for national waters. When the fleet was moved to the vicinity of the two islands, Quemoy and Matsu, the question of the three-mile limit recognized by the United States and of the twelve-mile limit claimed by the Communist world in the current Law of the Sea meetings became of some moment. As Foster said on September 9 to the newsmen, "We do not accept from the Chinese Communists or anybody else, for that matter, the extension of territorial waters to 12 miles. That is what you might call a 'grab.'"

Although the United States did not waver in its support of Nationalist China in the aims that seemed legitimate and peaceful, the President and the Secretary made clear their unwillingness to condone provocative activities by any power, including Nationalist China.

In private, the Secretary speculated as to the possible mistakes friendly nations might make under conditions of aggravated tensions; he was haunted by the risks of weakness on the one hand and of the use of strength on the other. He did note that the Communists, however, had not yet mounted an air attack on the islands and had shown some caution in the manner in which they had carried out their harassing operations.

In some of the conversations that he held at this time he devoted consideration to the intrinsic value of the Offshore Islands in security

planning. He recognized that if an earthquake or tidal wave should cause the disappearance of the islands, tragic though it would be, the strategy and defense arrangements to make the Far East secure from Communism would not be substantially altered.

The Secretary's and the President's estimate of the effect of their position of strength was soon to be further corroborated by the encouraging request of the Chinese Communists, in a statement from Peiping on September 8, calling for a resumption of talks. These talks began in Warsaw without delay.

The Secretary had had a long talk at his house with Ambassador George Yeh, of Nationalist China, on Saturday, September 13. Clearly, the attitude of the Nationalists had to be kept in line with a policy that was feasible from the American point of view. It was not until ten days later, however, that the *New York Times* speculated that the Secretary might be attempting to "take a severe line with the Nationalists." It asserted that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had requested approval to bomb the Chinese mainland and that Secretary Dulles was insisting that the Nationalists refrain. Selwyn Lloyd, then in New York, and Macmillan, in London, were indicating their support of the Americans and trying to convince the Soviets of the foolishness of Red Chinese provocation.

Khrushchev's attitude was most belligerently exposed in his letters of September 7 and 20. Gromyko in the United Nations on Thursday, September 18, demanded the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet. The public was informed on September 20 that President Eisenhower had received a lengthy communication from Khrushchev. "This communication," said the White House, "is replete with false accusations; it is couched in language which is abusive and intemperate; it indulges in personalities; it contains inadmissible threats. All this renders the communication unacceptable under established international practice. Accordingly it has been rejected and the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow has been instructed to return the communication to the Soviet Government." The second probe of the Soviet leader was becoming sharper and more menacing.

Although all these statements described the situation as "extremely serious," the public, according to a *New York Times* survey of opinion, was generally *not interested* in the crisis. Editorials and cartoons of the period, however, showed a lively and often critical interest.

The diplomatic problem of the moment was to give the Communist Chinese the maximum possible reason for acting in a calm manner and helping to restore peace in the straits without weakening the

morale of the whole Pacific area. This meant that the Secretary must walk on eggs in policy, with the help of the President, without manifesting any lack of strength, and always preventing the impression that he himself could be swayed.

While the President was reinforcing the Secretary's statements, and while he instructed the Seventh Fleet, for the first time, issuing the historic order to convoy in daylight the supply ships to the Offshore Islands, the State Department in the normal course of its duties was studying the mail from the public. The volume of letters had been light, as was natural during the summer months. Nevertheless, the trend was against the Administration. While in its one opinion it did not go so far as Senator Wayne Morse did later, in his call for the Secretary's impeachment, it perhaps did show an organized effort against the Administration.

Senator Morse's call for the impeachment of Dulles declared, "If Eisenhower and Dulles persist in their present foreign policy based upon warlike action over the Quemoy and Matsus, they should be impeached." At this moment one or more subordinate officers of the Department gave information to the *New York Times* that the American public was against the Secretary's policy. This was generally referred to as a leak. It was known to the Secretary as a somewhat uninformed and ineffective effort to bring about a reversal of policy. Such an episode is rare in the Department of State.

Vice President Nixon, informed of the situation, declared he was "shocked." This was, he said, "a patent and deliberate effort of a State Department subordinate to undercut the Secretary of State and sabotage his policy."

"The apparent assumption on the part of those who put out the story," said Nixon, "was that the weight of the mail rather than the weight of the evidence should be the controlling factor in determining American foreign policy."

The Secretary himself preferred not to discuss the matter. He referred to the release of information as "ill advised," and when asked at the news conference of September 30 whether it was a sabotage of his policy, he replied dryly, "that could be a matter of opinion." In answer to a question as to whether anyone "would be fired or reprimanded," Lincoln White said that no inquiry was being made.

The Secretary took time out from crisis on September 20 for a needed moment of recreation. The following document is in the files:

CUP RACES—NEWPORT *Columbia—Sceptre* September 20, 1958. I, John Foster Dulles, have a series bet of \$50.00 against

\$10.00 on *Columbia* vs. *Sceptre* with the Counselor, Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt. The aforesaid Mr. Reinhardt has a similar bet with Admiral Burke. JFD [*Columbia* won.]

Meanwhile, despite the small show of progress in the Warsaw discussions, the Chinese Communists, as was apparent in hindsight, were endeavoring to find a way out.

Correspondent Thomas J. Hamilton, in a story of October 10 in the *Times*, never confirmed, reported that before the Secretary's news conference of September 30—but after the beginning of the Warsaw talks—Dr. Halvard Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, had delivered a message indicating Peiping's willingness to consider a possible ceasefire. The communication was to the effect that the Chinese Reds would not insist on bringing the Taiwan issue into the Warsaw talks (the date was supposed to be September 29). No such accommodating attitude had emerged in the conversations reported between Ambassadors Wang Pin-nan and Jacob Beam in Warsaw. Events suggest that the Secretary's news conference on September 30 was, in effect, an answer to that message. The Department denied that there *had* been a "message," but conceded that the British representative in Peiping might have called attention to certain passages in the September 30 news conference. In any case, the United States pronouncement apparently gave the Communists the way out they had been seeking. The strange alternating cease-fire began on October 6.

The press conference on September 30 was in a very real sense a negotiating technique, for by maintaining the firmness of the declared position without wavering, by refusing to speculate beyond these limits, the Secretary gave a basis for the informal conversations in New York at the U.N. and, as events proved, made it clear to the Communist Chinese what the actual situation was. With regard to the recurring question on the possibility that Chiang would return to the mainland, Foster made it constantly clear that we were in no way committed to aid such an attempt. Still, he said, there might be a revolutionary situation—and he cited Hungary—which might make such a return a possibility.

A complex diplomatic game was being played. Only a fraction of the moves were visible. The United States was pressing in two directions, but each effort had its limits. There was to be no yielding to force in the straits. At the same time, we wished the Communist Chinese to know that we would respond affirmatively to any convincing move to end the shelling of the islands by drawing back the naval forces if the free world was assured of a peaceful situation. Mean-

while, the support of Chiang had to be a part of the clear understanding that he must avoid provocative or menacing acts, since there was no indication in Washington that an attack on the mainland would be either justified or supported by the United States and its allies. The problem of communication between governments and with the public on these matters was a difficult one.

The confidence of Chiang Kai-shek in the United States had to be carefully guarded, and a face-to-face meeting was called for. The Secretary had to fit a trip to Taipei into an already crowded schedule. Problems with France, Cyprus, Panama, Guinea, Indonesia, the withdrawal from Lebanon, the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, and nuclear testing had to wait. He told the ANZUS representatives, from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, at the meeting of October 1, in which these problems were threshed out, that he thought the next moves, which must avoid any kind of political shock to Taipeh, required a visit. He was then quietly scheduling such a visit at the invitation of the Chinese Generalissimo. Among the ANZUS representatives there was little opposition. The views were clearly expressed, and there was a satisfactory "meeting of the minds."

But, meanwhile, another matter was to complicate his timetable in the next few days. On October 9, Pope Pius XII died. History does not arrange itself to fit human schedules.

At the White House Cabinet meeting on October 9, President Eisenhower passed a note scribbled on a piece of memorandum paper to the Secretary. "Foster," it read, "if it can be done in a feasible time schedule you would be the best representative in this country at the Pope's funeral on October 18." What he did not say in this note, but what was probably on his mind, was that he and the Secretary had both agreed it would be useful and even essential for the Secretary to fly to Taiwan for a talk with Chiang Kai-shek about the attitude of Nationalist China toward the mainland and the problems of the straits. Thus the plans were laid for the trip in a jet-tank Air Force plane for a flight to Rome, to England, and "over the Pole" via Alaska to Taipei.

The jet tanker (there were no other passenger jets available in those days) was airborne from Patuxent Naval Air Station, outside Washington, in the late afternoon of the 17th. The estimated flight time to Rome was nine hours. The interior of the fast, functional plane had been fixed up temporarily for the distinguished guests. In addition to the Secretary, there were former ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, Chairman John McCone, then head of the Atomic Energy

Commission, Mrs. Dulles, Jerry Greene, Phyllis Bernau, and one or two others. The dark, almost windowless, interior, with its bucket seats, was a far cry from the *Columbine III* or the luxury jets in which most official flying is now done, but speed and performance were of the first importance in taking the Secretary on this seven-day journey two thirds around the world.

The sandwiches, coffee, and the highballs were welcome, as always, but the passengers knew the flight against the sun was short, and turned in at an early hour by Washington time, already late by Rome time, to sleep in the canvas bunks hung to the metal hull by special straps.

In spite of the makeshift arrangements, most of the travelers—all used to making the best of plane conditions—were asleep by midnight. But not long after midnight the straps on the Secretary's bunk broke—though he carried himself with the litheness of a man who is used to an active outdoor life, he was a large man. The fall wrenched his back, already sensitive because of his injured disc.

The next morning, Lou Jefferson, his security aide, saw him lying on the thin mattress on the bottom of the plane. Anxiously he asked the Secretary why he had not wakened anyone to help him. "You were all sleeping so nicely," he said. "I know it is hard to get to sleep again on a plane if once you wake up."

He walked off the plane at the Ciampino Airport at 7:30 A.M. Rome time, on an unusually cold day, but without a limp, though those close to him knew he was in pain. When he reached the Ambassador's residence, the Villa Taverna, his back seemed worse.

Mrs. Dulles and Ambassador James D. Zellerbach finally persuaded him not to go to the Mass on Friday so he would be more certain to be well enough to attend the final and most solemn requiem Mass on Saturday.

The solemn gathering at Rome gave the Secretary a chance to have a word or two with several foreign ministers and prime ministers. One such memorandum of conversation is date-lined "The Basilica of St. Peter's." Several of his conversations dealt, quite naturally, with the Far East. Speaking to Heinrich von Brentano in the portico of the Basilica, he reminded him of Pericles' speech to the Athenians at the time of Athens' dispute with Sparta. Pericles said that the little town of Megara was not the stake; rather its defense was a symbol of the resolution of the two contending parties that they could not give up their positions piecemeal to avoid risk. Pericles said that the psychological elements in the situation were of great importance, and that the nature of the national character is

not divisible. The Offshore Islands were to be judged not in terms of their size or their location but in terms of their history and their significance.

The departure of the Secretary's party from Rome after the funeral was late on the afternoon of Sunday, the 19th. The group was somewhat smaller—several had returned from Rome by more direct routes. There was a brief two-hour stop at Brize-Norton in England for fueling and rest, and Selwyn Lloyd motored out from London for dinner with the Secretary before the plane headed for the polar regions.

Selwyn Lloyd wrote on November 3:

I am acknowledging your letter of October 31 separately, but may I tell you in a very personal note of the admiration I felt when I saw you at Brize-Norton a fortnight ago, going off in that very uncomfortable aeroplane after a brief period of so much work on a long and tiring journey. . . . As I saw the side of the aeroplane close on Janet and yourself, I thought what a gallant couple you were and how little gratitude is sometimes shown to those who so much deserve it. Yours, Selwyn.

The landing in Alaska was for breakfast at 10:15 A.M.—on the same day for those who had been in Rome—at Eielson Air Force Base, near Fairbanks, but here matters of the greatest moment awaited the Secretary.

Central Intelligence was able to find him at this fueling stop. They had learned that the shelling of the Offshore Islands had resumed on the 20th. The Secretary, considering this a serious political act, called President Eisenhower, getting him out of bed at 5:30 A.M., to ask whether he should continue or return to Washington. They both agreed he should go on. He arrived at 10:08 A.M., on Tuesday, October 21 (having lost the 20th at the international date line), for his talks with Chiang.

They discussed, among other things, the military aspects of the crisis, the transfer of howitzers to the Generalissimo, the improvement of the Nationalist position. In the conferences the Secretary was joined by Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson, who had flown direct from Washington, and our Ambassador to Taipei, Everett Drumright.

"Our consultations are not aimed at reaching any new agreements," the Secretary had commented to reporters on landing. "We hope through reexamination further to consolidate a relationship of mutual trust and confidence of immense value to all of the free

world." Washington warned the Chinese Communists we would resume our convoys. However, on October 25, the Red China Minister of Defense, Peng Teh-huai, announced that he had given orders not to shell "on even days of the calendar," adding, "we shall not necessarily conduct shelling on odd days." They seemed to be trying to save themselves from loss of face. The Secretary cautioned: "I wouldn't ever bank heavily . . . on just one theory of the Chinese Communists' action because they can reverse themselves overnight."

The results of the meetings of October 22 and the new emphasis of the communiqué were little noticed in a world relieved of their main fear of war. From time to time for eight years the eyes of the world had been focused on this faraway island, thinking of it mainly in terms of an early invasion of the mainland of China.

Foster feared not only for the long-lasting political transformation of China into a semipermanent revolutionary state, but also for the loss of the country's subtle, age-old cultural and intellectual values. He was very pleased, therefore, when the Department's Policy Planning staff gave him a paper that he could use in talking with Chiang.

The new emphasis on the mission of the Nationalist Chinese was expressed in a communiqué that indicates their main role was to foster the element of "a civilization which respects and honors the individual and his family life [and their efforts] to preserve those characteristics which have enabled the Chinese to contribute so much for the benefit of humanity." In this same vein, after his return from Formosa Foster referred to the Republic of China as "the authentic custodian and defender of those honored cultural values long identified with China."

WAR AND PEACE

On October 28, in his news conference, the Secretary discussed the Chicoms:

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think of the idea of having war every other day? [The audience of reporters laughed.]

A. Well, it is part of this upside-down acting and talking to which we have had to grow accustomed, or try to grow accustomed. It seems to me the most shocking aspect of it is the complete demonstration that this shooting is not for military purposes but merely for the purpose of promiscuous killing. If you have a military purpose, you carry on your shooting for military objectives and your purpose is to destroy the capacity of your enemy to resist. When you do it only every other day and say, in between times you can bring in supplies—indeed, we will give them to you, so as to increase your capacity to resist—and the next day you do your shooting, that shows the killing is done for political purposes and promiscuously. It is only designed to kill primarily the civilians, who are the ones most exposed. It is an extremely repugnant procedure according to our standards.

It is in a measure ironic that Foster, whose policies led some of his critics to suggest that he risked war unnecessarily without due calculation of the cost, should have devoted so much of his own thought to the nature of war and peace.

He wrote two books on the subject: *War, Peace and Change*, published in 1939, and *War or Peace*, first issued in 1950 and reissued in 1957. These books were very different in their approach to the problem. Writing in 1939, when he was able to view such questions with a perspective somewhat more detached than later, he emphasized the philosophical justification for peace, the need to recognize change in human life. Writing in 1950, he spoke more to the direct event in a manner less reflective.

But certain themes were constant in his thought. And one of them

was the need for the corrective of spiritual power in controlling secular forces. Religion, he thought, should direct much of its energies to pressure for peace, to the avoidance of force as an instrument to gain political ends. He felt that "Man is by nature selfish" and that totalitarian war was directly related to the irrationality of man:

Totalitarian wars are made possible by a series of circumstances of which the most significant is the essentially emotional quality of human beings. We like to think of ourselves as rational beings. We like to feel that reasoning and logical argument are the most persuasive means of inducing human action. Actually this is far from being the case. In only a small segment of our lives are our acts dictated by reason. In the main we act unthinkingly, under the impulse of emotional and physical desires or in accordance with tradition or the custom of the social group of which we happen to form a part.

We have pointed to the essentially emotional nature of human beings, particularly in the mass. Upon this foundation is built that form of patriotism which personifies the nation as a living being endowed with heroic qualities, who lives bravely and dangerously in a world of inferior, and even villainous, other-nation personalities.

Religion, he thought, could transform and control man's selfish and irrational nature to better ends. He was concerned that America had lost its spiritual strength and worried that it had become "defensive" and "fearful," forgetting the power of its own ideals. A belief in God, he thought, was fundamental to the strivings of American citizens. As he once said:

The successes of the United Nations have been largely due to those throughout the world who believe that there is a God, a Divine Creator of us all; that he has prescribed moral principles which undergird this world with an ultimate authority equal to that of the physical law; that this moral law is one which every man can know if only he opens his heart to what God has revealed; that these moral principles enjoin not merely love and respect of the Creator, but also love and respect for fellow men, because each individual embodies some element of the Divine; and that moral principles should also govern the conduct of the nations.

He felt that nationalism and war were direct results of an emotional identification of one's own country with the right. He wrote:

Most of us lead lives which are lacking in drama, excitement and adventure. We seek, through imagination, that which is lacking

in reality. We read romances and see plays or movies which portray some hero or heroine in dramatic action, with whose exploits we tend to identify ourselves. This normal human trait has been capitalized to an extraordinary degree in the dramatization of the "nation-hero" and "nation-villain."

One's own hero, always in the right, is in constant peril from such other nations. In the face of intrigue and peril the personified nation-hero comports himself with courage, forbearance and wisdom. Never a bully, he sponsors the cause of righteousness and of the oppressed; never bellicose, he has, nevertheless, a high sense of dignity and of personal honor which others affront at their peril. If he is forced to battle to defend his integrity or honor, to succor the oppressed, or to secure justice against wrong-doers, he conducts himself with bravery and honor. He usually emerges successfully from his hazardous adventures. If setbacks occur, which cannot be glossed over, they are portrayed as but temporary, like the incidents of a melodrama which, to sustain suspense, must admit occasional failures that serve to spur on the hero to his final and more dramatic triumph.

Some might have said that the "nation-hero" and "nation-villain" became part of his own foreign policy after 1953. He certainly did refer to Communism as an "enemy," but as a "self-proclaimed enemy," openly urging aggression. He thought the free world should exert constant pressure on Communism:

But the despotism of Soviet Communism has great weaknesses, such as always go with despotisms. Two observable weaknesses are the underlying distrust and suspicion within the top leadership, and the lack of mobility which comes when there is little delegation of authority, so that no significant decision can be taken until after debate within the Politburo. These are major weaknesses; but they are weaknesses that are fatal only under pressure. If there is no pressure, purges can occur, organizational wounds can be healed at leisure, and the despotism can go on. If there is no pressure, then there is time for the reference back to the Politburo and its deliberation.

The despotism of Soviet Communism needs to be subjected to the pressures which would come if we spread everywhere truth and hope and the conviction that the American people are uncompromisingly dedicated to the cause of human liberty and will not be willing to sacrifice that cause in an effort to make a self-serving "deal" with the despotic masters of the captive peoples.

Under the pressure of faith and hope and peaceful works, the rigid, top-heavy and overextended structure of Communist rule could readily come into a state of collapse.

He abhorred and dreaded war, though Andrei Vishinsky in the United Nations had attacked him as a "warmonger." He said in 1950, "No one will be able to 'win' the next war" and "war is not inevitable." And he wrote in 1939, "War is today a possibility more real and more terrifying than ever before. It would seem that some slight compromise of sovereignty might be practically realizable if there were a reasonable chance that this would reduce the danger of war." Thus he was an early supporter of the League of Nations and later of the United Nations. Article Nineteen of the League Charter included reference to placing, in the hands of an impartial and continuous body owing a responsibility to all, the responsibility for achieving balance between what he called the dynamic and static desires of national groups. Without this, he wrote, "we cannot have a peace which is other than an armed and precarious truce. We cannot have peace which is predicated upon principle or which is other than a matter of expediency."

He spoke frequently of the tension in life—and in foreign policy—between the static and the dynamic (presumably a legacy from his work with Bergson), and realized that dynamic forces in the world, whether one approved of their aggressive tendencies or not, strove constantly against the static forces of those whose ambitions were satisfied. "Change is the law of life, of international life as well as national and personal life. If we set up barriers to all change, we make it certain that there will be violent and explosive change." He often discussed these views with me and he was puzzled that they were not universally held.

The world would have to accept the fact of change, he felt. The only hope was to guide it—as in the case of adventurous nationalistic drives, some justified, some not—into channels less dangerous to the peace of the world. "Those who desire a change in the *status quo* and to acquire what others have," he wrote, "must accept the peaceful and sometimes slow procedures established by the authority and renounce the quick and direct methods of force."

He believed that the way to deal with Communism was to use pressure to back our ideals of freedom and justice, but also to be pragmatic about the facts of diplomatic life—to accept the "practical" means when it did not subvert our ends. On October 17, before setting out for a trip to Taiwan, he had given a television interview to the British Broadcasting Corporation for release on October 23. He had distinguished between "recognizing Red China as a fact" and dealing with it and granting diplomatic recognition—an act, in

his view, that would turn over valuable assets to Red China and would result in subversion and the probable overthrow of the government in Formosa. So, he said, the practical policy of "realism" in negotiating, but without diplomatic recognition, had many advantages. "Indeed, I suspect that the United States has had more continuous serious dealings with Communist China than any other free-world country over the last 10 years."

In this same broadcast, William Clark, American representative of the BBC, asked about the Secretary's health:

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if I could ask you one at least rather more personal question, which is this: You have been Secretary of State now for 6 pretty gruelling years, and you seem to be doing very well and very healthy on it. Tell me, what is it that keeps you going? Is it faith, hope, or do you somehow enjoy all the pressures and the power that go with this great post?

A. You know, I don't think anybody is a very good analyst of himself, and I have never psychoanalyzed myself; so I don't really know the answer to this. But I can say this, Mr. Clark: These are times of tremendous importance. Anybody who has a tradition, as exists in my family, of public service in the international field cannot but feel the challenge of these times. And when you have a President, such as President Eisenhower, whom I consider a very great President, one who himself knows a great deal about international affairs, problems of war and peace—if he says, "I think you are the fellow to carry this job at this time," I think one cannot but take satisfaction and do one's best to justify the faith that President Eisenhower puts in you. And I think it is that perhaps more than anything else that keeps me going.

He did not indicate at this time the minor physical discomfort diagnosed as diverticulitis, which was beginning to limit his diet. He ended this dialogue with a statement about the relations between Britain and America, that in his belief, "never since this nation became independent has there been the close cooperation that exists at the present time."

Meanwhile, the public interest was to shift almost completely from the Far East.

At the end of October the Secretary had reason to think that the Chinese Communists did not intend to increase their military effort in the Formosa area to a point likely to provoke general war. In fact, they were shifting from emphasis on active hostilities to the idea of coprosperity for the Asian nations, excluding American and other Western influences.

The indications in the Secretary's press conference of November 7 were that attention was focused on Europe again, with special emphasis on testing and disarmament negotiations. From July 1, when the agenda for the conference of experts of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee was adopted, to August 21, when its report was accepted, the conference had been meeting in Geneva to study the complex problem of detection of nuclear tests. It sometimes seemed as if the goal of discovery and control receded before the scientific measures to refine and to hide atomic tests and the entire complex of nuclear action. Nevertheless, the careful, and often frustrating, work continued until August 21; a number of conclusions had been reached. The experts from Western countries, and from the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, joined in the specific recommendations.

It was something of a shock to public opinion when in the midst of the active exchanges and talks of the period, the State Department announced that on September 30 the U.S.S.R. had set off two nuclear tests. The proposals of the United States for control of nuclear testing submitted on October 10 in the United Nations were followed shortly, on November 4, by a related resolution, concurred in by the United States. These were intended to end the paralysis of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee sitting in Geneva, and to bring together various proposals for ending nuclear testing, for effective measures against surprise attack, and for the peaceful use of outer space.

The Secretary, in answer to a question at the November 7 press conference as to whether there had been any progress in the eighteen years since the end of World War II, said he thought there had been some progress; we had passed beyond the realm of generalities and were "getting down to what you might call 'brass tacks' talks." He admitted that the talks in Geneva on the suspension of nuclear testing, initiated after many conversations with the U.S.S.R. in the spring, had not advanced rapidly. He indicated that he had more hope for the coming discussion of the prevention of surprise attack. However, he said of the Soviets, "We cannot in fairness charge them with bad faith in having continued to conduct the tests. . . . I do not think we have ever attached a proviso in the sense that we would not have talks unless they agreed to suspend testing while the talks were going on" in Geneva.

One matter that had been under consideration for some weeks but which had not been given attention in the newspapers was a com-

munication from President de Gaulle about the leadership in Europe. As one reporter put it, "General de Gaulle's proposals have been interpreted by some as suggesting that the United States, Britain and France in effect set themselves up as a super directorate which would mastermind Western strategy." Dulles indicated that "it is not quite in order for me to discuss this letter here because the letter is a private communication. But I do not myself interpret the French proposal as a proposal to set up a sort of superdirectorate of the world." He did refer back to 1955, when, as a result of a speech he made in New York, the "three wise men"—Edwin Noel Plowden, Jean Monnet, Averell Harriman—were appointed to study the European Alliance. It is clear from events as they unfolded, that any proposition of this sort—to the extent that it was put forward—was not supported by the President and his advisers. The dangers of moves in such directions were obvious, and the strengthening of the European Economic Community was to lead in a different direction.

Because of the recent Congressional election he was queried about bipartisanship. He explained that he thought he knew about it; "I am not worried at all about partisanship of the people with whom I deal, whether they are partisan Republicans or partisan Democrats, because I do not think any of them who have stature are going to introduce partisanship into foreign policy."

Bipartisanship was always important to Foster, but not always easy to carry out. In 1950, for example, it came to his notice that President Truman was annoyed at something he had said or done. I got wind of this fact and inquired among my Democratic friends in a confidential manner as to what had happened to influence President Truman. I was told that the President had thought, when Foster had returned from Paris in 1948 as his representative, that he had "reported" to Thomas E. Dewey before coming to Washington to confer with the newly elected President about the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. I discovered this was not true and endeavored to pass along this information to a man close enough to the President so that I would be sure it would come to the President's attention. As far as I could ascertain, President Truman was reassured and his attitude toward Foster influenced in his favor. In any case, Foster was soon called down to Washington.

When Truman asked Foster in 1951 to serve further as adviser and consultant on foreign-policy matters, Foster told me he had reminded the President that he was a Republican. As I remember, Truman indicated, "You are a good American and seek the same

aims in international affairs as the rest of us. When the time comes for elections, I expect you will get out and fight the Democrats for all you are worth. Meanwhile, before that, we can work together."

No desire for cooperation for its own sake could, in Foster's view, change the locus of responsibility for final decisions. As long as the President held the same aims and standards, Foster, as a sound American *and* as a Republican, would support and further these aims; there was no serious difficulty in this regard in 1950 and 1951. If there was a difference in view on Korea or on Formosa, the President stood for his views, and those who disagreed had to fight for what they believed to be right. The President remained responsible.

In the years 1953 to 1959 there was to be no important foreign-policy measure advanced by the President and the Secretary that did not, sometimes after a struggle, secure bipartisan support in Congress. The long debate and sometimes sharp exchanges that preceded such agreement were, in the mind of the Secretary, an essential, though time-consuming, part of his job. In this respect, his thinking advanced as time went on beyond the questioning of the scope of his work, which made him hesitate in November 1952 before accepting the Secretaryship. He had had over several decades an evolving philosophy of bipartisanship and valued greatly the ability of such men as Senators John Sparkman, Mike Mansfield, William Fulbright, Paul Douglas, Hubert Humphrey, Walter George, Congressman James P. Richards, of many other Congressmen, and a dozen other Democratic political leaders as well as the Republicans whom he knew and talked with on many occasions.

Since the stakes in terms of national welfare and survival were high, the representatives of the people, he believed, must know, understand, and if possible support action by the President in the foreign field.

The news conference on Friday had covered a wide area. The scene was to change as attention was focused again on the Far East. The Secretary was airborne on Sunday for Seattle, the Colombo Plan meeting, and the discussion of economic development.

The conference in Seattle, with President Eisenhower and Under Secretary Douglas Dillon, gave an opportunity to talk informally with the representatives of the eighteen participating countries (Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaya, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, together with Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo, the United States and Vietnam) about recent events

in the Far East. Secretary Dulles, chosen for the chair, expressed his keen interest in this informal, noninstitutionalized, but genuinely effective, organization. He said:

This is a unique institution. Without charter, constitution, or written rules, and operating on the basis of procedures developed through custom, the Colombo Plan has come to be a symbol of the economic hopes and aspirations of many hundreds of millions of free people. In its 8 years of existence it has expanded from 7 to 18 members. Today it provides a forum where their representatives can meet harmoniously to advance a common objective.

It is a simple objective: to contribute on a cooperative basis to the economic development of an important area of the free world. The simplicity of this objective, however, should not obscure its importance to the world generally or its significance to the Colombo Plan countries particularly. For now, in midcentury, we are increasingly aware that economic growth is as much an element in the survival of our civilization as the deterring of aggression.

On this same day, November 10, in a speech in Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev demanded that the four powers end their occupation of Berlin.

In spite of the significance of the success in the Middle and Far East, discontent with the Secretary's policies had long been smoldering. Senator Joseph S. Clark, Jr., of Pennsylvania, voiced these sentiments in a speech before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on November 11, 1958. The headline in the *New York Times* read: "Senator Clark Asks Removal of Dulles to Halt Disaster." The article reported him as saying that the Secretary should be removed, since he had become a symbol of the country's dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration, and that it was no secret that Dulles had lost the confidence of many of our allies and of "many of us in Congress."

Senator Jacob K. Javits addressed the group after Senator Clark. The President has the right to have whom he chooses carry out his policy, he said; anti-Communist governments in Asia and in Europe had been strengthened, and aid had emboldened Yugoslavia to dissent from Communist control. We have firm relations with Germany and better understanding with India, he declared. He asked for bipartisan dedication to "peace leadership" and suggested that Senator Clark was already starting on the political campaign of 1960.

This debate took place as many were beginning to assess the looming crisis over Berlin; it did not arouse the response that it might have

evoked from the public before the evidence of leadership in the Middle East and the end of shelling of the Offshore Islands.

On the 13th, after the sessions on the Colombo Plan, Foster made a speech before the Seattle Chamber of Commerce. He sharpened the contrast between the strategy of consent and the strategy of duress, which others later flattered by imitating. He also explained that the Colombo deliberations were concerned with the betterment of life for 700 million people: "Implicit in all this was the awareness of the individual as a being endowed with human dignity."

He had not been able to devote much time to personal matters since the Offshore Islands crisis. But he did respond spiritedly to a letter from Art Eldridge, who had claimed a nickel bet that the Secretary protested. And on November 16, Janet and Foster came to my house in McLean for lunch. They always arrived on the dot. Foster wore his usual comfortable greenish tweed; Janet was also informally dressed. Frequently Pepi came with them, and the excitement of their city poodle with my own country-roaming poodles added to the lively atmosphere of family banter and more serious discussion of the world. We had cocktails on the terrace. We would cook a soufflé, and often had either a cheese soufflé with a fine European-type green salad or else a chocolate soufflé for desert.

Although in the earlier years I had frequently invited others after consultation with Foster, we found occasionally that the persistent talk on current matters charged the atmosphere with questions and problems. The last few times he was with me in the country he preferred to have only the family and to talk on a completely personal, informal basis.

There were, on this Sunday, some words on Khrushchev's November 10 speech in the Sports Palace, in which he threatened the Allies, saying they must leave Germany. "What could they mean by a 'free city'?" Foster asked.

During lunch, I remember Foster looking at the nine-by-twelve-foot map of the world, which covered most of my dining-room wall, and pointing out some remote islands off the coast of Africa near Madagascar—the Seychelles. He speculated on the possibility of visiting them and on the delights of exploring such a remote and unspoiled place.

None of us swam this Sunday. We joked about who would be the first one to go in when the temperature passed fifty degrees in the spring. Foster said he thought I should wait for sixty degrees, but that fifty-five degrees would suit him. He strolled about the garden,

looking particularly at some maples he had scraped for me in order to clear away diseased spots. The trees were flourishing.

Since he had planned afternoon appointments and work on a speech to be given at Cleveland, he and Janet left as usual at a little after three. He was to come once more to my home, on Thanksgiving Day.

When Foster went to Cleveland to address the Fifth World Order Study Conference of the National Council of Churches on November 18, he had with him a manuscript of serious intent and of considerable scope. It reviewed the urgent objects of concern in recent weeks. It was in a way a *tour d'horizon*, over which, as usual, he had worked personally since his return from Seattle the previous Sunday morning, glancing through the material prepared for him by his staff in the Public Relations Bureau, but rethinking and rephrasing. Those who worked with him knew that what they gave him as a foil or as a collection of information would not be the address that he would write on his yellow pad in his own library of an early morning.

In Cleveland he looked forward to speaking to many old friends. There would be a number of them there who were with him when he worked on the Federal Council of Churches Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, whose first chairman he had become in 1941.

This was the first time for several years that Foster had been asked to talk to a major meeting of the Council of Churches, and he was eager to speak to them.

He emphasized his belief that our duty to our own people could not be properly developed for their peace, well-being, and liberty if we did not hold to the proposition that interdependence was essential. He stated that our concerns were essentially world-wide.

Again, he stressed the problem of adapting to change, which had preoccupied him since his college days. This was, appropriately, the subject of the conference. He identified six areas where the forces for change are conspicuous. These were:

- (1) the change from colonialism to independence
- (2) the changes of accessibility through the frozen arctic regions—
which altered both defense and transport
- (3) the changes of physical power through the splitting of the atom
- (4) the new use of outer space
- (5) the changes and modifications in Soviet Communism induced by the attraction of freedom for people and the failure of external Soviet threats

(6) an acceleration toward a world of order.

In discussing the progress of the free world, he expounded his view of the organization of peace, the settlement of disputes, the continuous round of negotiation, resulting, after long effort, in agreements in some cases, and also the urgent need for disarmament. In concluding, he stressed the simple virtues of the founding fathers, which brought about the "Great American Experiment," an achievement destined to catch the imaginations of men everywhere. (He had written in *War, Peace and Change* that in a well-ordered society, virtues like "energy, industry, clean-living, thrift, efficiency, intelligence, willingness to forego present ease in the interest of future gains" would be commended. Characteristics like "indolence, dissipation, waste, inefficiency, stupidity, lack of tenacity" would be penalized. This was, really, a category of the virtues of men that he himself approved and of the vices that he condemned.)

"We must take as our working hypothesis," he said at Cleveland, "that what is necessary is possible. We must assume that what man by his ingenuity has created, man by his wisdom, resourcefulness, and discipline can harness and control."

These words were part of his religious belief, rooted in his early training and in the influence of his father and mother, strengthened and nourished through seventy years. He went to church, sometimes alone, sometimes with his wife or with others, because he believed that man, fallible and limited in vision, could not meet the grave responsibilities placed upon him without help from a divine being. He considered that his own personal strength and ability to stand firm for the right needed to be renewed and to be guided by the inspiration of the faith that must lie behind the works.

Some years before, in 1947, at the New York *Herald Tribune* Forum, he had explained the relationship between his religious convictions and his political philosophy:

The sovereignty of man rests upon a religious estimate of his nature. Without that estimate he tends to slavery.

A society of freedom cannot exist for long except on a foundation of belief that man is a child of God. If every human being does not contain within himself a spark of the Divine and a right to self-development in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience and of his own mind, then a society which dignifies the individual is purely a matter of expediency. It may be argued that a free society is the most expedient society because it is the most productive society. Certainly societies of freedom have, through their inventiveness, resourcefulness, and industriousness, developed

a productivity never equaled by any society of dictatorship or despotism. . . .

There is no factual way to prove or disprove estimates of the future. But the Marxist thesis must be totally rejected if one accepts the religious view of the nature of man. Under that view, slavery, however expedient, was never right. Under that view, the despotism of a police state can never be right. It might be that a time would come when men would be more productive and more secure if they were treated as domesticated animals and driven to pasture and back to shelter under the direction of some superior human will. It is unnecessary to argue that point if one accepts, as did our forebears, the Christian view that man is destined to be more than a material producer and that his chief end is something more than physical security. The religious conception of the nature of man is the premise and the only premise from which political freedom surely follows.

He had in his own mind a clear concept of what the church should do and the role it should play. It was a concept often expressed by our father, Allen Dulles, to all of us. The righteousness of the individual was to be fostered and strengthened by the spiritual communion of the church. The principles and moral purpose must be molded by the church, though the specific political issues were not to be argued from the pulpit. Man, in touch with the highest spiritual force, must go out from the churches to his work and his responsibilities as a citizen with renewed vision and act according to his own personal convictions. Yet this did not mean that the churches should never take a stand; as he wrote in the *Christian Century* in 1952:

. . . moral principles are not something to be relegated to Sunday services in our churches. They can be brought boldly and unashamedly into the arena of world affairs. There is a moral law which, no less than physical law, undergirds our world. It is relevant to the corporate life of men and the ordering of human society. It *can* be drawn upon—indeed, it *must* be drawn upon—if mankind is to escape chaos and recurrent war.

His speech was broad of character, not aimed at defending the foreign policy in the Far East. Those who favored his policy as well as those with different views did not find new arguments to change their opinions. Meanwhile, unknown to him, a move to express opposition had begun. It was to him a real and deeply felt hurt when the group in Cleveland to whom he had talked, and with many of whom he had worked, voted to recommend the recognition of Communist China, after his talk and within a few hours.

Communism and religion could not be reconciled, as he said often in his books and speeches. This view had been expressed ten years earlier by Foster. In 1949, speaking at the First Presbyterian Church, in Watertown, in his father's old pulpit, he had said:

I saw that there could be no just and durable peace except as men held in common certain simple and elementary religious beliefs: belief that there is a God, that he is the author of a moral law which they can know, and that he imparts to each human being a spiritual dignity and worth which all others should respect. Wherever these elementary truths are widely rejected, there is both spiritual and social disorder.

That fact is illustrated by fascism and communism. These are, in the main, atheistic and antireligious creeds. Orthodox Communists believe that there is neither God nor moral law, that there is no such thing as universal and equal justice, and that human beings are without soul or sacred personality. They are free of the moral restraints and compulsions which prevail in a religious society, and they think it is quite right to use force and violence to make their way prevail.

He had not anticipated the nature of the discussion on China problems that was to occupy a portion of the latter part of the session after his speech. Nor did he realize that some of the leaders whom he had not seen recently were convinced that United States foreign policies in the Far East should be altered. He did not present a brief for his views and therefore did not bring forward arguments that would bear on the later discussion on China policy.

He felt a deep sense of disappointment, not so much because the resolution on China was against the government's established position, as because he felt that confusion and misunderstanding were later reflected in the resolution's attempt to reconcile the safeguarding of "the rights of the people of Taiwan and of Korea," with the taking of steps "toward the inclusion of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and for its recognition by our government." As he had said on other occasions, the immediate situation did not permit such reconciliation. Thus he felt he would be faced with difficulties in his relations with a group who would continue to exert an important and widespread influence. The strength and constructive action of the National Council and the importance of their spiritual role was in his mind a major element in maintaining the faith and steadfastness of the nation. However, the churches' involvement in some aspects of the practical politics of international

relations, he felt, might hamper their capacity to bring inspiration to those of varying political convictions.

He left for his rest at Duck Island with a feeling of sadness that some of the churchmen had weakened in the face of pressures, as he wrote to his sister Margaret.

To Foster religion was both a private and a public matter. In the effort to serve the highest being, guidance could come from the pastor and the church, but the ultimate expression of man's faith was so special and unique in the case of each person that it could not be fully bared to the cold air of public debate. Mainly in common worship and in the expression of a few basic principles could he manifest openly his deep convictions.

As Secretary, he opposed the suggestion of newsmen that photographs be taken during the prayer at the opening of the Cabinet meeting. He deplored the news treatment of the church services at the National Presbyterian Church and always tried to slip in and out of the building, unnoticed, by a side door. He was proud and gratified, however, that he had been allowed to stand in the pulpit his father had held in Watertown, New York, and preach a sermon one October Sunday in 1955.

He practiced and spoke in a manner some thought moralizing, emphasizing the power of religion and the dominance of moral law. Yet he did not seek to impose his own views on others, and did not seem troubled by their range of opinions—one of his sons, for example, became a Jesuit.

He and his brother and three sisters had been deeply affected by a home atmosphere in which the reverence and affection for both parents was so intimately associated with religious training and the work of the church that it was not easy to separate the one from the other and therefore to share with others. His religion was deep in the core of his being.

His sister Margaret said, "His faith was, in a sense, inherited, and was strengthened by the lessons he learned early as he encountered the realities in the world in which he lived."

He had said to her one day, "Most decisions have some ethical or moral values—I have to study a situation to see what action seems to be right or wrong. Action, then, has to be formulated irrespective of popular appeal."

AN ISLAND

Forty-three degrees (43.40) north and seventy-six (76.30) degrees west—twenty miles west of the mouth of the St. Lawrence, in the wide east end of Lake Ontario—lay his island, little known, remote, unspoiled, and enduring.

Duck Island was the goal of adventurous sailing for Foster when he was a boy. It was to be, in later years, his lasting delight.

During November Foster had considered problems involving every part of the globe. He was preparing for his visit both to Mexico and to the NATO meeting in December. He was faced with the growing tensions of Berlin. There were visits from Japan, Thailand, Pakistan, and France. There was a new Ambassador from India, Mahommedali Currim Chagla. There was a departing Ambassador from Portugal, Luis Esteves Fernandes. There were problems in connection with de Gaulle's proposals on NATO and European defense, nuclear testing, the free-trade area, the Moscow fair, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Cyprus, and the Dominican Republic, Palestinian refugees, and the new nation of Guinea in Africa. Walter Lippmann's long conversation with Khrushchev was on the agenda for consideration; so was Peiping's brief relaxation, the "one hundred flowers" doctrine and its later liquidation of more than three hundred thousand recalcitrant Chinese.

Foster needed a respite from crisis and so he flew north with Janet, taking his dog, Pepi, along. Pepi, incidentally, was named for Pepin le Bref, an ancestor of the Dulleses and Averys—they were amused at the common ancestry dating from the Middle Ages.

There were only a few people on November 17 at the small Dexter-Watertown airport, then served by Colonial (later Eastern) and Mohawk air lines. A few pictures were taken by the Watertown *Daily Times*. Then Dick Benson slung the red and blue sailor bags with the duffel into the waiting amphibian Grumman Widgeon. Foster watched Pepi jump eagerly into the small plane; the aides said good-by and returned in the Air Force plane to Washington.

Where he had once navigated his catboats and the yawl *Menemsha* through the twelve-foot-wide, seven-foot-deep gap of the outer harbor of Fisherman's Cove, facing northeast, into the inner lagoon bordered with rushes and landlocked, he was now in these years set down in the amphibian Widgeon piloted by Benson, a trusted friend with the unique gift of unusual flying ability, combined with rare understanding of wind and weather and wave formations. The cold November winds were reported by the Watertown *Daily Times* as gusting into the sixties, and the waves in the harbor ran to six feet high. Both the landing and take-off were hazardous.

There was a jeep at the dock to take them and their gear from Fisherman's Cove to the cabin on the north bluff. The track had to swing southwest half a mile to the far shore and then double back to avoid the swamp and cove before it gained the higher ground facing north and protected, as well as partly concealed, by several maple and hickory trees and by an ancient and bold, spreading oak. Here in the tight little home the broad fireplace was blazing; yellow lamp-light shone on the oval mahogany table, the two easy chairs, and on the polished logs of the cabin.

Preparation had been made by the lighthouse keeper. The dark evening did not close down until Foster had checked the eight or nine buckets of water standing ready, and the firewood piled conveniently for the long dusk. It was time for the early evening meal. Outside, the wind whistled through the trees.

When Foster was fourteen, in 1902, the older children, with their parents and a few others, set out from Henderson Harbor for the Galloo Islands, and on further to the Ducks, in three small boats. The boats, the largest of them the *Stella K.*, had oars and sails, but no motors. The distance was twenty miles or more; the course in the open lake was fifteen miles of unprotected water. The trip could only be made with a favorable wind, but even when the weather was good, the wind could change in the hours it took to come and go. The family had dinner on Yorkshire, the smaller of the two main Duck Islands, and returned halfway that afternoon, sleeping in a farmhouse on Galloo Island. This was the first of many trips that Foster was to make to his favorite spot, the bluffs and bays and wooded glades of Main Duck. Main Duck was for all intents and purposes two islands; but Yorkshire, separated by a stretch of water, could be referred to separately. It was called Main Duck as well as Yorkshire. Foster was to buy both of them later.

Foster's first cruises here as a boy had been within a rectangular

eastern area of the lake, approximately fifteen miles square, with the foot of Galloo Island as the western corner, with the mainland, Point Peninsula, as the northern end, and the curving indented shore of Henderson Bay as the base. Here were rocky points and sheltered beaches, bluffs heading north and falling sharply to the wave line, marshes, cliffs, and long fingers of land with their inviting clear waters, their hazardous shoals. Bell buoys and lonely lighthouses marked the hidden rocks and the safe cruising waters.

These were the early sailing areas, before Foster and his friends, often Allen, sometimes his sisters or other companions from away, explored the more distant Canadian inlets and shores. Soon after, in 1906, his grandfather, John W. Foster, gave him the catboat *Number Five* (never given another name) and he explored Duck Island for himself. This small bit of land, a mere speck on larger maps of the world, was to be for him a haven of special value. It was to be his favorite place of rest, a refuge to which he never tired of turning.

The catboat that his grandfather gave him, and which was to mean so much to him in the next few years, was delivered to the cottage at Henderson on July 11, 1906. Although there is an impression that it came earlier, the diary indicates that he was in Europe in 1903 and 1904, and that it did not come in 1905—before that he had sailed mainly in the small skiffs the fishermen used. After the catboat came, every day that there was sufficient wind, he alone, or often with his mother or with other members of his family, would take the boat for short sails or longer cruises. One of his college classmates wrote, "I recall . . . a visit to Henderson Harbor in September of 1906, when he had got me a job tutoring his friend and classmate Sewall Camp and I had a weekend at Henderson. On Sunday your grandfather let us sail to Sackets to go to church, which we duly did and went home with the Camps for lunch. We stole some flat stones from the dock for ballast on a rough beat home. But all that has little of apparent destiny." The summer of his eighteenth year passed quickly.

On the bright summer days with a southwest breeze, which were characteristic in July and August, there was constant rivalry as to who would go fishing in the small guide boats, priority going to Foster as the older boy, but with the younger children having their chance from time to time. Foster, meanwhile, was learning sailing technique from Will Stevens.

This wise man, who had died in February 1958, at the age of ninety-eight, had taken my grandfather fishing for more than twenty years. He was tall and thin, weathered to a dark brown, with keen eyes and a sharp, gray mustache. He was reputed to be the most suc-

cessful guide and fisherman in the region and to have the keenest weather sense. When the fleet of little skiffs left the south shore, there was a race as to when they would reach the bar between the islands two miles out and then, as the boats became dim to us watching on the mainland, a guessing game about where the fish were biting.

From Will Stevens, Foster gained, I believe, his realization that few words, and these to the point, were worth many long sentences. Will never used four words if two would suffice. If the question was foolish, he frequently would not answer. Foster learned more than sailing from this man, who was admired and loved by us all even though occasionally we felt the irony of his pointed remarks. Sometimes, in the State Department, when I heard Foster talking or saw him listening to one of the staff, I thought of Will Stevens.

If we approach the island as small-boat sailors do, and as Foster did in those early days, from the south, we barely see it as we pass the foot of Galloo. Only when the green of the cedars fades southward to blue do we find to the west the slate-gray line becoming the more solid tree and rock that, perhaps eight miles away, is the shore of Duck, flanked by its sister island, Yorkshire. As we approach the broadening land, firm above the waves, the islands gradually separate until we can see the channel, a quarter of a mile of more choppy sea over the fifteen-to-twenty-foot shoal, which we cross on a northwest course.

The lee of the island is welcome to those who on windy days have been fighting the waves six and even occasionally eight or ten feet high. Heavy storms westward up the lake, driven by the prevailing wind, run two hundred miles from Niagara to the mouth of the St. Lawrence. A small boat is often hidden by the rush of water. Comfort and safety hang on the skill of the navigator and the ratio of the boat length to the contour and span of the waves. A small motorboat, or even a sailing yawl, is swept high, to swing down the steep incline. These waves do not disturb the lower depths of the deep lake.

Ontario is not like Erie, its western neighbor. It is much deeper, often more than seven hundred feet, with a seven hundred eighty maximum. Approximately one third of its waters lie below sea level. In these dark depths there is no disturbance from man, little from nature.

The inland sea's few islands are scattered in the east end of the lake, near the mouth of the St. Lawrence. They stand apart in dignity, each with its own characteristic limestone layers of cliff and pebbly beach. They do not crowd each other in the scenic exaggeration of the Thousand Islands. They vary in interest, shape, and in the wild life found

on their shores and beaches. One island, Stony, has a small inland lake with waterfowl, perch, and eels, bordered by reeds and calm cedar-shaded green slopes, almost three miles long. Only Main Duck has the conformation of a bastion—a barrier across the line of current. Foster was always fascinated by the way Duck and Yorkshire lay across the channel of the water's flow. He saw the other islands streamlined and contoured, while the headlands of Duck rose almost at right angles to wind and waves as they swept down the lake.

To the east of the island, at Henderson, was a band of water somewhat less open to the onslaught of the more severe storms. This area, which was the main fishing ground for the small-mouth bass, had its "three-day blows" from the north, its gusty south winds, its occasional thunderstorms; but it was more protected from the prevailing wind. The tradition was that the rain was funneled down the lake to the north through the St. Lawrence area, or moved south through the Mohawk Valley, missing the bay. Typically, the bay at Henderson had many blue and gold days, which the family used to call "grandmother days." On these calm summer mornings Mrs. Foster would sometimes gather a demoted purple lace evening dress around her and go out with her husband. My grandfather, the white-whiskered John W. Foster—"General Foster," as he was called locally—sat in the stern of the clinker-built skiff sailed or rowed by Will Stevens, standing forward lean and tall in the boat.

These fair days set the childhood imprint of beauty on all those who grew up there. But Foster preferred stronger winds and further reaches of rough water, where the stamina of the growing men was tested and trained. He welcomed the struggle with adverse conditions.

He foresaw the increasing responsibilities that would come with our entrance into the war and knew he could not disappear on long cruises. He had dreamed of owning Main Ducks for many years. He sought and found a substitute in Duck Island, and bought it that year. Much of the pleasure of cruising he enjoyed in the simplicity and isolation of the island. Here he used a small catboat for sailing, an outboard skiff for fishing and exploring, and a canoe for quiet evenings. Here he could bathe from the rocky ledges and observe the wildlife—the deer, the duck, the partridge—and the flights of the birds in migration, improve the paths and doctor the trees around the small cabin. In their early years there, a small herd of buffalo roamed the island, but they moved too far out on the ice, broke through, and drowned.

For seventeen years, whenever he could, and usually five or six times a year, preferably in early spring and late fall, Foster and Janet would

go to this congenial spot. Their life on the island illustrates unmistakably Foster's and Janet's extraordinary congeniality. Though sometimes in her later visits she worried about the isolation from help in case of an emergency, she was ready and eager for the days of quiet enjoyment, with no social claims or interruptions from a clamoring telephone. The manner in which they shared the work, and enjoyed the warm sunny days and the more rigorous activities of the early spring and late fall, shows a mutual understanding familiar to all those who knew them.

Before their marriage in 1912, Foster and Janet had canoed and picnicked together near Auburn while Foster was studying for the bar. Janet's exquisite charm was a constant delight to him. Many years later, when they were going to the dinner for Queen Elizabeth and Janet came down the stairs in a shimmering blue-gray satin dress to join him, handsome in his white tie and tails, I heard him say, or thought I did, "This is a queen—my queen."

They traveled together and spent most evenings together. But only at Duck was there time to read aloud, to prepare the meal together, to care for the well-tended cabin, to explore the woods and meadows. Here in the spring they tapped the maple trees for syrup, and occasionally in the fall they did some hunting.

At nine o'clock—on a usual evening—Foster would bank the fire, put out the lamp, and they would turn in for ten hours of unbroken sleep. By seven he would be up, lighting the fires. After breakfast, for more than an hour they both cleaned up, and Foster renewed the water supply, drawn in buckets, with block and tackle attached to a wire anchored beyond the bluff in deep water. The main part of the rig was an old "stay" from the mast of the *Menemsha*; the block and tackle lightened the hauling of heavy pails. Eight or nine buckets were set in a row to be ready for the day and night. Foster split wood from the dry logs piled behind the cabin.

The small sailboat, the Beetle Cat, and the canoe, sometimes the small outboard motorboat, were drawn up on the beach near the cabin. In any of these boats they could cut across the curving bays indenting the shore to Fisherman's Cove, to check on supplies of gasoline or food in the "stone house," or cruise farther east to Yorkshire, which was even wilder than Duck, with its tangled vines and bushes. There they would sometimes sun and swim off the rocks. The favorite swimming place, at least in the early days, was a cliff from which the rocks descended in large uneven steps, with jutting cedar roots for handholds. Here one could lie on a warm limestone

shelf or dive from several rock platforms at various levels into crystal-clear green water. If fish were caught, and Duck was a particularly good place for black bass as well as other fish, Foster cleaned them.

Many have wondered how Foster spent his time in this isolated spot. He wrote some notes on this subject himself, on the basis of which the New York *Herald Tribune* published a story on his life at Duck.

WHAT DO WE DO AT DUCK ISLAND?

What do we do at Duck Island? We keep ourselves living very comfortably and that takes considerable time and effort. The elementals of this take about 6½ hours of each day, leaving, for extras, about five hours of each day and an hour and a half before going to bed. The six hours are approximately standardized and much the same all the year around—except for morning swim. The hour and a half before bed-time is also standardized, leaving five hours for rest and recreation depending on the season.

7:00—J.F.D. generally gets up. (Daylight Saving Time, on which we usually run, irrespective of the time of year, so as to coincide more nearly with the sunlight.)

7:00-7:30—F. gets open fire (and iron stove if it is cold) going. Heats hot water and squeezes lemon juice for J.

8:00—J. gets up, and if water warm enough,

8:00-8:30—swim and eat oranges on rocks.

8:00-8:30—Set table and prepare breakfast.

8:30-9:00—Eat breakfast.

9:00—Final cup of coffee and "log" notes.

9:00-10:30—Wash and dry dishes, F. & J. both. F. dumps garbage, slops, and contents of wastepaper baskets, hauls water, splits small wood and brings logs and small wood into cabin for day's fires. Fills kerosene lamps, etc.

J. dusts and sweeps, polishes tables, makes beds, replaces burned candles, etc.

F. shaves and then both relax. J. does a crossword puzzle, and F. makes "log" notes and checks on birds seen during morning.

10:30-5:00—Depends greatly on season and weather. Early spring and fall—walks, looking for deer, birds and flowers. Tree surgery, fertilizing, etc. In early spring, tap maples for syrup. Cut down dead trees, sawing and chopping. Target practice with 22 rifle. Duck and shore bird shooting in fall. Summer—fishing, sailing in "Beetle Cat." Canoeing. To Yorkshire by sailboat or outboard motorboat for swimming off rocks. Trips to fishermen's cove, checking on supplies in Stone House, and buying trout or white-fish from commercial fishermen. Clean black bass, perch or rock

bass we have caught. Pick wild strawberries, raspberries, or blueberries, according to season.

On rainy days F. often works on speeches, particularly before dinner. J. typewrites for him.

4:30 or thereabouts—Pre-dinner swim or wash. Plan dinner. (Meals are quite elaborate and are carefully thought out.)

5:00-6:00—Cook dinner (largely over open fire).

5:30-6:00—Cocktails and hors d'oeuvres, out-of-doors if weather permits.

6:00-7:00—Dinner.

7:00-7:30—Cognac and cheese, out-of-doors if weather permits.

7:30-8:00—Clearing table, washing dishes, etc.

8:00-8:30—Walk or canoe if weather permits.

8:30-9:00—In bathrobes, in front of fire. J. reads aloud, some book of travel or adventure. Highballs.

9:00 or thereabouts—Bank fire and to bed.

Since life largely centers around eating, typical breakfasts and dinners are given. (No luncheons)

BREAKFAST—Fruit—Oranges, bananas, local berries, other fruit in season.

Cereal—Oatmeal, or cold dry, according to season. Heavy cream.

Meat, Fish, Eggs—Corned beef hash with eggs; fresh black bass or other fried fish with salt pork; ham or bacon with eggs, creamed chicken (left over) on toast, etc.

Honey or Marmalade on toast made over open fire.

DINNER—Cocktails (J. martini, F. rye) with appetizers: hickory nuts from Island; raw carrots and celery; tinned lobster, crab or anchovies; broiled giblets, etc., or pate de foie gras. Hot hors d'oeuvres on Japanese habachi, making blinis for caviar and sour cream, broiled mushrooms, etc.

Soup—tinned (wide choice) or from chicken or beef stock we have made. Or, broiled "lobster tails" or cold boiled fish with mayonnaise.

Entree—Meat (generally chops, beefsteak, chicken or veal cutlet) or Fish (Lake Trout au Court Bouillon). Chops and steak broiled over open fire. Chicken similarly broiled or else boiled with rice. Veal cutlets dredged in flour, cooked in skillet with water and served with mushroom sauce. Squab chicken on spit before open fire.

Two Green Vegetables, Potatoes or Rice.

Sweet—Pie or homemade pudding, such as apple betty, bread pudding, rice pudding custard; cookies or homemade cakes or gingerbread, canned fruit; canned babas au rhum, etc.

Salad with French dressing in warm weather.

Cheese—Black Diamond Canadian Cheddar, with pie or, usually, with cognac after dinner. June 1958.

In many ways this trip in November 1958 was like several score of earlier sojourns on Duck.

The food was carefully planned, according to the long-standing custom and the lists prepared over the years by Foster and Janet, and stocked for their use by Bob Hart, who took his motorboat or flew over from Chaumont before each visit.

It was rarely that Foster or Janet ate dessert in Washington, but with only two meals a day and long hours of outdoor and indoor activity at Duck, they usually had pie, a pudding, or some other sweet. After the meal the simple dishwashing did not take long with both helping; the rest of the evening was spent by the fire on cooler days.

On rainy days Foster would work on speeches, often consulting Janet on a draft. Janet would typewrite on the portable from the yellow-page manuscript. In the afternoon, except in the very coldest weather, they would both swim. Foster had built a series of steps with flat rocks down the edge of the cliff to the beach. Here they swam in calm water, relatively undisturbed by fishermen or passing boats.

The public has always had a considerable curiosity about the island. Although Foster made every effort to safeguard his privacy there, he often talked about his cabin and his life there to his friends. Once he allowed *Life* to send one of their best photographers, Alfred Eisenstaedt, out for a guided tour and he took some splendid pictures.

While in the hospital, Foster was presented with a model of the island, created by a Watertown admirer who had worked night and day to complete it in time.

The log cabin was small, twenty-five feet square. The living room served as bedroom as well, with two day beds in addition to several pieces of antique furniture, mainly bought in Kingston, Canada. There was a small dressing room on the left at the rear, and a kitchen with a butane-gas stove and bottled-gas refrigerator at the right.

Foster had selected each stone for the fireplace from the south shore, and he and Bob Hart hauled them by horse and wagon. Foster laid out the rough-grained boulders on the ground to arrange them in a pattern that would bring out the subtle shades of light green, pink, and gray. The andirons had been designed by him and made at Bob

Hart's order from sections of old railroad tracks. The mantel and side pieces of the fireplace, part of an old shipwreck, were dug out of the gravel by the two men and towed by outboard around the island and hauled up to the cabin site by horses.

The cabin was invisible from the water, and was usually approached over the fields. The lighthouse to the west stood sixty-five feet high, but its tower and swinging beam of light could not be seen from the cabin or the northeast shore.

Many ships, seeking the channel to the St. Lawrence, lost their bearings in rough weather before the advent of lighthouses and other aids to navigation, and came in close to land; they would then turn abruptly to avoid the rocky shoals. As someone said, "You could see the skid marks in the water."

It was not easy to explain the charm of the place to those who did not know it. In fact, Foster did not feel the need of dwelling on the experiences he had there with those who did not already love the water and the woods. The warm cosy fire-lit cabin, the simple tasks, the untouched meadows, the cliffs and rocky ledges were for him an extension of the early boyhood impressions—walks with his father, fishing with his grandfather, sailing with his mother and family and friends, picnics and swims and stormy open-boat struggles with the weather, and then the peace of calm moorings.

On Duck Island the horizons were wider, the repose more complete, a sense of self-sufficiency perhaps more satisfying than elsewhere. When he walked to the lighthouse, somewhat less than a mile, he saw the beacon stark white against the blue water—a main point of warning for lake steamers heading for the upper St. Lawrence and the sea. If he walked to the south shore, he saw the long shelving rock sloping gradually down, a hazardous shore for boats, on which the waves had hurled hundreds of round rocks of varying size, some more than three feet in diameter. They stood in the shallow water like a distant herd of elephants. Nearer, they looked like boulders to serve in some rugged sport of nature, a game to be played by time, with enduring stone for counters. Here the water in the evening ran in red and gold trickles inward over the seamed planes of limestone up to the irregular shore line of dry rocks.

In November 1958 the grass was brown. The oak leaves rattled on the trees. Wildlife, squirrels, deer took shelter. Few birds rode the wind. The arrival at Duck had not been without excitement. The departure was equally difficult. The waves were running high in the little harbor. Every extra bit of equipment—some of the clothing, the shaving kit, and odds and ends—was left behind to lighten the Widg-

eon for the take-off. There was no question of waiting for a calmer day. Benson taxied the short distance, which was in partial lee, and the plane rose into the northern sky, leaving gray waves and white-caps below.

This was Foster's last trip to Duck.

In August 1962 the nine windows and the three doors of the log cabin were closed, the shutters firmly in place. The subtle-textured boulders of the chimney stood square and solid above the low roof. The tackle for hauling water was no longer in place. The sheltering red oak in the past few years had increased its sixteen-foot girth by some fractional centimeters. The weather-scarred, wide-spreading maples cast their flickering shadows over the stripped, oiled, close-fitting logs.

The woodcock and deer were still sporting in the meadows and resting in the glades and marshes. Hundreds of thousands of flame-colored monarch butterflies flashed through the trees in frenzied, yet rhythmic, flight, migrating southward.

I saw the brilliant orange of the setting sun light up the boles of the trees around the cabin. In the early morning, sleeping on the pebbly beach below the cliff, where the cabin overlooks the eastern horizon, I woke to the dawn. The clear gray sky, meeting the water with no line of separation, changed swiftly to a dome of blue and gold as the sun seemed to cleave the still waters in the distant east. The gulls took sudden flight just before the brightness of day, as if surprised that the glory should return after the dark night. The cove below the bluff rippled as the current circled the outer rocks and moved north.

THE BONE IN KHRUSHCHEV'S THROAT

On Monday, November 24, Foster left Duck Island. The waves were running high even in the partial lee of the cove as Benson set the Grumman Widgeon down on the water. This feat, and the climb from the stormy waves, would have been full of peril with anyone less competent at the controls. Dick understood the special winds that buffeted the island and troubled the partially protected harbors. Janet and Foster, holding Pepi, stepped from the small dock into the smaller cockpit. Benson taxied and then climbed safely in the air for an early arrival at Dexter, where the plane from Washington met them. Jerry Greene, Foster's assistant, brought the latest documents and papers. The day was raw and blustery as they flew farther inland.

With preparation for a trip to Mexico at the end of the week and the plans for NATO in December, there was work to do on the plane and more in the office in Washington. The German situation was becoming more critical each day.

The news conference of November 26 found the Secretary convinced that some aspects of the relations with East Germany had not been given adequate attention. He answered questions about what the United States would do at the "checkpoints" on the Autobahn if East Germans appeared to replace Soviet guards in the sentry boxes. He stressed the decision that "we would certainly not deal with them in any way which involved our acceptance of the East German regime as a substitute for the Soviet Union in discharging the obligation and the responsibility of the Soviet Union."

Q. Does that mean that we might deal with them as *agents* of the Soviet Union?

A. We might, yes. There are certain respects now in which minor functionaries of the so-called G.D.R. [German Democratic Republic] are being dealt with by both the Western powers, the

three allied powers, and also by the Federal Republic of Germany. It all depends upon the details of just how they act and how they function. You can't exclude that to a minor degree because it is going on at the present time and has been.

Before he had fully answered the questions, several reporters had their minds on the overseas messages, and hardly heard the full statement. West German officials in Bonn were told that the United States was considering using the East Germans as "agents." The newspapers in Germany came out with large and misleading headlines.

The staff in the State Department was distressed at the commotion. When I got back to my desk from the news conference, Foster was on the line calling me. He asked me to his office. He wanted my comment on whether or not his statement was factually correct. I assured him that it was, but added that it would be misinterpreted in Germany because of the great sensitivity there to all matters affecting access to Berlin.

The statements to the correspondents that day were as firm as to our policy as any that had been given out before. They were emphatic that we would use "any and all means to assure access to the city." They echoed Foster's May 8 address in Berlin.

One reporter pointed out that there had been considerable evidence that on Saturday, the 22nd, the Soviet government would make its proposal about the status of Berlin, and perhaps East Germany, but pointed to the delay so far in following up the threat of November 10. The Secretary answered:

Well, somebody suggested to me that perhaps Mr. Khrushchev had submitted his ideas to his legal advisers and that they had raised some questions which had caused a pause. Because the fact of the matter is that it seemed as though Mr. Khrushchev had spoken initially without the benefit of legal advice, which is, of course, a very bad thing to do [there was laughter]—that he had based his case upon alleged breaches of the Potsdam agreement.

Now, the rights and status of the allies in Berlin and the responsibilities and obligations of the Soviet Union do not in any way whatsoever derive from the Potsdam agreements. Indeed that subject is, I am told by my own legal adviser, not even mentioned in the Potsdam agreements. Therefore to say that because the Potsdam agreements have been violated, the Soviet Union is relieved of obligations which it assumed explicitly some 4 years later, seems to be a *non sequitur*, to put it mildly. Perhaps in order to present a better case, indeed to see whether they had any case at all, the matter is being reviewed.

The official note came the next day, Thanksgiving, the 27th of November.

As usual, cable advice came from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in advance of the actual dispatch of the translated text describing in general terms the long rambling note from Premier Khrushchev, frequently referred to as "a time bomb with a six-months fuse." He said that if an agreed solution to the Berlin problem was not achieved in six months, he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Despite the fact that it was Thanksgiving, most of the senior officials of the Department's German Office were in the State Department building, and Deputy Under Secretary Livingston Merchant called a midmorning meeting. The first task was to determine the extent to which Khrushchev's note differed from his November 10 speech, and then to draft a release for the press indicating that the United States government found the proposal entirely unacceptable. This immediate reaction played a considerable role in convincing Khrushchev of the firmness of the United States position.

For the first time, the Khrushchev threat for unilateral action on Berlin was put in terms of an ultimatum. Although he subsequently denied that it was so firm, it was clear that he threatened to give complete control of land and air access routes to Berlin to the "German Democratic Republic" unless there was agreement for a drastic change in arrangements for Berlin control.

In pressing the diplomatic attack on the Allies over Berlin, Khrushchev had brought to a climax what had been for many months a prime objective, that is, to push the Western powers out of the city and make way for a possible surge of Soviet troops toward the Rhine. This goal was both a military and a political effort. Khrushchev knew then, as he does now, that if Berlin were to be abandoned, it would be a sign of basic weakness and of fear on the part of the West of a clash with Communism. He knew that people everywhere would note this failure to observe solemn guarantees and to justify the faith of the free world in Western leadership.

The grumbling and rumbling in the Kremlin had been going on all through 1958. There had been a number of suggestions for changes in Europe presented in different forms. The plan presented by Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki to Ambassador Beam in Warsaw on February 14, 1958, was an elaboration of the statement presented by Rapacki to the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 2, 1957. The United States took up this matter again on May 3 in a note to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. This plan for a zone

free of nuclear military force in Central Europe was intended, at the instigation of the Soviets, to open up a neutral area between the Rhine and Poland. It was, in a sense, the Soviet reaction to the ideas behind the United States's efforts to develop "broad areas of inspection against surprise attack" and other proposals for disarmament. It was rejected by the three powers, mainly because it was not consistent with the Geneva Agreement of July 23, 1955, which called for German reunification, nor with the more inclusive efforts to "promote real security in Western Europe."

Khrushchev had also proposed a ten-year treaty of cooperation on July 15, 1958, to which the United States replied on August 22. There was a Soviet note on September 18, supporting the request of the East German authorities "for a Commission to prepare a peace treaty." It was answered on September 30, indicating that the United States was "prepared to discuss the German problem in a separate Four Power group to be set up in accordance with the desire of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed in its Aide Memoire of September 9."

Khrushchev's warlike speech of November 10 at the Sports Palace in Moscow, in which he demanded the withdrawal of the United States, Great Britain, and France from Berlin, was a more specific prelude to the diplomatic note of November 27 three weeks later.

Washington had been wary about Berlin since the blockade and before. Policy papers had been prepared. Various officers served as watchdogs on the issues. A special four-power working group had been set up in September to give constant attention to the problem. The President and the Secretary, as well as the National Security Council, had been over the policy and plans frequently during the year. The basic paper, one of the series of top-secret papers to guide action in troubled areas, cleared by the NSC, had been reviewed and slightly revised in midwinter.

There was indeed little that was new in the Khrushchev speech. But the urgency of the tone in which he delivered it commanded special attention for its own sake.

I was asked to take an informal memo for the Secretary from Merchant to McLean, where Foster and Janet were coming for Thanksgiving dinner. His plans included joining a number of diplomats at Mass at St. Matthew's Cathedral before motoring the twelve miles across the Potomac at Chain Bridge and beyond McLean to my house.

The family gathering at 1:30 was gay and, on the surface, care-

free. The children—David and Ann, my son and daughter—served canapés to Foster and Janet, Allen and Clover and their son, Allen, and others. The family group around the table filled the dining room, which was almost a part of the outdoors with its sliding glass panels between the warm inside and the frost-touched field and garden outside. Foster carved the large bronze turkey and exclaimed in mock surprise at the bounty as the traditional American dishes were brought in—the chestnut and other dressings, the candied sweet potatoes, the vegetables, the salad, pies, ice cream. These were all in accord with the time-honored custom, but with the extra Austrian flourishes of Relli and Trudi, who had become good Americans without losing their European skill. Relli, who had come with me from Austria, was particularly fond of Foster, because he always went out to the kitchen to praise her cooking. Relli and Trudi remembered with pleasure that he had once taken over the washing of the dishes according to his own system—of constantly running water. Relli treasures the birthday note he sent her when she was sixty-five.

We hardly had time to settle at the table and bow our heads in a blessing said by my nephew Allen when the telephone began ringing. I answered, first calling Allen to speak to his CIA colleague with “the latest.” Then when it rang again, Foster had to get up and arrange his meeting with Livie Merchant. I was called a few minutes later on some details—Would the press release be prepared? What did the Secretary wish done after lunch? What kind of meetings had he planned? Other interruptions concerned contacts with the British and French.

Only then were we able to turn back to our family talk.

At the salad course, I went out to check on the progress of the translation. The text was to be ready at about three o'clock. But there were no surprises, only the unusual ultimatum—which had to be carefully scrutinized to see what kind of threat it was presumed to hold.

There was time for coffee, brandy, and cigars. (Allen had the best cigars in Washington and always shared them with my guests.) Foster and one or two others had the brandy. The children passed the coffee. Foster and Allen asked me a few questions about the technical aspects of checking access to Berlin and about the probable reaction of the citizens of the city to this new menace to their security.

The dinner interlude was brief, but nevertheless we were able to capture a sense of relaxation before leaving again for the city. Foster went to his house, where the senior officers would gather; Allen went to the CIA office; I to the German Office, where my colleagues were

working on the press release we were planning to give out that afternoon. Telephone calls were put in to "opposite numbers" at the British, French, and German embassies. Work required by the new crisis was in full swing by midafternoon. The Khrushchev note of November 27, which Foster was studying even more intensively than the tough speech of November 10, was replete with propaganda phrases: "The Soviet Union, which had borne the brunt of the struggle against the Fascist aggressors, [had] destroyed the basis for the revival of militarism and have made the German Democratic Republic an important factor for peace in Europe"; "the Potsdam agreement has been grossly violated by the Western Power"; "the USSR hereby notifies the United States Government that the Soviet Union regards the Protocol of September 12, 1944, as well as the supplementary agreements, including that of May 1, 1945 as null and void."

The note continued: ". . . a solution of the Berlin problem must be found . . . to prevent West Berlin from being used any longer as a springboard for intensive espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities"; "the population of West Berlin must be granted the right to have whatever way of life it wishes for itself." It would be possible "to solve the West Berlin question at the present time by the conversion of West Berlin into an independent political unit—a free city"; "an important step toward normalizing the situation in Berlin, which, instead of being a hotbed of unrest and tension, could become a center for contact and cooperation between both parts of Germany." In an effort to create an appearance of making a concession, he said there would be "no objection to the United Nations sharing, in one way or another, in observing the free-city status of West Berlin."

It concluded that if the half-year period indicated "is not utilized to reach an adequate agreement, the Soviet Union will then carry out the planned measures through an agreement with the [East German regime]."

The words "peace," "demilitarization," "normalization," "relaxation," "cooperation," and "free city" were used repeatedly in a statement designed to lure public opinion in the direction the Soviets desired.

Khrushchev also accused the Western powers of refusing to take part in negotiation of a peace treaty and of opposing a peaceful settlement. He ignored completely the 1955 four-power agreement on Germany, which had been concluded at Geneva. He had increased the prospects of confusion by varying his statements of November 10

and November 27. He was already shifting his position at an Albanian Embassy reception, and again on January 10 and on February 24, 1959. He was presumably impressed by the Western Allies' statement. He had left himself the maximum room for maneuver, advance, or retreat, while couching all his statements in the language of peaceful accommodation. In this case it was to be a retreat, lasting more than three years, until in 1961, stone on stone, the Berlin wall was built.

The basic principles of American foreign policy, overlapping and reinforcing each other, had been vindicated in the Far East and in the Middle East. They were:

- (1) A security vacuum—an area unprotected by the NATO shield or some similar security pact—held grave dangers.
- (2) The United States cannot desert its friends.
- (3) The United States cannot yield to threats.
- (4) Holding Berlin was essential to holding Germany, and the Federal Republic was a keystone in the European arch.
- (5) Hesitation or delay in showing firmness would risk Soviet miscalculation over American intentions, and thus risk the possibility of war.

During the news conference on November 7, a question was posed as to whether the Secretary had been too rigid in opposing talks with Russia on the reunification of Germany. The Secretary was clearly endeavoring to think out the answers to the various questions raised in deliberate and carefully worded fashion. He realized that tension was increasing. His reply referred to the four-power agreements reached in Geneva in 1955, and said that the basis for action by the occupying powers had been laid down at that time. This agreement and the views of the Federal Republic "would govern the timing and form of any steps to be taken to bring about reunification."

An understanding of the nature of Germany and the characteristics and aims of the German people is essential to developing policies for Europe. These Khrushchev did not understand. Frequently on the verge of making a favorable impression or winning some support either from the left-oriented politicians or the commercially minded, practical realists, he would act with such clumsiness and brutality as to bring even greater unity to a large number of diverse elements in Europe.

Foster himself had known many Germans in his legal work and during his earlier period of public service. At the time of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 he was assigned to work on the economic clauses of the treaty. He had prepared the main United States eco-

conomic brief. His views paralleled on many points regarding Germany those of John Maynard Keynes. As a result he had been called on as adviser and consultant on various post-World War I problems affecting Germany, and he was asked to head part of the United States Reparations Commission. Although he decided not to accept the post of commissioner, he maintained a constant interest in the question nevertheless. He concluded then, and never abandoned the thought later, that the victorious Allies had been insensitive to German ideas and ambitions after World War I and had been partly responsible for German rejection of a philosophy of moderation.

I had talked to him in 1930 about the growing Nazi influence I had noted among youth whom I had met while canoeing on the German rivers. He hoped my fears were exaggerated. A year or so later, however, he grew alarmed by the experiences of his Jewish associates in Berlin, already under severe pressure.

The legends about his associations with German business rose later to haunt him. In a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* and in the *New York Herald Tribune* during the 1949 Senate election campaign, the "independent" committee for Herbert H. Lehman, who was his opponent, made a number of allegations about Foster's German connections, which, though unfounded, have been repeated in various forms since that time. These assertions were either completely inaccurate or seriously misleading. It was said, for instance, that he was a lawyer for those who built up the Nazi Party, "that statements in his book *War, Peace and Change* justified German, Japanese and Italian land grabs," that Foster and his wife made large contributions to America First, which was supported by the German-American Bund.

Since there were no formal denials of these false allegations and implications, a number of persons have felt free to quote them or to add to them. I had often talked to him of these matters. He regretted bitterly the desperate position of his close Jewish friends in Germany. He saw the menace of Hitler's drive for power, and although he hoped in 1938 that war could be avoided by firm action and peaceful solutions reached, he saw the lowering clouds that built up in the period after the Czechoslovakian and Austrian take-overs. Business with the Germans at that time and, in fact, after 1933, was impossible, in his opinion, because there was no freedom to act except with Nazi permission and in support of their ideas. In 1934 the Berlin office of Sullivan & Cromwell was closed on his instruction.

When Foster was working for Secretary of State Hull on the development of the United Nations, from 1942 to 1945, he had not

been involved in any way with the conferences on the future of Germany or consulted by the State Department on the Yalta or Potsdam meetings. His views on Europe were not officially solicited until 1947, when he attended the conference of foreign ministers in Moscow.

Some months later, in October 1948, he was called away from a luncheon I was giving in his honor in Vienna to fly to Frankfurt; at General Clay's request, he was to go to Berlin on the airlift. He made a strong statement supporting United States policy to the press. Later, in 1949, as adviser to Secretary Acheson, he went to Paris to help negotiate the agreement on normalizing access when the Soviets decided to lift the Berlin blockade. Thus he had a broad panorama of postwar German problems, and had discussed many of them intimately with his friend Chancellor Adenauer, as well as with Ernst Reuter.

Foster regarded the rise of the spirit of democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany, a defeated country, as one of the most impressive and encouraging features of the postwar years. He took satisfaction in observing that although Adenauer has exerted powerful control, minority groups have shown vitality in the midst of every governmental crisis and election. The Social Democratic majority in Berlin has both fought and cooperated with the Christian Democratic Party of the Federal Republic in Bonn. These have been healthy manifestations for those who dread an aggressive and regenerated Germany. Most of those who were prominent or active Nazis were dead, had emigrated, or were under restrictions limiting their influence, though some less important supporters of the Hitler regime had returned to minor technical posts.

An immediate press release came from the Secretary on November 27, in response to Khrushchev's note of the same day. The more formal coordinated replies by NATO on December 16 and by the four powers (including the Federal Republic) on December 31 elaborated on the rejection of the note of November 27.

Thus the quick and unequivocal response, first on November 27 through a press release, shortly thereafter by the four powers, and then by the NATO powers speaking from Paris, made clear to the world in general and to the Kremlin in particular the firm and unwavering Allied support of the city of Berlin, and the assurance that the Allied powers would respect to the fullest extent their earlier commitments with respect to the city of Berlin and the reunification of Germany. The brief moment of panic in the city of Berlin ended. The city resumed its vigorous pace of reconstruction and economic growth.

The policy that had emerged in 1947 and been strengthened during the airlift had taken on renewed vitality.

From 1953 to 1958 the United States government had built on a strong foundation of Allied political support a many-sided program for improving the life of the city. Unemployment had been reduced from more than thirty per cent of the labor force to almost zero as a result of a carefully worked-out program of cooperation between the United States government and the German authorities. The cultural, intellectual, and social life of the city had expanded to a notable extent. Brilliant new structures rose above the open squares where burnt-out buildings had been razed. The facilities of the Free University were doubled. A new Congress Hall and other spectacular structures were to attract tens of thousands of tourists and other visitors. The foundations of an extensive medical teaching center were laid. All these projects stimulated and encouraged the citizens of Berlin, resisting tenaciously and yet in a cheerful mood the visible and never forgotten dangers resulting from the presence of hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in nearby areas and of Russian-trained political police. The note of November 27 brought a brief period of hesitation, but the policy clearly and unhesitatingly expressed from Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn renewed the onward progress of this city, which had been made a symbol, a showplace, and a trigger for NATO action, a sign of free-world determination, a source of courage to those who resist tyranny.

Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin ran out in May, on the day the flags were at half mast and taps sounded in Arlington for the Secretary. He had made his message clear; the ultimatum has not been renewed.

The ultimatum had introduced a new mood into the relations of the four powers with the Kremlin. At this, the Secretary decided to stop at Augusta to confer with President Eisenhower on November 29 on his way to Mexico for the inauguration of President Adolfo Lopez Mateos. He took Livingston Merchant with him for the conversations. There was little to add to earlier formulations of views. But Livie, who was known and trusted by those working on European affairs, would act for the President and the Secretary in a temporary but effective manner during their absence from Washington for most of the next four weeks. A statement was issued from Augusta to underscore the Secretary's earlier release. He left Augusta after a short stop.

The Secretary's health had not been discussed in the press in recent

weeks, but those close to him—that is, three or four people—knew that he was in considerable distress from abdominal pain. Ambassador Robert C. Hill, in Mexico City, who was aware of the situation, was worried about his own inability to do anything to help.

The program for the inauguration of Mateos went ahead in normal fashion. At the formal banquet Foster is reported to have had considerable conversation with Ambassador Merkatz, of the Federal Republic, on the Berlin issue.

His son John, a mining engineer, and his granddaughter Edith had come from Monterrey to join in many of the festivities, and he and John had a long private talk. John had been with Penoles mining company for some sixteen years. After his brief stay in Mexico City the Secretary flew on Monday, December 1, on his way to San Francisco, to Smoke Tree Ranch, Palm Springs, California, hoping for rest and relief from pain. Little improvement occurred.

He spoke in San Francisco mainly on problems of the Far East, referring once more to the importance of having retaliatory power and willingness to use it, which is appreciated by potential aggressors. However, he avoided the careless use of the phrase "massive retaliation," which others had publicly construed to mean atomic warfare. He referred rather to having "forces in being at endangered points." He mentioned the importance of the "ability to oppose what may be limited probings in ways less drastic than nuclear war." He said that then "most of the 'limited war' forces [were] contributed by our allies." This constituted, in his opinion, "truly a system of 'collective security' " of crucial importance in the persistent efforts of thousands to escape tyranny in Europe and the Far East. In the strategy of peaceful victory, he said, we placed our major hopes.

On his return to Washington on December 5, he had a long talk with Secretary Neil McElroy in preparation for the NATO Ministers Council meeting, which was about to convene. On Saturday, the 6th, he entered Walter Reed Hospital for almost a week of "rest and check-up." This was described as normal and routine. The doctors said there was no evidence of cancer but that he needed a hernia operation; at his request, however, they postponed it so he could attend to urgent matters in the next few weeks. Even his family for the most part did not know that he was in great pain. He wrote a letter on December 8 to his granddaughter Edith, who had expressed concern about him: "With your prayers and the good care I am getting in the hospital, I should be out of here in no time."

When he was asked about his health, he felt embarrassed to discuss matters so personal and so delicate, and he tended to brush the

questions aside. He did not think that what affected him personally ought to intrude on serious business, but he did recognize late in 1958 that there would perhaps come a time when this question would be a legitimate public concern. It was a hard situation with which to deal.

The degree of his concern for his health in 1958 is difficult to estimate. There is reason to think that he tried at this time to reconcile his knowledge that the discomfort experienced in the last two months of that year might have grave meaning, with his inherent optimism of temperament and confidence in his physical strength. To one or two close friends he talked about the possibility that either persistent pain or a recurrence of cancer might lead to a blurring of his judgment, a state of mind that would render the execution of his job difficult. There is no doubt that his mood and even his condition changed from time to time from the end of October on. Because the doctors, after the 1956 operation, had held out the prospect that there would be no recurrence of cancer, he faced with relative equanimity the diverticulitis, the coming hernia operation, and the restriction of his diet and social activity imposed toward the end of 1958. Until the second operation, on Friday, the 13th of February, he had no dependable reason to believe that once again he had cancer.

But on this visit to Walter Reed, he stayed almost six days, and on December 12 drove directly from the hospital to the airport. The President loaned him the *Columbine III* and his personal pilot, Colonel William G. Draper, for his trip to Paris—an unusual arrangement but one that assured him the maximum comfort and safety.

An editorial in the *New York Times* for December 14 said:

Those who think he never made a diplomatic mistake, like those who suspect that he has sometimes made such mistakes, will agree in their admiration of the energy and courage which make a man more than 70 years of age get up from a hospital bed and tear off on one of the most difficult diplomatic errands in all our history.

The stories of current differences between the Germans, the British, and the French were somewhat exaggerated, but it was nevertheless true that the task of getting full and resounding approval of the American position worked out for presentation to the coming conference was not easy, even though the West Berliners had voted overwhelmingly for a proposition that epitomized the United States view.

The NATO foreign ministers meeting lasted only two days. Gerard Smith, head of the Policy Planning staff, said later that the Secretary made a formidable impression of strength. Despite his terribly wearing inability to sleep and the fact that he could scarcely eat, his strength of will sustained him. Smith said it was the greatest meeting thus far held by the North Atlantic Alliance and that the Secretary's moral energy led to the strong "agreed position" on Berlin. The Secretary stated emphatically that the President and he were convinced, as were his advisers, that the Soviet Union was not prepared to initiate atomic war over the Berlin issue. They believed, on the contrary, that a firm stand on the part of the United States would mean a Soviet retraction of their ultimatum.

This meeting underscored for the world "the enormous respect Moscow had for JFD," as Minister Louis Joxe, de Gaulle's right-hand man, said to me in 1962. The American public was also responsive, according to a Gallup poll that ran seven to one for the Administration.

Before leaving Paris on December 15 he wrote to his son Avery:

Thank you for writing. I am feeling much better although I still have a little discomfort and have to watch my diet pretty carefully for a while. Your Mother and I will be going to Jamaica directly from here for at least a week of rest, and I am sure that will be helpful.

Two weeks ago when I was in Mexico City, I had a good visit with John and Edith. She is most delightful and enjoyed attending the various parties relating to the Inauguration of the new President.

Mother and I send our love.

Daddy

He reached Jamaica on the 19th, where he stayed at Round Hill, the Clarence Dillons' home. His visit was restful, but it did little to ease the discomfort that he was now enduring most of the time. He returned to Washington on January 3, on the *Columbine III*, with Mrs. Dulles, Jerry Greene, Phyllis Bernau, and others.

On Sunday, January 4, Dr. Alva Daughton and the other medical consultants spent some time with him. I saw him briefly, but he did not speak of his physical concern. There was a meeting at 4:30 P.M. with Livie Merchant, Freddie Reinhardt, and Douglas Dillon to discuss the European problems. He had a slight virus infection, which took him from the office early on Monday, but it did not prevent his meeting with Anastas I. Mikoyan, Ambassador Menshikov, and officials from the State Department. He was back in the Department

on January 7 for a series of conferences, including the small staff meeting and a meeting of the National Security Council.

The question of Berlin was still urgent. At his news conference on Tuesday, the 13th, the Secretary was asked a number of pointed questions. One of them was:

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it our position that free elections are the only method of reuniting Germany? In other words, do we say, "No free elections, no reunification"?

A. Well, we never have said that. The formula of reunification by free elections was the agreed formula. It seems to us to be a natural method. But I wouldn't say that it is the only method by which reunification could be accomplished.

He called me to his office at 12:14 P.M. to ask my view of his statement on reunification. The question was similar to the one on the use of "agents," and my answer was very much the same. I indicated that there was no refuting the logic of his response, but I was afraid that the Bonn newspapers might again display it as a sensational story.

It was apparent later to those close to him that, despite days of pain, there were a number of days when his natural vigor and optimism were dominant. The calendar was crowded with appointments. He gave a dinner for Mikoyan at the F Street Club. He met President Arturo Frondizi at the MATS Airport. The tense European situation led to plans for a trip to London, Paris, and Bonn, scheduled for January 31. This was one of the last of his official ordeals.

JOURNEY'S END

After the year-end rest at Round Hill, Jamaica, Foster and Janet returned to their home on Thirty-second Street. Foster undertook his normal burden of work. Meetings were held with various visitors from abroad. Social life was as usual. Mikoyan came into Washington for some discussions, and was almost mobbed by reporters when he came from the Secretary's office. He had nothing to say.

This was a time of great uneasiness about Berlin and therefore about NATO and Europe. Although Khrushchev had appeared to modify his ultimatum about the Allied occupation, leaders in many countries still remembered the harsh and belligerent words of previous months. There were those who said an accommodation should be sought, not seeing the larger implications of retreat from the Berlin outpost. A few feared that the European alliances would crack, but meanwhile the people of Berlin, confident in American support, were redepositing their savings in Berlin banks and increasing their production. In the beleaguered city the moment of panic had passed.

At the Secretary's press conference on January 29, the question of the German policy was again up for discussion. Could the East and West be reunified by means other than by free elections? This, said Foster, was indeed possible; there was a stir of uneasiness among the German reporters, who thought they had a "story." The two or three Foreign Service officers in the room were shocked—had the Administration considered a basic change in position? They did not follow the thought of the Secretary, who was considering the whole gamut of possibilities. After all, the thirteen American states had been united without the preliminary of popular elections. Germany itself had in former times become a nation by a route other than elections. There were interesting theoretical possibilities.

The Secretary was fully aware of the sensitiveness of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet threats and to the occasional expression of opinion in the

United States that discounted the value of holding to the established policy. Some deplored the failure to agree to a summit meeting, and regretted the resumption of nuclear tests. A clear answer to all these questions must be given. Neither fear nor uncertainty must be allowed to weaken the association now, at a moment when it was most needed. A brief visit to Paris, Bonn, and London, with conversations at the highest levels and with the attendant releases and publicity, would show the Kremlin and the free world that the United States held firmly and unreservedly to the central core of policy.

At the press conference of January 13 a reporter asked the Secretary how he felt after his vacation in Jamaica. "Well, I am feeling good. I feel able to carry on," he answered without hesitation. "At any time I don't feel able to carry on, you will know it." His whole mien substantiated his words; if his face was drawn, it seemed to be from anxiety and not, as far as we could observe, from pain.

But it was also on January 13 that he wrote to my son:

Dear David:

Thank you very much for the subscription to *Holiday* which I shall certainly enjoy throughout the year.

We had a delightful two weeks in Jamaica with perfect weather to add to our pleasure.

With my best wishes for the New Year,

Affectionately,
Uncle Foster

Thus Foster, planning to be back in eight days, boarded the plane on January 30. Janet went with him, having talked over with me the details of the luncheon for Mrs. Willy Brandt on February 9, which she and I had planned for the day of their return from Europe. All the arrangements had been made in the State Department and at the Dulleses' home for the official and for the unofficial entertainment of the charming couple from Berlin. This was to be in part my responsibility.

It was not until Foster and Janet returned on a wet, snowy February morning that those of us who had not been with him knew of the desperate struggle and the dark hours of that trip. He had been able to eat almost nothing but raw eggs and gruel and the like, and had difficulty in retaining even these. He had not been able to bathe or dress himself alone. When I went to the house on Thirty-second Street to see if the luncheon plans were in order, I was told that Foster was in bed and that he wanted to see me. I joked with him for

"taking it easy." He protested that he was but a victim of the doctor's orders. Then, more seriously, he said he would be in his office at the scheduled time to see Willy Brandt.

The luncheon for Frau Brandt at the Dulleses' went off without a hitch. Janet was charming as hostess. None of the guests knew of the doctors going in and out and the grave conversations being held elsewhere in the house.

At a little before 3:00 in the afternoon I met Willy Brandt and escorted him with two of my colleagues to the Secretary's office. There the greetings were cordial and the conversation both relaxed and serious. The Secretary, who had gotten out of bed for the occasion, inquired about the morale of Berlin, referred to his recent conversations with the Chancellor. Foster, in talking with Brandt about the use of the East Germans as "agents" of the Soviets, stated that, if done, it would not imply recognition of the East German regime. He emphasized that speculation by anyone on this point did not imply that there had been any change in the government's intentions with regard to German reunification. Some specific details as to travel and transport of freight in and out of Berlin were discussed. Willy Brandt was firm in his assurances of the steadfastness of the citizens of Berlin and equally categorical about the importance of the United States soldiers in the city. No other force could be a substitute if U.S. forces were withdrawn.

Then came the Secretary's scheduled talk with the Socialist Vice Chancellor of Austria, while I escorted Brandt to his next appointment.

Secretary Herter, who had seen the Secretary only briefly that day, was called in at four o'clock. Foster told him and several others that he had to go to the hospital the next day to prepare for the postponed operation. He called the White House, arranged to see the President, and then called for his car.

As he went down to the lobby, his security officer went out to tell the chauffeur to pull up to the door. He stood there alone, and then walked over to the desk of receptionist Charlotte O'Day. "May I sit here a minute?" he asked, and she indicated a chair by the desk with a smile. Then he walked slowly out of the State Department for the last time.

On Tuesday, February 10, at 10:30, after a night at home, Foster and Janet were driven to Walter Reed. The President had made his own suite available. The living room was bright and attractive, the

bedroom spacious and comfortable. Meals were served in a small dining room for those of us who came in to visit, for Janet who was there most of each day, and for members of his trusted staff.

Phyllis Bernau came in daily to take dictation, handle the many telephone calls, and other matters. Jerry Greene came for a good part of the day, often eating with Janet. Bill Macomber talked with the Secretary every few days.

The operation on Friday, the 13th of February, was unexpectedly long for a hernia operation, and Janet, Clover Dulles, and I waited with an acute sense of strain. The doctors emerged with words that were not definitive but which conveyed the burden of their thought. They had performed an exploratory operation as well as the hernia operation. In a day or two all the reports from the biopsy and other tests would be in. Foster himself had asked for the truth and received the doctors' verdict as, stage by stage, it became more complete. The tests showed the presence of cancer cells in the abdominal cavity. He agreed to the deep radiation and followed the other advice they gave. He devoted his strong will to two tasks—to the fight against cancer and to the endeavor to keep his mind and strength for what work he could do. He left Walter Reed on March 30 for Hobe Sound, Florida.

One of the first things on his mind as he came out of the operation and heard the reports of the tests was the assurance he had given to his old friend Adenauer that the operation was for hernia only, that there was no recurrence of cancer. So, as Adenauer told it to Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, who reported it in *Duel at the Brink*, "Only a short time after he awoke from the anesthetic he had his brother Allen send me a cable through Ambassador Bruce. In that message, he said he was afraid I would think he knowingly told me an untruth in the car. He wanted me to know that he really believed what he had told me. He wanted his brother to let me know this immediately."

The President would not hear of resignation, though Foster had brought up the subject. During his March 30 visit to Douglas Dillon's house at Hobe Sound, near Palm Beach, Florida, he wrote out his resignation in longhand. Allen says he was in such pain that the writing was mainly illegible. He then dictated it to Janet and gave it to Allen, who took it to the President. The President read it and considered it carefully. Before he could reach a decision, he said, he wanted to talk to the doctors and to Foster. He said he was returning to the capitol and that Foster was, too. In Washington there was a long consultation with several of the doctors. They presented

a report on April 13 or 14, indicating that there was no hope. Foster felt that he must persuade the President that it was his duty to resign, and the resignation was announced to newsmen by the President on April 15.

When I learned of his plans to return on Sunday, April 12, I called my son, David, in Philadelphia and asked him if he could come to the airport with me. Together we waited for the *Columbine III*. Bill Macomber, who had met the Secretary, came down and asked Secretary Herter, Vice President Nixon, David, and me to board the plane. Here the Secretary talked to Herter about Department matters, and he went over part of a speech that Nixon was to give on problems of law and peace. My brother had a casual word for David and me, and then walked with a slow but firm step from the plane. He drove from the airport to his home for a brief look around and then on to Walter Reed. The President called the next day, and three days later announced his resignation. Acting Secretary Herter was appointed to the post at the end of that week. Foster was sworn in as Special Adviser to the President, with Cabinet rank.

Later that month, when Foster's illness had become more acute, he called me in from the Department. "I know you have been planning to go to Berlin and that you have work to do there," he said. "I want you to go. If you were to change your plans, the Berliners would be disappointed and many would think you were abandoning your work when it is not true."

I stayed in Berlin for ten days, conferring with various officials. Then a telephone call in the middle of the night, relayed by the Central Intelligence Agency, asked me to come home. Foster had contracted pneumonia and was weaker. I was able to catch a jet out of London the next day, May 9.

On May 11 Foster asked me to report to him on my visit to Germany. He was leaning up against the pillows in the large bed in the darkened room. I told him, in answer to his questions, that the problem of the Chancellorship was still open. Konrad Adenauer was contemplating moving over to the Presidency. Foster asked me about the two prospective Chancellors, Erhard and Franz Etzel. He thanked me for having made the trip and for my report, and then, after half an hour, he said, "I am tired, this is enough for now."

Berlin was on his mind a great deal those last weeks. Bill Macomber, who was one of those who learned to understand him well in their four years of work together, wrote me later: "The last time I saw Mr. Dulles at Walter Reed, not long before he died, we had a general discussion of a number of things. He said for instance,

'A man's accomplishments in life are the cumulative effect of attention to detail.' After philosophizing along this line and then going on to specific matters he said, as I was about to leave, 'Never forget, Bill, that if the United States is willing to go to war over Berlin—there won't be any war over Berlin.' "

It is often said that Foster had extraordinary courage. Those who knew him intimately, like Roswell Barnes, would say rather that he had great faith. He did not fail to ignore danger, and often said so. His sense of the enduring human values, of religious truths, and of the continuing progress of the human being, in spite of setbacks, were the psychological forces that carried him along. They stood him in good stead in times of difficult decisions, and brought him serenity in his last weeks of illness.

The record of the weeks in April shows visits of Winston Churchill, of Prime Minister Macmillan, of Jean Monnet, of various ambassadors, relatives, colleagues, and friends. They would come to the cheerful room with flowers, pictures, and books. We had cut a large branch from one of my dogwood trees and brought it into a warm and sunny corner of my living room. When the white petals bloomed, I brought it in to him. When he felt well enough, he sat in one of the easy chairs or strolled around the room. He was able to drive to his home on several occasions. He refused to take narcotics because he wanted to keep his mind clear for consultations on policy. His letters, written during these last days, are lucid and interesting. His sense of humor and his interest in people and problems did not fail him.

In a nearby room at Walter Reed lay the former Secretary of State and great general, George C. Marshall. He was too ill for conversation, but President Eisenhower used to call on Mrs. Marshall when he came in to see the Secretary. General Marshall was to outlive Foster.

Death is a concept and an experience, but it is not something that can be understood. A vital man with power, intellect, and a surpassing keenness for living cannot readily apprehend that this life will end.

Foster was aware of certain medical facts and of his own grave physical suffering, but he did not appear to anticipate that his work on earth was to end.

Those who now see how swiftly the end came find it hard to recapture his sense that he could dominate his illness. But it was with

a confidence that he could carry on his fight for what he believed to be essential that he had made his last journey to Europe at the end of January. It was with faith that he could defeat the illness that had come upon him that he had told Adenauer that there had not been, and probably would not be, a recurrence of cancer. On the basis of the assurance of his doctors that, though the chances of recurrence in eighteen months were considerable, after that period he could assume that the 1956 operation had saved him, he looked to the future with faith in his ability to carry on his work.

The Chancellor asked me about this when I saw him in October 1959. It was clear that he, and those with whom Foster conferred during this last flight abroad, had the gravest apprehension and already felt the shadow of grief for the loss they feared. To Adenauer this last visit to Bonn was a particularly moving experience. In talking to me he recalled meeting Foster in the rain and showed me the photograph of him descending from the airplane, hand outstretched, an eager smile on his face. "When I got the autographed picture from the hospital, I knew he was saying good-by," Adenauer said. "He was my warm and true friend. He was not only a great statesman but a good and great human being."

The story of the first week of February in Europe reveals the immense courage and the unceasing determination of a man for whom life meant a continuing struggle with forces of evil, but who had always seen in it brightness and beauty.

His death came just after dawn on Sunday, May 24, 1959.

The people who walked through the Bethlehem Chapel in Washington National Cathedral on May 26 were not only diplomats, but teachers and students, taxicab drivers and State Department messengers. All through the hot night they stood in line to pass through the crypt. Soldiers and sailors stood guard, one at each corner of the flag-draped bier.

During the morning and afternoon of May 27 thousands stood outside the cathedral. Several thousands more were inside, men and women of many nations. The high strains of the choirboy voices and the deeper tones of the congregation gave tribute and testimony of their fervent faith:

O God our help in ages past,
Our hopes for years to come . . .

The more somber words of one of Foster's favorite hymns, "Through the night of doubt and sorrow," followed by passages, serious and

triumphant, from the Old and New Testaments, echoed from the vaulted ceiling. Bright sun shone in many colors through the stained-glass windows.

The familiar and loved farewell of Mr. Valiant-for-Truth, from *The Pilgrim's Progress*, followed:

Then said he, I am going to my Father's;
and though with great difficulty I am got hither,
yet now I do not repent me of all the Trouble
I have been at to arrive where I am.
My Sword I give to him that shall succeed me
in my Pilgrimage. . . .
My Marks and Scars I carry with me,
to be a witness for me, that I have fought his Battles
who now will be my rewarder.

When the day that he must go hence was come,
many accompanied him to the Riverside,
into which as he went he said,
Death, where is thy Sting?
And as he went down deeper, he said,
Grave, where is thy Victory?
So he passed over, and all the Trumpets sounded
for him on the other side.

COMMENT ON SOURCES

In bringing together significant materials on the making of foreign policy in 1958 and in selecting events and anecdotes bearing on Foster and his manner of making policy, I have had specific and general help from more than fifty persons. These were people in official life, his close friends, and his family. Most of them knew well both the policy and the man. To these persons, I owe a debt of gratitude for having given generously of their time, for writing to me, and for suggesting helpful lines of analysis.

I was particularly honored to have reflections from General Eisenhower on his relations with my brother. My conversations with Chancellor Adenauer reflected both his understanding of Foster and his warm feeling of personal friendship.

To my family, I wish to express special thanks. Janet Dulles, my sister-in-law, with genuine understanding of my purpose, helped me in countless ways. Others in the family—some of whom worked with him closely in Washington, in New York State, in church affairs—shared my desire to present a clear and valid picture of Foster. They have been ready with their advice and counsel. I hope I have not fallen short of their ideas as to what should be written.

In a study made so close to the events, people are generally more significant as sources than books. It is therefore proper that I should list the names of a number of those outside the family with whom I have talked or from whom I have received important help. These include Mildred J. Asbjornson, Roswell P. Barnes, John R. Beal, Andrew Berding, Phyllis D. Bernau, Robert R. Bowie, Marquis Childs, Alexander P. Clark, Philip K. Crowe, Philip A. Crowl, Arthur H. Dean, Thomas E. Dewey, William S. Dix, Joseph N. Greene, Jr., John W. Hanes, Jr., Robert F. Hart, John M. Hightower, George M. Humphrey, Henry Cabot Lodge, Henry R. Luce, William B. Macomber, Jr., Livingston T. Merchant, Philip E. Mosely, George Murnane, Charles J. V. Murphy, Roderic L. O'Connor,

Jameson Parker, Sidney Parker, E. Taylor Parks, Arthur W. Radford, G. Frederick Reinhardt, Walter S. Robertson, Gerard C. Smith, Thomas E. Stephens, Doris Thompson, Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., William R. Tyler, Ann C. Whitman, Charles W. Yost.

An important source has naturally been the material in the Dulles Library of Diplomatic History at Princeton. With the permission of the committee responsible for access, and with the generous cooperation of William S. Dix, librarian, and Alexander P. Clark, curator, I have been able to read personal papers that pertained to the period I covered and some pertinent documents from other years. This rich collection of letters, drafts, memorabilia, and other items affords historians dealing with the period an enormous amount of information.

It has also been my privilege to consult various official documents both at Princeton and at the Department of State. These have provided a foundation for conclusions I had in some cases arrived at earlier, from my own work or from personal conversations with my brother.

A further source has been the published documents of the Department of State, particularly *American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1958* (U.S. Government Printing Office); the monthly *Bulletin* of the Department of State; the news conferences, speeches, and articles of 1958 and 1959; as well as Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. The dates in the text indicate where the references are to be found.

The two major books my brother wrote, *War, Peace and Change* (Harper, 1939) and *War or Peace* (Macmillan, 1950, 1957), have been of particular use in connection with his general ideas as to the danger of war and the possibility of peace.

I have made extensive use of news media, readily available to the student.

Because I did not wish to be distracted from my main purpose of reconstructing a part of the past from original sources, I have made relatively little reference to secondary material, although some of it is clearly of considerable value. If my memory or my use of sources has failed me in some instances, I can suggest that later students make a parallel search and regard my statements as a serious effort to bring my earlier recollections and my more recent judgments to bear on the nature and purposes of my brother. The evidence in official and unofficial papers is voluminous.

Other historians should give consideration to the memorial

pamphlets, the critical comments, and the biographies so far written. Among the useful books are: John Robinson Beal, *John Foster Dulles, 1888-1958* (Harper, 1959); Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblenz, *Duel at the Brink* (Doubleday, 1960); Richard Goold-Adams, *John Foster Dulles, A Reappraisal* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962); Deane and David Heller, *John Foster Dulles, Soldier for Peace* (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960); Henry Pitney Van Dusen, *The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles* (Westminster Press, Philadelphia), a book of selections from articles and addresses; and Andrew Berding, *Foreign Policy and You* (Doubleday, 1962). Other articles and books could be cited, but few of them have been the basis for interpretation here. The quotations can be found in the major sources listed in accord with the dates to which they pertain.

The description of activities on Duck Island in Chapter 13 is based in part on a memorandum Foster prepared and which was later published virtually verbatim in the New York *Herald Tribune*.

McLean, Virginia
June 15, 1963

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
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John Foster Dulles: Journeys, 1958 - 1959





Eleanor Lansing Dulles, author, economist, and diplomat, was born in Watertown, New York, on June 1, 1895. She was graduated from Bryn Mawr, where she received both her A.B. and M.A. degrees, attended the London School of Economics, and earned a second M.A. and a Ph.D. from Radcliffe.

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